given to sluggish idleness: seeking occasions after a sort, whereby the dulness of human slothfulness being shaken off, the largeness of its bounty may not seem to be unreasonable, while it imparteth the same under the colour of a kind of desire and labour. Yet so notwithstanding that grace may always continue to be gracious and free, while to such kind of small and little endeavours, with an inestimable largess it giveth so great glory of immortality, so great gifts of everlasting bliss. Leth human frailty therefore endeavour as much as it will, it cannot be equal to the retribution that is to come; neither by the labours thereof doth it so diminish God's grace, that it doth not always continue to be given freely."

Where you may observe, from what fountain the schoolmen did derive their doctrine of works preparatory, meriting grace by way of congruity, though not of condignity. For Cassianus (whom Prosperi chargeth, notwithstanding all this qualifying of the matter, to be a maintainer in very deed of that damned point of Pelagianism, "that the grace of God was given according to our merits") Cassianus, I say, was a man that bare great sway in our monasteries, where his writings were accounted as the monks' general rules: and until the other day, Faustus himself (who of all others most cunningly opposed the doctrine of St. Augustine touching grace and free will) was accepted in the popish schools for a reverend doctor and a Catholic bishop. Yea the works of Pelagius himself were had in such account, that some of them (as his epistle ad Demetriadem for example, and the exposition upon St. Paul's epistles, fraught with his heretical opinions) have passed from hand to hand, as if they had been written by St. Hierome; and as such, have been alleged against us by some of our adversaries in this very question of free will. The less is it to be wondered, that three hundred years ago in the midnight of popery, the pro

h Quantumlibet ergo enisa fuerit humana fragilitas, futuræ retributioni par esse non poterit; nec ita laboribus suis divinam imminuit gratiam, ut non semper gratuita perseveret. Joh. Cassian. collat. 13. cap. 13.

i Prosp. contr. Collator. cap. 3. et 17. tomo 10. oper. Augustini.

found doctor Thomas Bradwardin (then chancellor of London, and afterwards archbishop of Canterbury) should begin his disputations, Of the Cause of God against Pelagius, with this lamentable complaint: "Behold (I speak it with grief of heart touched inwardly) as in old time against one prophet of God, there were found eight hundred and fifty prophets of Baal, unto whom an innumerable company of people did adhere: so at this day, in this cause, how many, O Lord, do now fight with Pelagius for free will against thy free grace, and against Paul, the spiritual champion of grace? For the whole world almost is gone after Pelagius into error. Arise therefore, O Lord, judge thine own cause: and him that defendeth thee, defend, protect, strengthen, comfort." To whose judgment I also now leave these "vain" defenders," or (as St. Augustine rightly censureth them) "deceivers, and puffers up, and presumptuous extollers of free will."

Ecce enim (quod non nisi tactus dolore cordis intrinsecus refero) sicut olim contra unicum Dei prophetam octingenti et quinquaginta prophetæ Baal, et similes sunt reperti, quibus et innumerabilis populus adhærebat: ita et hodie in hac causa; quot, Domine, hodie cum Pelagio pro libero arbitrio contra gratuitam gratiam tuam pugnant, et contra Paulum pugilem gratiæ spiritualem? Thom. Bradwardin. præfat. in libros de causa Dei contra Pelag.

1 Totus etenim pene mundus post Pelagium abiit in errorem. Exurge igitur Domine, judica causam tuam; et sustinentem te sustine, protege, robora, consolare. Ibid.

m Liberi arbitrii defensores, imo deceptores quia inflatores, et inflatores quia præsumptores. Augustin. epist. 194. ad Sixtum, op. tom. 2. pag. 719. Vani, non defensores, sed inflatores liberi arbitrii. Id. in opere imperf. contra Julian. Pelagian. lib. 2. cap. 154. op. tom. 10. pag. 1014. Non defensores, sed inflatores et præcipitatores liberi arbitrii. Id. de Grat. et lib. arbitr. cap. 14. ibid. pag. 731.

OF

MERITS.

In the last place we are told, that the fathers of the unspotted Church of Rome did teach, that man "for his meritorious works receiveth, through the assistance of God's grace, the bliss of everlasting happiness." But our challenger, I suppose, will hardly find one father either of the spotted or unspotted Church of Rome, that ever spake so babishly herein, as he maketh them all to do. "That man by the assistance of God's grace, may do meritorious works," we have read in divers authors, and in divers meanings. But after these works done, that a man should "receive through the assistance of God's grace the bliss of everlasting happiness," is such a piece of gibberish, as I do not remember that before now I have ever met withal even in Babel itself. For with them that understand what they speak, assistance hath reference to the doing of the work, not to the receiving of the reward: and simply to say, that a man " for his meritorious works," taking merit here as the Romanists in this question would have it taken, "receiveth through God's grace the bliss of everlasting happiness," is to speak flat contrarieties, and to conjoin those things, that cannot possibly be coupled together. For that conclusion of Bernard is most certain: "There is no place for grace to enter, where merit hath taken possession;" because it is grounded upon the apos

a Non est in quo gratia intret, ubi jam meritum occupavit. Bernard. in Cant. ser. 67.

VOL. III.

N N

tle's determination, "If it be of grace, it is no more of works: or else were grace no more grace."

Neither do we therefore take away the reward, because we deny the merit of good works. We know that in the keeping of God's commandments "there is great reward"," and that unto him who "soweth righteousness," there shall be "a sure reward"." But the question is, whence he that soweth in this manner, must expect to reap so great and so sure a harvest? Whether from God's justice, which he must do if he stand, as the Jesuits would have him do, upon merit; or from his mercy, as a recompence freely bestowed out of God's gracious bounty, and not in justice due for the worth of the work performed. Which question, we think, the prophet Hosea hath sufficiently resolved, when he biddeth us "sowe to ourselves in righteousness, and reap in MERCY." Yea and God himself in the very publication of the decalogue, where he promiseth to shew MERCY unto thousands of them that love him, and keep his commandments. Neither do we hereby any whit detract from the truth of that axiom, that "God will give every man according to his works:" for still the question remaineth the very same, whether God may not judge a man according to his works, when he sitteth upon the "throne of grace, as well as when he sitteth upon the throne of justice?" and we think here, that the prophet David hath fully cleared the case, in that one sentence, "With thee, O Lord, is MERCY: for thou rewardest every one according to his works."

Originally therefore, and in itself, we hold that this reward proceedeth merely from God's free bounty and mercy, but accidentally, in regard that God hath tied himself by his word and promise to confer such a reward, we grant that it now proveth in a sort to be an act of justice, even as in forgiving of our sins (which in itself all men know to be an act of mercy) he is said to be "faithful" and

b Rom. chap. 11. ver. 6. Prov. chap. 11. ver. 18. Exod. chap. 20. ver. 6. 1 John, chap. 1. ver. 9.

c Psal. 19. ver. 11.

e Hosea, chap. 10. ver. 12.
Psalm 62. ver. 12.

just," namely, in regard of the faithful performance of his promise. For promise, we see, amongst honest men is counted a due debt; but the thing promised being free, and on our part altogether undeserved, if the promiser did not perform, and proved not to be so good as his word, he could not properly be said to do me wrong, but rather to wrong himself, by impairing his own credit. And therefore Aquinas himself confesseth," that God is not hereby simply made a debtor to us, but to himself; inasmuch as it is requisite that his own ordinance should be fulfilled." Thus was Moses careful to put the children of Israel in mind touching the land of Canaan (which was a type of our eternal habitation in heaven) that it was a land of promise, and not of merit, which God did give them to possess, "not for their righteousness, or for their upright heart, but that he might perform the word which he sware unto their fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” Whereupon the Levites say in their prayer unto God: "Thou madest a covenant with Abraham, to give unto his seed the land of the Canaanites, and hast performed thy word, because thou art JUST." Now because the Lord had made a like "promise of the crown of life to them that love him;" therefore St. Paul doth not stick in like manner to attribute this also to God's justice. "Henceforth" is laid up" saith he, "for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day: and not to me only, but unto all them also that love his appearing." Upon which place, Bernard, in his book of Grace and Free will, saith most sweetly: "That therefore, which Paul expecteth, is a crown of righteousness, but of God's righteousness, not his own. For it is just that he should give that which he

i Non sequitur, quod Deus efficiatur simpliciter debitor nobis, sed sibi ipsi ; in quantum debitum est, ut sua ordinatio impleatur. Thom. 1. cap. 2. quæst. 114. art. 1. ad. 3.

k Deut. chap. 9. ver. 5.

m James, chap. 1. ver. 12.

1 Nehem. chap. 9. ver. 8.

2 Tim. chap. 4. ver. 8.

• Est ergo quam Paulus expectat, corona justitiæ, sed justitiæ Dei, non suæ. Justum quippe est ut reddat quod debet; debet autem quod pollicitus est. Et hæc est justitia Dei, de qua præsumit apostolus, promissio Dei. Bern. lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio.