share in the ship is the distinct property of each individual part-owner, whose business it is to protect it by insurance; so that the insurance of another cannot be binding on such proprietors without some evidence importing an authority by them." This is so even where the part-owner, who has given orders for the insurance, is ship's husband or managing owner, appointed in the usual way to act discretionally for all the other owners. Nothing will make his insurance binding on the others, except either a particular direction from them to insure, or satisfactory proof that the other partowners severally approved and ratified the insurance after it came to their knowledge as a step taken for their benefit." Without such express direction, or subsequent ratification, as one part-owner cannot by an insurance bind the rest, it follows that the brokers who effect the policy under his directions can look to him alone for premiums, and are liable to him only for the amount received by them from the underwriters on account of losses." Whether a special partnership for a particular adventure Special adventure in partner. do, ex rei naturâ, imply at common law such an agency ship. in each partner or even in the common manager as without express authority enables him to bind all for the premiums of insurance, admits of doubt, notwithstanding the affirmative is favoured by certain language of some of the judges in Robinson v. Gleadow. Considering how immediately the end is in contemplation of the adventurers from the instant of beginning so as to be specified and detailed in the very act of contributing the means, one is almost driven to construe the silence of the partners in respect of insurance under the maxim, "Expressum facit cessare tacitum," unless the adventure be so completely one and indivisible that the partners could not conveniently insure each his own share.' 1 Per Lord Ellenborough in Bell v. Humphries, 2 Stark. 345. See French v. Backhouse, 5. Burr. 2727. 2 French v. Backhouse, 5 Burr. 2727; Robinson v. Gleadow, 2 Bing. N. C. 156. Roberts v. Ogilby, 9 Price, 269. 4 Robinson v. Gleadow, 2 Bing. N. C. 156. See Lindsay v. Gibbs, 4 Jur. N.S. 779; on appeal, 28 L. J. (Ch.) 692; Green v. Briggs, 6 Hare, 395; Alexander v. Simms, 23 L. J. (Ch.) 721. L Consignor or commission agent. Consignee. Has a consignor or commission agent, to whom funds are remitted to purchase and ship goods for his employer, an implied authority, as such, in the absence of express orders, to insure such goods on behalf of his principal? No doubt such insurances are not unfrequently made, but this is in expectation of their being subsequently adopted by the principal. The question here is, whether, in the absence of any established course of dealing, prior authority or subsequent adoption, such insurances would be upheld, so as to give the agent who has effected them a right to charge the premium to his principal, or to demand a loss from the underwriter? As a general rule, and in accordance with ordinary mercantile practice, the answer to this question, it seems, must be in the negative. Where orders are given to consign, and no orders given to insure, the practical inference generally would be, either that the principal meant to effect the insurance himself, or intended to remain uninsured. Exceptions to the general rule may, of course, be created by circumstances. An established course of dealing between the principal and agent; the usage of a particular port or trade; the knowledge of special or unforeseen circumstances, of which the agent may reasonably deem the principal to have been ignorant when he ordered the consignment, and which, if then known, he may fairly believe would have induced him to direct an insurance;-these, and similar considerations, may be reasonably held to confer an implied authority on the consignor to effect an insurance on behalf of his principal.' The same question may be put with regard to the implied authority of the consignee, as such, to insure. The answer to this question depends on the sense in which the word consignee is used. A consignee making advances clearly has not only the right to effect an insurance on his own behalf, and to recover thereon to the extent of those advances, but also an implied authority to insure on behalf of his consignor. But a mere naked consignee,-one, that is, 12 Duer, 101-104. 2 Woolff v. Horncastle, 1 B. & P. 316; who has no personal interest in the property consigned to him, but is the mere transmittee of the bill of lading with directions to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods to which it relates, has no implied authority (in the absence of any established course of dealing, express directions or subsequent ratification) to effect insurances on behalf of his consignor, at all events while the goods are in course of transit to himself.1 Has the general agent of a foreign merchant an implied authority to insure on his behalf? Here, again, the answer to the question must depend on the extent of trust and authority embraced by the term general agency. Where the general agency consists in this, that a merchant in one country consigns all his goods intended for sale in another country to a particular merchant there resident, and effects through him all his purchases, this alone, without some evidence of a special course of dealing in regard to insurances, would not show that either correspondent had implied authority to insure on behalf of the other. But where the trust reposed is more extensive, as, for instance, where a foreign merchant employs a general agent to procure consignments, and make advances and shipments on his account, leaving the whole conduct and management of the business entirely in the agent's uncontrolled and unassisted discretion, no doubt an authority to insure on the foreign merchant's behalf would be implied as a necessary means of conducting the business of such an agency." An implied authority to insure may arise from the peculiar situation of the property with which the agent effecting the insurance is entrusted. Thus, although the master, as such, has not in general an implied authority to effect insurance either on ship, freight, or cargo,3 yet there seems little doubt Carruthers v Shedden, 6 Taunt. 14; 22 Duer, 111-113. Judge Duer says, "Such agents as those last mentioned are to be found in all our prin cipal cities; and their universal prac- General agent of foreign mer chant. Authority implied from the peculiar situa tion of the property. A ratification is in all cases that cases may arise which would confer that authority on him. Where the ship is lost, but the cargo or part of it, is saved under such circumstances as to make it impossible either to sell it at the place of disaster or to forward it to the port of destination, the master, if he had the chance of so doing, would be justified, as agent for all parties concerned, in sending it on to some other port for sale. In such a case, if there were no means of speedy communication with the owners, he might have an implied authority to insure. It has been intimated by a learned judge in the United States, that in a similar case, a like authority would be implied in the supercargo. A merchant, who has ordered goods from a foreign correspondent, may refuse to receive them if in excess of or not according to order; in such case if he elect to re-ship them, he has, in the opinion of Lord Hardwicke, an implied authority to insure them on behalf of the consignor. Generally speaking, as we have seen, a mere order to consign or forward goods will not carry with it an implied authority to insure on behalf of the party giving the order. In a case, however, where an agent was empowered by the owners of a ship and cargo, captured as prize, to prosecute their claims in the foreign prize court, to make such compromise as he might deem advisable, and in case of restitution, "to forward the ship to London,”—it was objected that these circumstances raised no implied authority in the agent to direct an insurance on the property after restitution, but Lord Ellenborough said, "How can it be said that there was no authority to insure. The order to forward the ship to London was an authority to insure her. She might be intercepted by the perils of the sea, or of enemies, and a loss of the property would be incurred, the only way to prevent which would be by an insurance.” The cases hitherto considered have been those in which a considered equi- prior authority to insure has either been expressly given, or valent to a prior authority. 1 2 Duer, 101. 2 Per Jones, J., in De Forest r. Fulton F. & M. Ins. Co., 1 Hall, 84. 3 Cornwall v. Wilson, 1 Ves, sen., 511. 4 Robertson v. Hamilton, 14 East, 522; see the case as stated and commented on, 2 Duer, 101, 102. has been implied from the relation of the parties effecting This general principle has been so abundantly illustrated in our jurisprudence, and the cases establishing it will be so fully noticed elsewhere, that it will be sufficient to give below a general reference to some of the leading authorities." Thus, although one part-owner has no original implied authority from the rest to insure on their account, yet, if he does so, and they subsequently adopt the insurance, they are bound by it.3 So, although the captors of a prize have no original implied authority to insure, yet, if they do insure, and the Crown, in whom the legal interest vests, subsequently adopts the insurance, it is thereby rendered valid. Whether the clerk of a foreign consignee, as such, has a prior implied authority to direct an insurance to be effected by English correspondents of his master on a consignment made by them on account, and to the orders of his employer, may be doubtful; but if the foreign principal subsequently adopt the insurance so effected, a jury is justified in finding that it was made with his authority.' ratification. As regards the evidence requisite to establish the fact of Evidence of ratification, proof of an express ratification is not needful, the adoption of the policy may be inferred from the conduct of 1 Per Best, C. J., Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722, 727. Woolff v. Horncastle, 1 B. & P. 316; Lucena v. Craufurd, 2 B. & P. N. R. 269; Stirling v. Vaughan, 11 East, 619; Routh v. Thompson, 13 East, 274; Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2 M. & Sel. 485; Robinson v. Gleadow, 2 Bing. N. C. 156. French v. Backhouse, 5 Burr. 2227; Robinson v. Gleadow, 2 Bing. N. C. 156; Lindsay v. Gibbs, 4 Jur. N. S. 779; on appeal, 28 L. J. (Ch.) 692. Routh v. Thompson, 13 East, 274; Lucena v. Craufurd, 2 B. & P. N. R. 269. Barlow v. Leckie, 4 J. B. Moore, 8. |