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"immodéré des foldats; et cependant c'étoit par un travail im"menfe que les Romains fe confervoient. La raifon en eft, je

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croix, que leurs fatigues étoient continuelles; au lieu que nos "foldats paffent fans ceffe d'un travail extreme à une extreme oifivété, ce qui eft la chofe du monde la plus propre à les faire perir. Il faut que je rapporte ici ce que les auteurs nous difent "de l'education de foldats Romains. On les accoutumoit à aller le pas militaire, c'eft-a-dire, à fair en cinq heures vingt milles, et quelquefois vingt-quatre. Pendant ces marches, on leur fai"foit porter de poids de foixante livres. On les entretenoit dans "l'habitude de courir, et de fauter tout armés ; ils prenoient "dans leurs exercices des epées, de javelots, de flèches, d'une pé

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fanteur double des armes ordinaires; et ces exercices étoient "continuels. Des hommes fi endurcis étoient ordinairement fains; on ne remarque pas dans les auteurs que les armées Romaines, qui faifoient la guerre en tant de climats, periffoient beaucoup par les maladies; au lieu qu'il arrive prefque conti"nuellement aujourd'hui, que des armées, fans avoir combattu, “se fe fondent, pour ainfi dire, dans une campagne (a)." Ma




(a) Montefquieu, Grandeur de Romains, chap. 2.


"We obferve now-a-days, that our armies are confumed by the fatigues and "fevere labour of the foldiers; and yet it was alone by labour and toil that the "Romans preferved themfelves from deftruction. I believe the reason is, that "their fatigue was continual and unremitting, while the life of our foldiers is a "perpetual transition from severe labour to extreme indolence, a life the most rui" nous of all others. I muft here recite the account which the Roman authors give of the education of their foldiers. They were continually habituated to the "military pace, which was, to march in five hours twenty, and fometimes twenty"five miles. In thefe marches each foldier carried fixty pounds weight. hey "were accustomed to run and leap in arms; and in their military exercises, "their fwords, javelins, and arrows, were of twice the ordinary weight. These "exercifes

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refchal Saxe, a foldier, not a physician, afscribes to the use of vinegar the healthinefs of the Roman legions: were vinegar fo potent, it would of all liquors be the most in request. Exercise without intermiffion, during peace as well as during war, produced that falutary effect; which every prince will find, who is difpofed to copy the Roman difcipline *. The Marefchal gueffes better with refpect to a horse. Difcourfing of cavalry, he obferves, that a horse becomes hardy and healthful by constant exercise, and that a young horfe is unable to bear fatigue; for which reafon he declares against young horfes for the fervice of an army..

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That the military branch of the British government is fufceptible of improvements, all the world will admit. To improve it, I have contributed my mite; which is humbly fubmitted to the public, a judge from whom there lies no appeal. It is fubmitted in three views. The firft is, Whether an army, modelled as above, would not fecure us againft the boldeft invader; the next, Whether fuch an army be as dangerous to liberty, as an army in its

"exercifes were continual, which fo ftrengthened the conftitution of the men,, "that they were always in health. We fee no remarks in the Roman authors, "that their armies, in the variety of climates where they made war, ever perished "by difeafe; whilft now-a-days it is not unusual, that an army, without ever "coming to an engagement, dwindles away by difeafe in one campaign.”

* Rei militaris periti, plus quotidiana armorum exercitia ad fanitatem militum putaverunt prodeffe, quam medicos. Ex quo intelligitur quanto ftudiofius armorum artem docendus fit femper exercitus, cum ei laboris confuetudo et in caftris, fanitatem, et in conflictu poffit præftare victoriam. Vegetius, De re militari, lib. 3, cap. 2.- [In English thus: "Our mafters of the art-military were of opinion, that daily exercife in arms contributed more to the health of the troops, than "the kill of the phyfician: from which we may judge, what care fhould be taken, to habituate the foldiers to the exercife of arms, to which they owe both their health in the camp, and their victory in the field." The fame author

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obferves, that the Romans in his time had become fo inactive, as to leave off the fortifying their camps.


prefent form; and the laft, Whether it would not be a fchool of industry and moderation to our people.

With respect to the firft, we should, after a few years, have not only an army of fixty thousand well-difciplined troops, but the command of another army, equally numerous, and equally well difciplined. It is true, that troops inured to war have an advantage over troops that have not the fame experience: but with affurance it may be pronounced impracticable, to land at once in Britain an army that can ftand againft 100,000 British foldiers well difciplined, fighting even their first battle, for their country, and for their wives and children.

A war with France raises a panic on every flight threatening of an invafion. The fecurity afforded by the proposed plan, would enable us to act offenfively at fea, inftead of being reduced to keep our ships at home, for guarding our coafts. Would Britain any longer be obliged to fupport her continental connections? No fooner does an European prince augment his army, or improve military discipline, than his neighbours, taking fright, must do the fame. May not one hope, that by the plan proposed, or fome fuch, Britain would be relieved from jealoufy and folicitude about its neighbours?

With refpect to the second view, having long enjoy'd the fweets of a free government, under a fucceffion of mild princes, we begin to forget, that our liberties ever were in danger. But droufy fecurity is of all conditions the most dangerous; because the state may be overwhelmed before we even dream of danger. Suppofe only, that a British King, accomplished in the art of war, and beloved by his foldiers, heads his own troops in a war with France; and after more than one fuccefsful campaign, gives peace to his enemy, on terms advantageous to his people: what fecurity have we for our liberties, when he returns with a victorious army, devoted to his will? I am talking of a standing

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army in its prefent form. Troops modelled as above will not be fo obfequious: a number of the prime nobility and gentry ferving without pay, who can be under no temptation to enflave themselves and their country, will prove a firm barrier against the ambitious views of fuch a prince. And even fuppofing that army, to be totally corrupted, the prince can have little hope of fuccefs against the nation, fupported by another army, compofed of men, who, having completed their military service, may be relied on as champions for their country.

And as to the laft view mentioned, the plan propofed cannot fail to promote industry and virtue, not only among the foldiers, but among the working people in general.. To avoid hard labour and fevere difcipline in the army, men will be fober and industrious at home; and fuch untractable spirits as cannot be reached by the mid laws of a free government, will be effectually tamed by military law. At the fame time, as fobriety and innocence are conftant attendants upon industry, the manners of our people would be much purified; a circumftance of infinite importance to Britain. The falutary influence of the plan, would reach perfons in a higher fphere. A young gentleman, whipt at school, or falling behind at college, contracts an averfion to books; and flies to the army, where he is kept in countenance by numbers, idle and ignorant like himself. How many young men are thus daily ruined, who, but for the temptation of idlenefs and gaiety in the army, would have become ufeful fubjects! In the plan under confidera-tion, the officers who ferve for pay would be fo few in number, and their profpect of advancement fo clear, that it would require much intereft to be admitted into the army. None would be admitted but those who have been regularly educated in every branch of military knowledge; and idle boys would be remitted to their ftudies.

Here is difplay'd an agreeable scene with relation to industry. Suppofing

Suppofing the whole threescore thousand men to be abfolutely idle; yet, by doubling the industry of those who remain, I af firm, that the fum of industry would be much greater than before. And the fcene becomes enchanting, when we confider, that these threefcore thousand men, would not only be of all the most industrious, but be patterns of industry to others.

Upon conclufion of a foreign war, we fuffer grievously by difbanded foldiers, who must plunder or starve. The prefent plan is an effectual remedy: men accustomed to hard labour under ftrict difcipline, can never be in want of bread: they will be fought for every where, even at higher than ordinary wages; and they will prove excellent masters for training the peasants to hard


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A man indulges emulation more freely in behalf of his friend or his country, than of himfelf: the latter is felfifh; the former proceeds from a focial principle. In that view, have we not rea→ fon to hope, that the feparating military officers into different claffes, will excite a laudable emulation, prompting individuals to exert themselves on every occafion, for the honour of their corps? Nor will fuch emulation, a virtuous paffion, be any obftruction to private friendship between members of different. claffes. On the contrary, may it not be expected, that young officers: of birth and fortune, zealous to qualify themfelves, at their own expence, for ferving their country, will cling for inftruction to officers of experience, who have no inheritance but perfonal merit? Both find their account in that connection: men of rank become adepts in military affairs, a valuable branch of education for them; and officers who ferve for pay, acquire friends at court,. who will embrace every opportunity of teftifying their gratitude.

The advantages mentioned are great and extenfive; and yet are not the only advantages. Will it be thought extravagant to hope,


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