was in the rear of the working Party under Sir John St. Clair's command, and approv'd of by the principal Officers in the action.

As to the Consequences of the General's Defeat, after his Troops who were concerned in that Action, had join'd the Division, which was left under the Command of Col Dunbar, I find that now the immediate Destruction of great Quantities of the Artillery Stores and Provisions is Condemned by some of the Field Officers. The Copy of an Order from the late General, signed by Capt. Dobson his fourth Aid de Camp hath been produced to me by Col. Dunbar in his own Justification, yet it seems difficult to say how that Order, which was given out from the General at a time, when the Colonel looked upon him, as he says, as a dying Man, and consequently incapable of Command, came to be so readily Complied with, as it seems to have been, and without any Attempt to prevent it, by Application to the General, if that was the Colonels opinion when the Stores were destroyed. I am told by Lieutt. Col. Gage, that upon a Message being sent from Colonel Dunbar to the General, he immediately resigned the Command to him. I won't take upon me to say, Sir, what the Effect of the Panic, to which so much is imputed, might be in the Soldiers after they were all join'd at Colonel Dunbars Camp in Numbers treble to those of the Enemy; but there seems to have been no reason to dread a pursuit from them at that distance.

The reason, which Colonel Dunbar gives for marching the Troops so suddenly to Philadelphia, with design of going into Winter Quarters there in August, is because he says General Braddock designed to go into Winter Quarters there himself. If that was ever his design, I have abundant reason to think he had altered it; For in his Secretary's last Letter to me a few days before the Action at Monongahela he acquainted me that if the Business at Fort Du Quesne should not take up too much time, the General would endeavour, if that was practicable, to join me at Niagara; In which Case I am Confident he would not have Winter'd his Troops near so far to the Westward as Philadelphia; and from my knowl

edge of the General, it is very difficult for me to Conceive that he would have entertained a thought of going into Winter Quarters in the Month of August, when so great a part of this Continent was entering upon Action.1

In my first Letter to Colonel Dunbar, for preventing his going into Winter Quarters at Philadelphia, and directing him to march the Troops under his Command to Albany;

1 The feeling of consternation and helplessness prevalent in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia as a result of Braddock's defeat are well known. The withdrawal of troops by Dunbar resulted in many letters to Shirley for aid. See Dinwiddie to Shirley, Sept. 20 and Oct. 31, 1755 (Dinwiddie Papers, 2, 208, 257), Morris to Shirley, Sept. 5, Oct. 31, and Nov. 6 (1 Penna. Arch. 2, 400; Penna. Col. Rec. 6, 665; and 1 Penna. Arch. 2, 469), and Shirley to Sharpe, Aug. 13, ante, p. 236. On Nov. 2, 1755, Gov. R. H. Morris wrote as follows from Philadelphia to Shirley:DEAR SIR,

Last night I despatched an express to you with sundry letters and papers, relating to the present circumstances of the Province and other matters, and I now send away another with the further Intelligence that I have received within this hour, by which you will see that the Enemy whose numbers are still uncertain, are got much nigher to us than they were, being on the 31st of last month encamped near the Susquehannah, some few miles to the northward of the great road leading from this city to Carlisle, about one hundred and twenty miles from this place. Their scheme seems by their motion to be to take Possession of the Susquehannah, which we shall not be able to pass without great difficulty, and they will be in that case perfectly at Liberty to destroy all the rich country beyond that River, where there are many thousands of familys seated, what they may do afterwards time must discover. The Inhabitants in general are in great consternation, but being undisciplined and mostly without arms, they can do very little good.... My assembly meets to-morrow, but by what I can learn nothing is to be expected from them. Governor Sharpe will be here tomorrow night, and I am extremely concern'd I can not go with Him to New York, I must beg you would give me your advice what is best for me to do, in Case my Assembly shall continue to act the same part they have hitherto done. (1 Penna. Arch., 2, 467.)

On Nov. 4, Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia wrote Shirley requesting a commission for Col. George Washington and expressing the hope that the Virginia Assembly might grant some military

as I heard he designed to leave the Independent Companies at Fort Cumberland, I directed they should remain there for that Service until further Orders, and particularly recommended to him the protection of that Fort; but in his next Letter to me, he let me know, that upon his finding that General Braddock did not intend to leave those Companies at Fort Cumberland, he had brought them with him to Philadelphia, which he accordingly did, and is the reason for their not going into Garrison at Fort Cumberland.

My motive for ordering Colonel Dunbar to march his Troops to Albany, as soon as he could was, that if he had arriv'd there in time (which I was in hopes he might have done) he might have assisted in the Attempt against Crown Point, or at least have made ready to Cover Albany, in case General Johnson had been beat: and indeed it was extremely happy that the French Forces, which attacked General Johnson's camp, were repulsed and intirely defeated by him; for if they had prevailed in their Attack, there is the utmost reason to believe, as Colonel Dunbar did not arrive till about five Weeks after the Action, that the French General would have made himself Master of Albany, and in that Case have cutt off all Communication between Oswego and that Place; the Consequences of which might have been fatal to the Troops under my immediate Command, and very probably ended in the Loss of Oswego itself.

I have the Honor to be with the highest respect.

Sir

Your most Humble and

most Obedient Servant

W. SHIRLEY.

Rt. Honble. Sir Thomas Robinson Knt of the Bath, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State.

provision for the spring campaign if not earlier (Dinwiddie Papers, 2, 261). The year following the defeat of Braddock was as severe as any year of war to Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. Parkman, "Montcalm and Wolfe," Vol. 1, passim. Note especially the report of the French commander at Fort Duquesne, Capt. Dumas, in July, 1756, ibid. 1, 329.

WILLIAM SHIRLEY TO CHARLES HARDY

[Extract]1

Albany, November 8, 1755.

I acquainted your Excellency from Oswego, that I designed to Garrison the two Forts, in the Mohawk's Country with the King's Troops during the Winter, and had given orders Concerning it at Schenectady; it would have made a saving to the Publick in the Article of Pay, Provisions, and Barracks, and been a More Expeditious way of Covering the King's Troops intended for that Service, in this Severe Season of the Year.

Since my Arrival here, your Excellency hath Acquainted me, that you have received Messages from those Indians, desiring that the Garrisons now Posted at those Forts may be Continued there, and Not exchanged for Others, Consisting of the Regular Troops. I have the Honour to be of the same Sentiments with you, that the Indians should not be Disgusted; Especially at this Critical Conjuncture, by putting Troops into their Forts, built for their Protection, that would be Disagreable to them; But as it Appears to me most probable, that this Application of the Indians to your Excellency was made at the Instigation of the Officers, who at Present Command those Forts; I would Mention it for your Consideration, whether it Might be Adviseable to try the Indians further upon that Point, by a Message to them, in which I will join with you letting them know that if any Regular Troops are sent to their Castles their Officers and Soldiers shall Consist Chiefly of Americans, who shall have Strict Orders to treat them with all Kindness and Civility and to know their Answer upon it.2

1 P. R. O., C. O. 5, 46. Inclosed in Shirley to Robinson, Dec. 20. A transcript is in the Library of Congress.

2 This letter, the reply of Hardy of Nov. 9, and Shirley's letter to Robinson of Dec. 20, in which both are inclosed, illustrate well the difficulties surrounding the Colonial Commander in Chief of the

His Excellency Sir Charles Hardy.

Endorsed:

A true Copy Examined by

WM. ALEXANDER Secy.

Extract of a Letter from

Major General Shirley to Govr. Hardy dated

Novr. 8. 1755. in Govr. Shirley's of

Decr. 20th, 1755

CHARLES HARDY TO WILLIAM SHIRLEY1

Albany, Novr. 9th, 1755.

SIR,

After what has Passed Between the Indians and me with Respect to Garrisons: which I have already acquainted your Excellency with, I Cannot think it advisable to Send the message you Propose and as General Braddock has in Consequence of his Instructions from home with the unanimous opinion of the Council at Alexandria given General Johnson a Commission to Take upon him the management and Care British forces in America when he attempted to obtain aid from New York for national purposes. That province would not work under Shirley's leadership, and in the end secured his dismissal from office. To the jealousy existing between New York and Massachusetts and the constant friction between DeLancey and Hardy of the former and Shirley of the latter colony was added the fear of Sir William Johnson that in some way his position as Superintendent of Indian relations would be lost. The letter of Dec. 2, 1755, from Secretary John Pownall to Johnson (Docts. rel. Col. Hist. N. Y. 6, 1622) encouraged the latter greatly. See Sir William Johnson to Governor Hardy, Oct. 22, Oct. 24, Oct. 31; to Governor Hopkins of Rhode Island, Nov. 1; Shirley to Johnson, Nov. 15, and Johnson to Shirley, Nov. 17, 1755, in Johnson Manuscripts. The principle of the supreme authority of the commander in chief designated by the Crown was acknowledged by Shirley in defeat (Speech to the General Court of Massachusetts, Sept. 8, 1756, post, p. 548) as well as in time of success.

1

1 P. R. O., C. O. 5, 46. A transcript is in the Library of Congress.