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Prima facie warehousing the cargo is a charge that ought to be borne by the cargo, which benefits exclusively by it. It may conceivably, in some cases, have been rendered necessary by an antecedent sacrifice, so as to fall within the definition of the loss caused thereby. Re-loading is not an act of sacrifice, for long before it occurs both ship and cargo are safe. Where, for example, a ship has cut away a mast and has put into port to repair the damage so caused, and been compelled, in order to repair this special damage to unload and to re-load the cargo, it may follow, according to the decision in Atwood v. Sellar (ante), that such expenses are all part of the loss involved in the original sacrifice. The principle of law that appears to be the basis of the decision in Atwood v. Sellar is that a general expenditure directly caused by a general average sacrifice is part of the loss which it entails, and becomes the subject of general average contribution.”

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A common sea risk may be defined as that which does not require the deliberation of the party to determine whether it shall be incurred or not. It may be here incidentally pointed out that by the law of England the expenditure of ammunition in resisting capture by a privateer,

the damage done to the ship in the combat, and the expense of curing the wounded sailors, are not the subject of general average.

Where the thing destroyed has some peculiar condition attached to it, so that it will be lost whether the whole adventure is saved or not, then its destruction cannot be deemed a sacrifice. And where a mast is in such a condition that it must have been lost, whether the vessel got safely into port or not, there can be no sacrifice of it when it was cut away, and the plaintiffs have, therefore, no claim to contribution.

General average cannot exist without an intentional sacrifice; but the meaning of the word "sacrifice," and what is comprehended by it is that if anything on board a ship which is cut or cast away because it is endangering the whole adventure, is in such a state or condition that it must itself certainly be lost, although the rest of the adventure should be saved without the cutting or casting away, then the destruction of the thing gives no claim for general average. In other words, where, whether the act relied upon as the act of sacrifice has been done or not, the thing in respect of which contribution is claimed would, by reason of its own state or condition, have been of no value whatever, or would have been certainly or absolutely lost to

the owner, although the rest of the adventure had been saved, there is nothing lost to the owner by the act, and therefore there is nothing sacrificed, that is to say, there is no sacrifice. Again, to make the meaning of the word "sacrifice" absolutely clear, there is nothing in respect of which a general average contribution can be claimed, if the thing in respect of which the contribution is claimed was, when the act relied upon was done, of no value whatever to the owner. Conversely, where it is possible to save the mast.1

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The expression "hopelessly lost" signifies "impossible to be saved." Colloquially, a thing is impossible when, according to the ordinary course of human events, no expectation can be entertained that it will happen. The property destroyed or abandoned must, in all respects, be considered in the same light as if it had been saved, and its value must be estimated accordingly; and, therefore, where the thing said to have been voluntarily abandoned or destroyed is in such a state, by reason of a peril peculiar to itself, that if the act of supposed sacrifice had not been done, it would have very shortly been destroyed without the

1 See Corry v. Coulthard, unreported, but mentioned in Shepherd v. Kottgen, 2 C.P.D. 583.

rest of the common adventure being lost, the act of slightly hastening the moment of loss is not an act of sacrifice which enables the owner of the thing to claim contribution. There is no act of sacrifice if within a short time the thing would have been lost by a peril peculiar to itself, and independent of the common peril to which the whole adventure is exposed." A bill of lading contained an exception of "fire on board." The defendants carried goods belonging to the plaintiff, and the goods were injured during the voyage in consequence of water used to extinguish a fire which occurred during the voyage. On the true construction of the bill of lading it was made perfectly clear to the Court that the meaning was that their contract as carriers was subjected to the specified exceptions to fire and its consequences, but these exceptions only applied to the defendants as carriers, and did not relieve the shipowners from the liability for general average contribution to the owner of goods damaged by water used in putting out a fire on board.'

1 See Schmidt v. Royal Mail Company, 1876, 45 L.J., Q.B. 646.

CHAPTER V.

The two Conditions necessary in order to make Jettison the subject of General Average--Long continued custom has created Claim called General Average-Where Steam Power substituted for Sailing Power-English Law quite clear where Equipment of Ship is employed for its Ordinary Purpose Where endeavour made to Float Stranded Steamship-An Imminent Peril must Exist in order to Claim Contribution--Liabilities of Shipowner existing upon Bills of Lading-Where Insurance is upon each Package Separately-Where Armed Forces Board a Ship--Rule of Law that Master may, in Urgent Cases, Sell part of Cargo of Ship-Ship Disabled by Perils of Sea from Pursuing her Voyage-Expenditures-Determination of question of Destructive Total Loss--Services Rendered by getting Ship away from place where she Stranded—Ship going to Sea with Less Hands than she ought to do.

In order to make jettison the subject of a general average contribution two conditions must be fulfilled. First of all, there must be common danger; it must be a maritime peril, and it must be common to the whole adventure. And secondly, there must be a sacrifice in the sense of intentional sacrifice. That is a second condition which must be fulfilled, "and that seems to exclude all those cases in which the average staters ought to refuse to allow a contribution upon the

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