doing the like in time to come. The dread of punishment is a weight in the scale on the fide of virtue, to counterbalance vicious motives. The final cause of this branch of our nature is admirable. If the neceffary influence of motives had the effect either to leffen the merit of a virtuous action, or the demerit of a crime, morality would be totally unhinged. The most virtuous action would of all be the leaft worthy of praife; and the most vicious be of all the leaft worthy of blame. Nor would the evil ftop there: instead of curbing inordinate paffions, we should be encouraged to indulge them, as an excellent excufe for doing wrong. Thus, the moral fentiments of approbation and disapprobation, of praise and blame, are found perfectly confiftent with the laws above mentioned that govern human actions, without having recourse to an imaginary power of acting against motives. The only plaufible objection I have met with against the foregoing theory, is the remorfe a man feels for a crime he fuddenly commits, and as fuddenly repents of. During a fit of bitter remorfe for having flain my favourite fervant in a violent paffion, without juft provocation, I accufe myself for having given way to paffion; and acknowledge that I could and ought to have reftrained it. Here we find remorfe founded on a fyftem directly oppofite to that above laid down; a fyftem that acknowledges no neceffary connection between an action and the motive that produced it; but, on the contrary, fuppofes that it is in a man's power to refift his paffion, and that he ought to refift it. What fhall be faid upon this point? Can a man be a neceffary agent, when he is confcious of the contrary, and is fenfible that he can act in contradiction to motives? This objection is strong in appearance; and would be invincible, were we not happily relieved of it by a doctrine laid down in Elements of Criti VOL. IL cifm cifm (a) concerning the irregular influence of paffion on our opinions and fentiments. Upon examination, it will be found, that the prefent, cafe may be added to the many examples there given of this irregular influence. In a peevish fit, I take exception at fome flight word or gefture of my friend, which I interpret as if he doubted of my veracity. I am instantly in a flame: in vain he protests that he had no meaning, 'for impatience will not fuffer me to liften. I bid him draw, which he does with reluctance; and before he is well prepared, I give him a mortal wound. Bitter remorse and anguifh fucceed inftantly to rage. "What have I done? why did I not abftain? I was not mad, and yet I have "murdered my innocent friend: there is the hand that did the “horrid deed; why did not I rather turn it against my own "heart?" Here every impreffion of neceffity vanishes my mind tells me that I was abfolutely free, and that I ought to have fmothered my paffion. I my paffion. I put an oppofite cafe." A' brutal fellow. treats me with great indignity, and proceeds even to a blow. My passion rises beyond the poffibility of restraint: I can scarce forbear fo long as to bid him draw; and that moment I ftab him to the heart. I am forry for having been engaged with a ruffian, but have no contrition nor remorse. In this cafe, my fentiments are very different from what they are in the other. I never once dream that I could have refifted the impulfe of paffion: on the contrary, my thoughts and words are, "That flesh and blood "could not bear the affront; and that I must have been branded "for a coward, had I not done what I did." In reality, both the actions were equally neceffary. Whence then opinions and fentiments fo oppofite to each other? on our opinions and fentiments, will folve the question. All violent paffions are prone to their own gratification. A man affected (a) Chap. 2. part 5.. The irregular influence of paffion with deep remorfe abhors himself, and is odious in his own eyes; and it gratifies the paffion,, to indulge the thought that his guilt is beyond the poffibility of excufe. In the first cafe accordingly, remorfe forces upon me a conviction that I might have restrained my paffion, and ought to have restrained it. I will not give way to any excufe; because in a fit of remorfe it gives me pain to be excused. In the other cafe, there being no remorse, there is no difguife; and things appear in their true light. To illustrate this reasoning, I observe, that paffion warps my judgement of the actions of others, as well as of my own. Many examples are given in the chapter above quoted : join to these the following. My fervant aiming at a partridge, happens to fhoot a favourite spaniel croffing the way unfeen. Inflamed with anger, I ftorm at his rafhnefs, pronounce him guilty, and will liften to no excufe. When my paffion is spent, I become fenfible that it was merely accidental, and that the man is abfolutely innocent. The nurse overlays my only child, the long-expected heir to a great estate. It is with difficulty that I refrain from putting her to death: "The "wretch has murdered my infant, and deferves to be torn to pieces." When my paffion fubfides, I fee the matter in a very different light. The poor woman is inconfolable, and can scarce believe that she is innocent: fhe bitterly reproaches herfelf for want of care and concern. But, upon cool reflection, both fhe and I are fenfible, that no perfon in found fleep has any felf-command; and that we cannot be anfwerable for any action of which we are not conscious. Thus, upon the whole, we find, that any impreffion we may occafionally have of being able to act in contradiction to motives, is the refult of paffion, not of found judge ment. The reader will obferve, that this fection is copied from Eflays on Morality and Natural Religion. The ground-work is the fame: the alterations are only in the fuperftructure; and the fubject is abridged in order to adapt it to its prefent place. Part of the as bridgement was published in the fecond edition of the Principles of Equity. But as law-books have little currency, the publifhing the whole in one effay, will not, 1 hope, be thought improper. I Hold it to be an intuitive propofition, That the Deity is the primary cause of all things; that with confummate wisdom he formed the great plan of government, which he carries on by laws fuited to the different natures of animate and inanimate beings; and that these laws, produce a regular chain of caufes and effects in the moral as well as the material world, admitting no events but what are comprehended in the original plan (a). Hence it clearly follows, that chance is excluded out of this world, that nothing can happen by accident, and that no event is arbitrary or contingent. This is the doctrine of the effay quoted; and, in my apprehenfion, well founded. But I cannot fubfcribe to what fol lows, viz. "That we have an impreffion of chance and contin gency, which confequently must be delufive."I would not willingly admit any delufion in the nature of man, where it is not made evident beyond contradiction; and I now fee clearly, that: (a) See Effays on Morality and Natural Religion, part 1. effay 3. 3.0 the the impression we have of chance and contingency, is not delúfive, but perfectly confiftent with the established plan, 6.6 -The explanation of chance and contingency in the faid effay, fhall be given in the author's own words, as a proper text to reafon upon. in our ordinary train of thinking, it is certain "that all events appear not to us as neceffary. A multitude of events feem to be under our power to caufe or to prevent; and we readily make a distinction betwixt events that are necessary, ❝i. e. that must be; and events that are contingent, i. e. that may "be, or may not be. This distinction is void of truth: for all things that fall out either in the material or moral world, are, as we have feen, alike neceffary, and alike the refult of fixed "laws. Yet, whatever conviction a philofopher may have of "this, the diftinction betwixt things neceffary and things con"tingent, poffeffes his common train of thought, as much as it "poffeffes the molt illiterate. We act univerfally upon that dif «tinction': nay it is in truth the caufe of all the labour, care, "and industry, of mankind. I illuftrate this doctrine by an example. Conftant experience hath taught us, that death is a neevent. The human frame is not made to laft for ever cellary ** in its prefent condition; and no man thinks of more than a temporary existence upon this globe. But the particular time of our death appears a contingent event. However certain it "be, that the time and manner of the death of each individual is determined by a train of preceding caufes, and is no lefs"fixed than the hour of the fun's rifing or fetting; yet no perfon is affected by this doctrine. In the care of prolonging life, we are directed by the fuppofed contingency of the time of death,, which, to a certain terin of years, we confider as depending in: a great measure on ourfelves, by caution against accidents,, "due ufe of food, exercife, &c, Thefe means are profecuted: “with the fame diligence as if there were in fact no neceffary i |