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the French upon Lake George, (which is about five miles on this side of Tionderoge, and thirty beyond Fort William Henry,) were in such readiness, that the Provincial Troops might, as Major General Winslow inform'd me, have begun their march for that place by the end of the first Week in July; and before the 25th of June Provisions for 2500 Men for four Months were sent to Sarahtoga (which is within seven miles of Fort Edward) and there deposited for the use of his Majesty's Regular Troops, who also might have been ready to have march'd by the 7th of July; in which case, or even if the Troops had begun their march by the 20th of that Month, there seems to be no doubt, but that, according to the intelligence we had received, they might easily have made themselves Masters of that Post.

In the latter end of May we had undoubted Accounts that the number of the French Troops Regular and Irregular at Crown Point, Tionderoge and their advanc'd Post did not exceed 1100 in the whole besides Indians; that they were then at Work upon a new Road of Communication between the two last mention'd places; at the latter of which they had not then above 200 Men; and that Tionderoge was very accessible from thence by Land on the North west side to a Train of Artillery. In June we had certain intelligence, that they had demolish'd their Works at the advanc'd Post, abandon'd it, and drawn the Men lately posted there into their Garrison at Tionderoge; and, though since I left the Command, the French, according to the latest Accounts have return'd and taken possession of that Post, yet the Men posted there did not, on the 23d of July, exceed 400; the Works were then inconsiderable, and on the 2d September Major General Winslow attempted to make them a Visit there by Water with three Lighters, having two Cannon six Pounders, one seven Inch Mortar, and Swivels, accompanied with 7 Whaleboats, and in the whole 220 Men.

The making ourselves Masters of this Post would have secur'd a Communication by Water, as well as by Land, between that and Albany, and put it into our power to have transported Provisions, Stores and Artillery thither across

Lake George, from whence they might have been transported, and the Men march'd by Land, through a practicable Road of 5 miles to Tionderoge, without being expos'd to any of it's Batteries in their Passage; and in such case, with the Force, they had, they could not have fail'd in the reduction of that Fort, as the Army might, upon every occasion, have received fresh Supplies and Reinforcements from the Colonies, as well as British Troops, in time to have compass'd it this Year.

The Effect of the Reduction of Tionderoge, Sir, which is the place where the French seem clearly to have been for sometime collecting their main Strength between Montreal and Albany, and to design to make their stand in their dispute with us for the Command of the Lakes in that Quarter; would have been the putting Crown Point itself in our power, the distance of which from Tionderoge is not above 15 miles through a good Road for Wheel Carriages, and the same distance by Water, which is broad and navigable for Vessels of considerable Burthen; And in the mean time the compassing of all our points upon Lake George, as our possession of this Pass would effectually, of itself, have cover'd all the Country between Tionderoge and Albany against the Incursions of the French from Montreal into any part of it, either through the Lake, South Bay, or Wood Creek.

But, though the Provincial Forces did actually begin their Grand march from their Camp at Half Moon upon the Plan Settled with Major General Abercromby, yet so many Stops were from time to time put to their proceeding, that they advanc'd no further in it than Fort William Henry; where Major General Winslow receiv'd Orders from the Earl of Loudoun on the 22d of August "not to proceed to Crown "Point for the present, but to do the utmost in his power to "Guard against the Enemy's attacking them or getting into the Country by slipping by South Bay, or Wood Creek." His Lordship's apprehensions of the Enemy's slipping by South Bay or getting into the Country by Wood Creek, are founded I Suppose upon the Baron de Dieskau's making a march by the way of the former to attack Major General

Johnson last Year; but if it is consider'd that the Baron did that without either Artillery or even Baggage, and without expecting to be oppos'd with Cannon, how extremely difficult, if not altogether impracticable, it is for a large Body of Troops to march by South Bay with Artillery; or even by the way of Wood Creek without being discover'd. There seems no great reason to fear they will run the risque of exposing themselves to the resistance they must expect to meet with from so considerable a number of Regular Troops, as his Lordship now hath with him; supposing they could slip by the Provincials, and had Forces sufficient to leave behind them for the protection of their own Forts.

You now have the Account, Sir, of the failure in the Expedition against Crown Point. And, with regard to the misfortune at Oswego, I must proceed to observe that at the time of its being attack'd by the Enemy, it was depriv'd of the naval Armament design'd for its protection, by Capt. Bradstreet's being kept with the Battoes, and Battoemen at Schenectada from the 11th July to the 12th Augt. For if the 20 pieces of Cannon, which lay at the Carrying Place, and the Battoemen had been at Oswego by the 1st August, which would have been the case, had it not been for that delay, our whole naval Force might have been upon the Lake, and prevented the Embarcation, or at least the landing of the French with their Cannon and Stores near Oswego. Whereas for want of those 20 pieces of Cannon two of our best Vessels were without any, consequently could not appear on the Lake; and without their Assistance and that of our Whaleboats and Battoemen, or at least such a part of them as was necessary for manning the Whaleboats, our other Vessels were not strong enough for the Enemy.

Oswego was likewise, at the time of it's being attack'd, without any Assistance from the Indians of the Six Nations, which was occasion'd by Sir William Johnson's returning in July after the Council at Onondago to Albany, instead of carrying those Indians from thence to Oswego, agreeable to the appointment I made with them the year preceeding, and with the Messasagues and other Foreign Indians; which

meeting Sir William Johnson, in some of his Letters to me observes, was of the greatest importance to his Majesty's Service.

This delay of the return of the Battoes to Oswego was occasion'd, Sir, by the following means.

Intelligence had been gain'd from a French Prisoner taken by Capt. Bradstreet on the 3d July,' that the French were forming a large Incampment at about 32 Miles distance from Oswego and design'd soon to attack the place; This Major General Abercromby was appriz'd of upon Capt. Bradstreet's arrival at Albany (being on the 10th or 11th July) and in one or two days after gave Orders for Colonel Webb and the 44th Regiment to hold themselves in readiness to march to Oswego; But their Embarcation was delay'd, and the Battoes detain'd, as is before observ'd, from the 11th July to the 12th August; which was thirteen days after the arrival of the Earl of Loudoun himself at Albany, though by mistake in my Letter of the 4th September to his Lordship, I call'd it five days only; and this, according to the inclos'd Declaration and Extracts of two Letters relative to the same point (which I have good reason fully to Credit) and other Accounts, was owing to a dispute whether Colonel Webb should receive any Provisions for the transportation of those Troops, that were not supply'd by Mr. Kilby.

About the same time a great number of the Battoemen (800 as I am inform'd) whose usefulness not only by Water, but in an Action by Land, against the Enemy had been so lately experienc'd, were discharg'd.

To this delay therefore principally, the Discharge of so many Battoemen, and the failure of Sir William Johnson to assemble the Indians of the Six Nations at Oswego, whereby that place was depriv'd of so essential a part of the defence, which it ought to have had at the time of its being attack'd, and for want of which in all human probability it was lost, together with the Garrison and the Command of Lake On

1 See Bradstreet to Shirley, July 16, 1756, ante, p. 485, and July 24, 1756, ante, p. 487.

2 See letter referred to, ante, p. 536.

tario, it seems evident, Sir, that the misfortune, which his Majesty's Service hath sustain'd there, is to be imputed.

If any other Endeavours have been used since the Expiration of my Command, either before or after the Earl of Loudouns arrival in America "to throw Succours into Oswego" (which his Lordship seems to allude to in his Letter of the 29th Augt. to me 1) than those herein beforemention'd, which have most unhappily depriv'd it of that defence, it would otherwise have had; and which would have been sufficient for its protection, without any new Succours; I have not heard of them: Had indeed the 44th Regiment which Major General Abercromby at first, and the Earl of Loudoun afterwards order'd to proceed to Oswego, been, upon our receiving intelligence of the design of the French to attack it, embark'd in time for the Battoes to have arriv'd there before that Attack, which might easily have been done; such Endeavours would not only have sav'd the place; but might have strengthen'd the Forces there, so as possibly to have enabled them even to act offensively upon the Lake Ontario.

For a full Account of the beforemention'd Dispute concerning the Provisions, and the true Cause of the Delay in the Embarcation of the 44th Regiment, I beg leave to refer you, Sir, to the inclos'd State of it.2

I have the Honor to be with the Highest Respect,

Sir,

Your most Humble

and

most Obedient Servant

1 Ante, p. 521.

W. SHIRLEY.

2 The manuscript to which Shirley here refers is entitled: "State of the Dispute concerning the Provisions for transporting the 44th Regiment to Oswego, and the true Cause of the Delay of its Imbarcation." With it are four depositions, etc., tending to fortify the contention of Shirley. All are in P. R. O., C. O. 5, 46, inclosed in the letter here given. With this deposition of Shirley should be read the twenty-seven-page statement of Loudoun to Fox oi Oct. 3, inclosing his letter from Shirley of Sept. 13. The contrast

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