amounting to 10 per cent. on each series." A policy of this nature is to be construed as if it had stood alone. Whether the words do or do not imply the existence of another policy effected on the same goods is quite immaterial; such other policy, if there be one, not being so incorporated into the policy sued on as to affect this contract. If the words had stopped at "stranded, sunk or burnt," it would not be a loss within the terms of the policy sued on. The policy then would have covered only the risks excepted by the well-known clause in English policies, and the only claim the assured will have will be particular average where there has been a stranding, sinking or burning. The words "to pay all claims and losses on Dutch terms, and according to statement made up by official dispacheur in Holland," will have no meaning unless they are incorporated with, and govern the interpretation of, the earlier words. The whole of the sentence must be read together. Again, the words in a bill of lading, average, if any, is to be adjusted according to British custom," have, in one case, been held to mean that whether or not the loss was, according to the general law of England, the subject of general average contribution, plaintiff, by the terms of the bill of lading, had

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made the admitted practice of average adjusters part of the contract, and he was bound by it although erroneous.' Moreover, where the policy declared does not refer to or incorporate any other policy, it is to be construed as if there had been no other policy in existence.

The master of a vessel has no right to insist upon payment of an arbitrary sum without furnishing the necessary account or particulars to enable the owner to ascertain how this amount became due. If the master refused to furnish such particulars, so as to enable the plaintiff to ascertain the extent of the defendant's lien, he is guilty of a breach of duty within the terms of section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861. But if, after giving all proper information, the master were to say: "You must either pay the amount which I demand from you, or you must pay the right sum," the owner of the cargo could not insist upon paying the amount into a bank in the name of persons other than the shipowner, but must pay him either the amount demanded, or tender that which he (the consignee), believes to be reasonable. If, however, the master had said that, whatever might be the amount of the sum

I See Stewart v. West India and Pacific Steamship Company, L.R. 8, Q.B. 88, 362.

tendered by the consignee, he would accept nothing but a particular security, then the question would arise whether the security which he demanded was a reasonable one. "If he (the captain), says that he will only accept a deposit of 10 per cent. on the value of the goods, this as a general rule would be only unreasonable."

Take the case of salvage. The ship is in distress and is succoured by salvors, and the master makes a compromise with them for the payment of a large sum, and it may turn out upon the final settlement that a large part of the salvage will fall on the shipowner, and yet, under the terms of the bond, the master is to be at liberty to take the whole amount of the salvage out of the deposit, the only security for the payment of what ought to be returned being the credit of the shipowner.

If the shipowner requires the consignee to enter into a bond in particular terms, the question arises whether the bond is unreasonable, and if part of what is insisted upon is unreasonable, the whole instrument is unreasonable.

It is undoubtedly true that if a person receives goods in pursuance of a bill of lading, in which it is expressed that the goods are to be delivered to him, he paying freight, he by implication engages to pay freight, and so he would to pay

general average, if they were mentioned in the bili of lading. The master has a lien on the goods for general average, and if he had exercised that right, and informed the defendant that if he took the goods he must pay the general average, and if the defendant after such notice had taken the goods, there would then have been an implied, if not an express contract on his part to pay it. The law, however, will not imply a contract from the mere fact of knowledge that the goods were subject to a charge, unless it were accompanied with notice from the shipowner that he would insist on his right of lien. If there is any established usage that a consignee shall pay general average there must be evidence of an agreement on the part of the defendant to pay. Moreover, for a defendant to pay general average in one case it is not sufficient evidence to raise by implication a promise to pay in every case.

A consignee who is the absolute owner of the goods, is liable to pay general average, because the law throws upon him that liability. But a mere consignee, who is not the owner is not liable, unless before he receives them he is informed by the shipowner or the master that if he (the master) takes them he must pay it. A consignee by taking the goods adopts the

contract, i.e., the contract in the bill of lading, the terms of which are: "The master agrees with the shipper to deliver the goods to the consignee, he paying demurrage and freight ". It should also be particularly borne in mind that the law will not imply a contract to pay general average because the defendant, before he received the goods, knew that they were subject to it. There must be an express contract to pay general average.

To prevent the inconvenience of resorting to the consignor, he may insert in the bill of lading an express clause that the goods shall be delivered to the consignee, he paying general average; or he may insist on his right of lien and refuse to deliver unless the consignee pays or agrees to pay it. The shipowner's parting with his lien on the goods may be a good consideration for an express promise by the consignee to pay general average, but does not raise any implied contract to pay it, even though the consignee has notice that a general average has been incurred. The cases in which a mere consignee, not the owner of goods, has been held liable to freight or demurrage proceed on the ground that his acceptance of the goods in pursuance of a bill of lading, whereby the shipper has expressly made the

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