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able accept according adequate admit affirm answer appears assumed authority become belief Bible called cause certainty Christian cognition common concept conclusion consciousness contents contradiction demand demonstration determine direct divine doctrine doubt edge effect element error evidence examination existence experience expression external fact faculties faith false feeling furnish give given ground hold human idea ignorance important impossible inspiration intelligence intuition kind knowl knowledge known less light limited live material matter means mental method mind moral nature necessary necessity never object observation opinion perceived perception possession possible present principles probable proof proposition question rational reach reality reason relations religion religious respect result revelation sensation sense simply soul spiritual stand supposed term testimony theology things thought tion true truth universe whole
Página 86 - For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other : and this, I think, we may call
Página 82 - Thus the mind has two faculties, conversant about truth and falsehood. First, knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. Secondly, judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears.
Página 89 - But reason itself must rest at last upon authority ; for the original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, beliefs or trusts. Thus it is, that in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophically admit, that belief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of belief. We are compelled to surrender the proud Intellige ut credos of Abelard,...
Página 85 - ... a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention; or a shop for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate.
Página 86 - For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives, that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two.
Página 84 - A thing is known immediately or proximately, when we cognize it in itself ; mediately or remotely, when we cognize it in or through something numerically different from itself. Immediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves the fact of its existence ; mediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the possibility of its existence. 2. — An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is itself presented to observation,...
Página 198 - ... in belief not so. That which makes me believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of, those ideas that are under consideration. The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our own experience, or the testimony of others
Página 197 - ... is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary.
Página 133 - They who talk thus may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, say, that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it : whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks.