ftration for every thing: even a felf-evident propofition is not fuffered to escape. These fuperfluous proofs occur more than once in the Elements of Euclid. Nor has Ariftotle, with all his fkill in logics, entirely avoided them. Can any thing be more felf-evident, than the difference between pleasure and motion? Yet Ariftotle attempts to demonstrate, that they are different."No motion," fays he, "except circular motion, is per"fect in any one point of time: there is always fomething want"ing during its courfe, and it is not perfected till it arrive at its "end. But pleasure is perfect in every point of time; being the "fame from the beginning to the end." The difference is clear from perception merely; but is far from being clear from this demonstration. Plato alfo attempts to demonstrate a self-evident propofition, viz. That a quality is not a body. "Every body,” says he, “is a fubject: quality is not a fubject, but an accident; ergo, quality is not a body. Again, A body cannot be in a sub"ject every quality is in a subject; ergo, quality is not a body." But Defcartes affords the moft illuftrious inftance of the kind. He was the greatest geometer of the age he lived in, and one of the greatest of any age; which infenfibly led him to overlook intuitive knowledge, and to admit no propofition but what is demonstrated or proved in the regular form of fyllogifm. He took a fancy to doubt even of his own existence, till he was convinced of it by the following argument. Cogito, ergo fum: I think, therefore I exift. And what "fort of a demonftration is this after all? In the very fundamental proposition he acknowledges his existence by the term I; and how abfurd is it, to imagine a proof neceffary of what is admitted to be true in the fundamental propofition? In the next place, How does our author know that he thinks? If nothing is to be taken for granted, an argument is no less neceffary to prove that he thinks, than to prove that he exifts. It is true, that he has intuitive knowledge of his thinking; but has he not the fame of

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his exifting? Would not a man deferve to be laughed at, who, after warming himself at a fire, fhould imagine the following argument neceffary to prove its existence, "The fire burns, crgo it "exifts?" Liften to an author of high reputation attempting to demonstrate a self-evident propofition. "The labour of B, can

not be the labour of C; because it is the application of the organs and and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of fomething; "and therefore the labour is as much B's, as the limbs and facul"ties made ufe of are his. Again, the effect or produce of the la"bour of B, is not the effect of the labour of C: and therefore "this effect or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the labour was B's, and not C's: Because, what the labour of B caufes or "produces, B produces by his labour; or it is the product of B by his labour: that is, it is B's product, not C's, or any other's. "And if C fhould pretend to any property in that which B can "truly call his, he would act contrary to truth (a).”

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In every fubject of reafoning, to define terms is necessary in order to avoid mistakes. But there must be words that admit not of a definition, otherwise definitions would follow definitions without end and fuch words are what fignify fimple ideas, which have no parts nor compofition. The habit however of defining is fo inveterate in fome men, as to make them attempt to define words fignifying fimple ideas. Is there any neceffity to define motion: do not children understand the meaning of the word? And how is it poffible to define it, when there are not words more fimple to define it by? Yet Worfter (b) attempts that bold task. "A continual change of place," fays he,

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leaving one place for another, without remaining for any space "of time in the fame place, is called motion." That every body

(a) Religion of Nature delineated, feat. 6. paragr. 2.

(b) Natural Philosophy, p. 31.

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in motion is continually changing place, is true: but change of place is not motion; it is the effect of motion. Gravefend (a) defines motion thus, "Motus eft tranflatio de loco in ló

cum, five continua loci mutatio*;" which is the fame with the former. Yet this very author admits locus or place to fignify a fimple idea, incapable of a definition. Is it more fimple or more intelligible than motion? But, of all, the most remarkable definition of motion is that of Ariftotle, famous for its impenetrability, or rather abfurdity, viz. "Actus entis in potentia, quatenus in " potentia t."

Extenfion enters into the conception of every particle of matter; because every particle of matter has length, breadth, and thickness. Figure in the fame manner enters into the conception of every particle of matter; because every particle of matter is bounded. By the power of abstraction, figure may be conceived independent of the body that is figured; and extenfion may be conceived independent of the body that is extended. These particulars are abundantly plain and ́obvious; and yet obferve what a heap of jargon is employ'd by the followers of Leibnitz, in their fruitlefs endeavours to define extenfion. In order to that end, they begin with fimple existences, which they fay are unextended, and without parts. According to that definition, fimple existences cannot belong to matter, because the fmalleft particle of matter has both parts and extenfion. But to let that pass, they endeavour to show as follows, how the idea of extenfion arifes from these simple exiftences. We may look upon fimple existences, as having mutual

(a) Elements of Phyfics, p. 28.

"Motion is, the removing from one place to another, or a continual change "of place."

"The action of a being in power, fo far as it is in power."

"relations

"relations with refpect to their internal ftate; relations that form a "certain order in their manner of existence. And this order or ar

rangement of things, coexifting and linked together, but fo as we do not distinctly understand how, caufes in us a confused "idea, from whence arises the appearance of extenfion." A Peripatetic philofopher being afked, What fort of things the fenfible. fpecies of Aristotle are? answered, That they are neither entities nor nonentities, but fomething intermediate between the two. The famous aftronomer Ifinael Bulialdus lays down the following propofition, and attempts a mathematical demonstration of it, "That light is a mean-proportional between corporeal fubftance and incorporeal."

I close with a curious fort of reasoning, fo fingular indeed as not to come under any of the foregoing heads. The first editions of the latest verfion of the Bible into English have a preface, in which the tranflators make the following apology for not keeping close to the words of the original." Another thing we think good 66 to admonish thee of, gentle reader, that we have not tied our"felves to an uniformity of phrafing, or to an identity of words, as fome peradventure would with that we had done, because they obferve, that fome learned men fomewhere have been as "exact as they could be that way. Truly, that we might not 66 vary from the fenfe of that which we have tranflated before, if "the word fignified the fame in both places, (for there be fome "words that be not of the fame fenfe every where), we were efpecially careful, and made a confcience according to our duty. But that we should express the same notion in the fame parti"cular word; as, for example, if we tranflate the Hebrew or "Greek word once by purpose, never to call it intent; if one where

journeying, never travelling; if one where think, never suppose; "if one where pain, never ache; if one where joy, never gladness, "&c.; thus to mince the matter, we thought to favour more

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of curiofity than wisdom, and that rather it would breed scorn “in the Atheist, than bring profit to the godly reader. For is the "kingdom of God become words or fyllables? Why fhould we "be in bondage to them, if we may be free; ufe one precifely, when we may ufe another, no lefs fit, as commodiously? We "might also be charged by fcoffers, with fome unequal dealing "toward a great number of good English words. For as it is “written by a certain great philosopher, that he should say, that "thofe logs were happy that were made images to be worship

ped; for their fellows, as good as they, lay for blocks behind "the fire: fo if we fhould fay, as it were, unto certain words, "Stand up higher, have a place in the Bible always; and to others of like quality, Get ye hence, be banished for ever, we might be taxed peradventure with St James his words, namely, to be partial in ourselves, and judges of evil thoughts." Queritur, Can this tranflation be fafely rely'd on, as the rule of faith, when fuch are the tranflators ?jubi