ftice. 4thly, This branch is a strong cement to fociety. If we were not accountable beings, thofe connected by blood, or by country, would be no less shy and reserved, than if they were mere strangers to each other.

The final cause that next occurs, being fimple and obvious, is mentioned only that it may not feem to have been overlooked. All right actions are agreeable, all wrong actions difagreeable. This is a wife appointment of Providence. We meet with fo many temptations against duty, that it is not always an easy task to perfevere in the right path: would we perfevere, were duty difagreeable? And were acts of pure benevolence disagreeable, they would be extremely rare, however worthy of praise.

Another final cause respects duty, in contradiftinction to pure benevolence. All the moral laws are founded on intuitive perception; and are fo fimple and plain, as to be perfectly apprehended by the most ignorant. Were they in any degree complex or obfcure, they would be perverted by selfishness and prejudice. No conviction inferior to what is afforded by intuitive perception, could produce in mankind a common fenfe with respect to moral duties. Reafon would afford no general conviction; becaufe that faculty is diftributed in portions fo unequal, as to bar all hopes from it of uniformity either in practice or in opinion. At the fame time, we are taught by woful experience, that reafon has little influence over the greater part of men. Reafon, it is true, aided by experience, fupports morality, by convincing us, that we cannot be happy if we abandon duty for any other interest. But conviction feldom weighs much againft imperious paffion; to control which the vigorous and commanding principle of duty is requifite, -directed by the fhining light of intuition.

A propofition laid down above appears to be a fort of mystery in the moral fyftem, viz. That tho' evidently all moral duties are contrived for promoting the general good, yet that choice is not

permitted

permitted among different goods, or between good and ill; and that we are strictly tied down to perform or forbear certain particular acts, without regard to confequences; or, in other words, that we must not do wrong, whatever good it may produce. The final caufe, which I am about to unfold, will clear this mystery, and fet the beauty of the moral fyftem in a confpicuous light. L begin with obferving, that as the general good of mankind, or even of the fociety we live in, refults from many and various circumftances intricately combined, it is far above the capacity of man, to judge in every inftance what particular actions will tend the most to that end. The authorifing therefore a man to trace out his duty, by weighing endless circumstances good and ill, would open a wide door to partiality and passion, and often lead him unwittingly to prefer the preponderating ill, under a falfe appearance of being the greater good. At that rate, the opinions of men about right and wrong, would be as various as their faces; which, as obferved above, would totally unhinge fociety. It is> better ordered by Providence, even for the general good, that, avoiding complex and obfcure objects, we are directed by the moral fenfe to perform certain plain and fimple acts, which are obvious to us by intuitive perception.

In the next place, To permit ill in order to produce greater good, may fuit a being of univerfal benevolence; but is repugnant to the nature of man, compofed of felfish and benevolent principles. We have seen above, that the true moral balance depends on a fubordination of felf-love to duty, and of arbitrary benevolence to felf-love; and accordingly every man is fenfible of injuftice when he is hurt in order to benefit another. Were it a rule in fociety, That a greater good to any other would make it an act of justice to deprive me of my life, of my reputation, or of my property, I fhould renounce the fociety of men, and affociate with more harmlefs animals.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, The true moral fyftem, that which is difplay'd above, is not only better fuited to the nature of man, and to his limited capacity and intelligence, but contributes more to the general good, which I now proceed to demonftrate. It would be lofing time to prove, that a man entirely felfifh is ill fitted for fociety; and we have seen (a), that universal benevolence, were it a duty, would contribute to the general good perhaps less than absolute selfishness. Man is too limited in capacity and in power for univerfal benevolence. Even the greatest monarch has not power to exercise his benevolence but within a very small compafs; and if fo, how unfit would fuch a duty be for private perfons, who have very little power? Serving only to diftrefs them by inability of performance, they would endeavour to fmother it altogether, and give full scope to selfishness. Man is much better qualified for doing good, by a constitution in which benevolence is duly blended with felf-love. Benevolence, as a duty, takes place of self-love; a regulation effential to fociety. Benevolence, as a virtue, not a duty, gives place to felf-love; because as every man has more power, knowledge, and opportunity, to promote his own good than that of others, a greater quantity of good is produced, than if benevolence were our only principle of action. This holds, even fuppofing no harm done to any perfon: much more would it hold, were we permitted to hurt fome, in order to produce more good to others.

The foregoing final caufes refpect morality in general. We now proceed to particulars; and the first and most important is the law of restraint. Man is evidently framed for fociety: and as there can be no fociety among creatures who prey upon each other, it was neceffary to provide against mutual injuries; which is effectually done by this law. Its neceffity with respect to perfo

(a) Sect. 4.

nal

nal fecurity is felf-evident; and with refpect to property, its neceffity will appear from what follows. In the nature of every man, there is a propensity to hoard or store up things ufeful to himself and family. But this natural propenfity would be rendered ineffectual, were he not fecured in the poffeffion of what he thus ftores up; for no man will toil to accumulate what he cannot fecurely poffefs. This fecurity is afforded by the moral fenfe, which dictates, that the first occupant of goods provided by nature for the fubfiftence of man, ought to be fecure in his poffeffion, and that fuch goods ought to be inviolable as his property. Thus, by the great law of restraint, men have a protection for their goods, as well as for their perfons; and are no lefs fecure in fociety, than if they were separated from each other by impregnable walls.

Several other duties are little lefs effential than of restraint to the existence of fociety, Mutual trust and confidence, without which fociety would be an uncomfortable state, enter into the character of the human fpecies; to which the duties of veracity and fidelity correfpond. The final cause of these corresponding duties, is obvious: the latter would be of no use in fociety without the former; and the former, without the latter, would be hurtful, by -laying men open to fraud and deceit.

With respect to veracity in particular, man is fo conftituted, that he must be indebted to information for the knowledge of most things that benefit or hurt him; and if he could not depend upon information, fociety would be very little beneficial. Further, it is wifely ordered, that we should be bound by the moral fenfe always to speak truth, even where we perceive no harm in tranfgreffing that duty; because it is fufficient that harm may enfue, tho' not foreseen. At the fame time, falfehood always does mifchief: it may happen not to injure us externally in our reputation, or in our goods: but it never fails to injure us internally; for one great bleffing of fociety is, a candid intercourfe of fenti

ments,

ments, of opinions, of defires, and wishes; and to admit any falfehood in fuch intercourfe, would poifon the moft refined pleasures of life.

Because man is the weakest of all animals in a state of feparation; and the very strongest in fociety, by mutual aid and fupport to which covenants and promifes greatly contribute, thefe are made binding by the moral fenfe.

The final cause of the law of propriety, which enforces the duty we owe to ourselves, comes next in order. In difcourfing upon thofe laws of nature which concern fociety, there is no occafion to -mention any felf-duty but what relates to fociety; of which kind are prudence, temperance, industry, firmness of mind. And that fuch qualities fhould be made our duty, is wifely ordered in a double refpect; first, as qualifying us to act a proper part in fociety, and next, as intitling us to good-will from others. It is the intereft, no doubt, of every man, to fuit his behaviour to the dignity of his nature, and to the station allotted him by Providence ; for fuch rational conduct contributes to happiness, by preferving health, procuring plenty, gaining the esteem of others, and, which of all is the greatest bleffing, by gaining a justlyfounded self-esteem. But here interest folely is not relied on: the powerful authority of duty is added, that in a matter of the utmost importance to ourselves, and of fome importance to the fociety we live in, our conduct may be regular and steady. Thefe -duties tend not only to render a man happy in himself, but also, by procuring the good-will and efteem of others, to command their aid and affiftance in time of need.

I proceed to the final caufes of natural rewards and punishments. It is laid down above, that controverfies about property and a-bout other matters of intereft, must be adjusted by the ftandard of right and wrong. But to bring rewards and punishments under the fame ftandard, without regard to private confcience,

VOL. II.