What delay is excusable. What delay inexcusable. immediately on her first arrival, and continues during the time she remains there in a course of preparation for the voyage insured.' Length of time consumed in necessary repairs, though considerable, does not take the ship out of the protection of the policy, if the repairs be with an ultimate view to the voyage insured; nor does any other reasonable delay, if justified by necessity, or incurred bona fide for the purposes of the voyage—it may be to take in simulated papers,* or a particular description of crew, or provisions when rendered necessary by unavoidable delay." The principle, in short, established by the cases is, “that a detention for a reasonable time for the purposes of the adventure insured must be allowed, and whether the time is reasonable or not must be determined, not by any positive or arbitrary rule, but by the state of things existing in the port where the vessel happens to be."' On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that a policy on ship "at and from" a port implies that the voyage insured shall be very shortly commenced, or, at all events, be in the near contemplation of the parties. Otherwise all protection under the policy is lost, if an unreasonable time elapse before preparing for the voyage insured, and there be no excuse for delay, such as the necessity for repairs. 299. See also per Lord Kenyon in 1 Thus Lord Hardwicke laid it down 2 Motteux v. London Ass. Co., 1 Atk. 548. 3 Smith v. Surridge, 4 Esp. 25; Grant v. King, 4 Esp. 174. Langhorn v. Allnutt, 4 Taunt. Grant v. King, 4 Esp. 174. Raine v. Bell, 9 East, 195. 7 Per Tindal, C. J., in Phillips v. Irving, 7 M. & Gr. 328. See to the same effect the remarks of Story, J., in Seamans v. Loring, 1 Mason's R. 127, cited 1 Phillips, no. 935. 8 Per Tindal, C. J., in Palmer v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 317, 318. "It is clear insurance law, says Park, J., that in a policy at and from' a port, a vessel ought to be ready to sail as soon as she reasonably can, and not to lie in the port for months before she takes her departure:" Palmer v. Fenning, 9 Bing. 462. Thus, for instance, if all thought of the voyage insured be laid aside, and the ship lie in the port for years, with the knowledge of the owner, the risk would be held, either never to have attached, or, at all events, to have come to an end directly the determination to abandon the voyage was finally fixed.1 In case it be a foreign port, and she have been lying there In foreign port. a long period without reference to any particular voyage, it seems the policy will attach only from the time that prepara tions are commenced with reference to the voyage insured.' In case it be a home port, and she is then lying there, the In home port. policy generally attaches from the period of its subscription, but the ship is not protected by it if any unreasonable delay intervene between the subscription of the policy and her sailing on the voyage insured. Thus a policy was effected on the 28th January, "at and from Bristol to London" on a yacht then lying in the port of Bristol, and it did not sail thence till the middle of May, the delay not being for repairs or other necessary purpose; there the Court held this delay unreasonable, and that the yacht at the time of the loss was not protected by the policy.' usage. This general rule is liable, however, to be modified by the Exception by usages of a particular trade. Thus, in the Newfoundland trade, owing to the well-known practice of making fishing expeditions or intermediate trading voyages after the ship's first arrival off the coast of Newfoundland, the homeward risk, though expressed to be "at and from" any port or ports in Newfoundland, does not attach on the ship on her first arrival out, but only from her beginning to prepare for the homeward voyage.* What is such a beginning to prepare for her homeward "Beginning to 1 See the observations of Lord Hardwicke in Chitty v. Selwyn, 2 Atk. 539. 2 Per Story, J., Seamans v. Loring, 1 Mason's R. 127, cited in 1 Phillips, Ins. no. 935. 3 Palmer v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 79, 317. See also Mount v. Larkins, ibid. 108; Palmer v. Fenning, 9 Bing. 460. 4 Vallance v. Dewar, 1 Camp. 503, and the other cases there collected. prepare for her homeward voyage." Lambert v. What is included in "port." voyage, within the meaning of the rule, as brings the vessel under protection of the policy, appears by the following case: -A ship engaged in a cruising voyage in the Southern Atlantic, was insured for a trading voyage home by a policy "at and from Pernambuco or any other port or ports in the Brazils to London." "Beginning the adventure on the goods from the loading thereof on board" the ship, “and upon the ship on the determination of her cruise, and preparing for her voyage to London," &c. The cruise being ended, the captain went to Pernambuco, and when off that place, sent in one of his officers to see if a homeward cargo could be procured there, but as there was none, he sailed southwards to St. Salvador for the same purpose, and was lost at sea between the two places. The Court held that this going to Pernambuco, and sending in an officer to inquire after a cargo, was such "a preparing for his voyage to London" within the words of the policy, that the homeward risk attached from that moment, and continued at the time of the loss." We have already seen that the terminus "at and from" which the voyage is made to commence, is, generally speaking, taken to include, not different places classed together in legal style, or for the purposes of revenue, as one port, but some one place, which in the more limited and popular sense is considered the port; in other words, the harbour-town.' But if the policy be "at and from a port or ports" or "port or places" in the alternative, it must be supposed that the insurer underwrote the greater risk of letting the ship sail to several places in order to take in her cargo. Thus, where a ship was insured "at and from her port of lading,” the Court held, that the expression "port of lading," pointed to one single place, and did not allow of the ship loading at two distinct places, (though both lying within seven miles of one 1 Lambert v. Liddard, 1 Marshall's R. 149; S. C., 5 Taunt. 479. 2 Constable v. Noble, 2 Taunt. 403; Payne v. Hutchinson, ibid. 405, note; Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241; see also, as to the meaning of the word Port, Hull Dock Company v. Browne, 2 B. & Ad. 43; Stockton and Darlington Rail. Co. v. Barrett, 7 M. & Gr. 870, in Dom. Proc.; Roelandts v. Harrison, 9 Exch. 444; Van Baggen v. Baines, 9 Exch. 523. 3 Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241; see also Lambert v. Liddard, quà supra. another in the same bay), in either of which there might have been a lading.' It is not at all necessary to the definition of the term "port," as used in policies, that it should be an artificial harbour shut in with regular moles or piers. If it be a natural basin protected by a headland, or even an open roadstead, provided it be the usual and sole place of loading and unloading, it is sufficient, especially if there be the usual machinery and appendages of a harbour. Thus, in one case, the Court of King's Bench held that the expression "to any port or ports whatsoever," in a time policy, ought to be construed as if it were "place or places," and would protect the ship while anchored in an open roadstead, if that were the usual place for loading and unloading goods." Not necessarily imply an artificial harbour. Gavin. A ship insured "at and from Leith to Shetland, and from Sea Insurance thence to Barcelona, and at and from thence and two other Company v. ports in Spain, to a port in Great Britain," was lost while loading at Saloe. The roadstead there was the usual station for vessels of her burden. Saloe town lay at the bottom of a natural basin, protected by a headland, and without any artificial harbour. It was frequented as a port, was usually designated as such, and so was recognized by the Spanish government and also by this country, which had a vice-consul there; it had a custom-house and harbour-master; port dues were levied there, and at the time of the loss, conveniences were erected on the shore for the purpose of loading goods and of protecting smaller vessels from wind and weather. On this evidence the House of Lords, affirming the judgment of the Scotch Court of Session, decided that it was a port within the meaning of the policy. When the policy is "at and from" an island or other 1 Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241. 2 Cockey v. Atkinson, 2 B. & Ald. 460; S. P. in the United States, Delonguemere v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 10 Johnson's Rep. 120, cited in 1 Phillips, Ins. no. 929. 3 Sea Insurance Co. v. Gavin, 2 Dow. & Clark, 124. Several additional cases as to the meaning of the word port will be found in the section on "Warranties to be free of Seizure and Confiscation in Port," Part III. c. iii. Excepted Risks. Insured "at and district containing several ports, the risk on ship under the from" an island containing several ports. homeward policy commences as soon as that on the outward policy ends, namely, directly the ship has been moored in good safety for twenty-four hours at the first port at which she touches at the island, for the purpose of discharging her outward cargo. Hence, where a ship insured for her outward voyage from London to Jamaica "until moored twenty-four hours in good safety," was insured by a homeward policy "at and from Jamaica to London," and was lost in coasting the island, after she had staid some days at one port there, but before she had delivered all her outward cargo, a special jury found, and Lord Mansfield supported their finding, that this loss on the ship was at the risk of the underwriters on the homeward policy.' Ever since this case it has been clear insurance law, that a ship insured for a homeward voyage "at and from" any of the West India Islands, is protected by the word "at" in going from port to port of the island.' In these cases, the general word by which the terminus a quo of the homeward voyage is described, comprehends all ports and places in the island or country named; it is clear the construction would be different if the terminus a quo was otherwise described in the policy: thus, if the policy was on the ship "at and from the ship's port of loading" in Jamaica, that would restrict the commencement of the risk to one particular port in the island.3 Termination of risk on ship in our common policies. Foreign Law. So much for the commencement of the risk on ship; its continuance is expressly stipulated in all our common policies to be "until the ship hath moored at anchor twenty-four hours in good safety." In Spain and Portugal the rule is the same; in France, 1 Camden v. Cowley, 1 W. Bl. 417, 418. 2 Cruickshank v. Janson, 2 Taunt. 301; Warre v. Miller, 4 B. & Cr. 538. 3 Per Patteson, J., in Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241, 248. 4 For the older laws see 2 Benecke, p. 234-238; for the more recent, Id. par Nolte, vol. i. p. 668–671. |