Sect. 216. effect of a notice of abandonment, if accepted, or made on good grounds, is to vest the ownership of the abandoned property in the underwriter from the moment of the loss, the master will be considered as the agent of the underwriter in all acts done by him from that time, within the scope of the authority given to him by the policy "to sue, labour, and travel," for "the defence, safeguard, and recovery of the subject insured." (j). If no effective notice of abandonment is given, the master, in all that he does within the scope of his duty, is the agent of the assured (k). (j) See the judgment in Fleming v. Smith (1848), 1 H. L. Cas. 513; and per Privy Council in Provincial Ins. Co. v. Leduc (1874), L. R. 6 (k) Fleming v. Smith, supra. a 217. GENERALLY speaking, everything which is exposed to risk by the perils of the seas may be made the subject of contract of marine insurance, unless its insurance is prohibited by law-including in this term the general law maritime, and the rules of international law so far as they form part of the law of the land (a). In this chapter we will consider what may be insured, and what is covered by the description in the policy of the usual subjects of insurance, leaving to another part of the work the consideration of those things the insurance of which is unlawful, owing to the prohibited nature of the traffic, or voyage, for or on which they are insured. The reason for this arrangement is that, as the prohibition of insurance in these latter cases generally arises not from anything in the nature of the things themselves considered as subjects of insurance, but solely from the illegality of the risk on which they are embarked, it seems more natural to treat of them, under the (a) See the Marine Insurance Bill, 1899, s. 3. What may and may not be insured. Sect. 217. general head of the illegality of the risk, in that division of the work devoted to the discussion of the causes that avoid the insurance. What is covered by a Ships and goods have always, and universally, been regarded as the proper and main subjects of insurance, and in dealing with them it will only be necessary to consider what is covered by a policy on "ship" or "goods" respectively. 218. In our common printed forms the policy, after stating policy on ship. that it is effected " upon any kind of goods and merchandises,' proceeds thus-" and also upon the body, tackle, apparel, ordnance, munition, artillery, boat, and other furniture, of and in the good ship or vessel called the," &c. When the insurance is intended to be confined to the ship alone, this is generally effected by inserting, either at the foot or margin of the policy, the words "on ship;" or by stating in the valuation clause that, as between the assured and underwriters on the particular policy, the subject of insurance is agreed to be the ship, or as many sixty-fourth shares thereof as the assured owns. The effect of either mode of specifying the subject of insurance is to obliterate, as it were, such other words of the general form as are inapplicable to the specified Not any part subject (b). It is hardly necessary to remark that a policy in this form on ship alone, even when effected by one who is owner both of the ship and cargo, cannot extend to protect the latter (c). of the cargo. Policies on hull and machinery. Sometimes a policy is made upon the hull and machinery of a steamship, and in valued policies on steamships it is a common practice to have separate valuations of hull and (b) See the general principle which subordinates the printed portions of the policy to the effect of those in manuscript, laid down in Robertson v. French (1803), 4 East, 130, 140, 141; Haughton v. Ewbank (1814), 4 Camp. 89; per Lord Penzance, Dudgeon v. Pembroke (1877), 2 App. Cas. 284, 293. Thus, the interest of a mortgagee, if misdescribed as bottomry, would remain uncovered by the policy, although there are printed words in the policy which would cover a mortgage notwithstanding the misdescription in manuscript. See Simonds v. Hodgson (1829), 6 Bing. 114; and S. C. (in error), per Lord Tenterden (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 50. (c) 1 Marshall, Ins. 328; per Smith, L. J., Field S.S. Co. v. Burr, [1899] 1 Q. B. 585. machinery. There can be no doubt that it is unnecessary to Sect. 218. mention the machinery in the policy, and that the term ship in a policy in which the vessel is stated to be a steamer covers the machinery as well as the hull (d). The object of the separate valuation is to provide that for certain purposes, in particular as regards average, the hull and the machinery are to be considered separately insured (e). word "fur 219. The provisions put on board the ship, when she sails, Provisions are for the use of the crew on the voyage, are comprehended part of the comprised as under the word "furniture," and protected by an insurance ship, under the on the "body, tackle, apparel, ordnance, furniture," &c., of niture.” the ship in the common printed form (ƒ). The contrary position had been erroneously inferred from the case of Robertson v. Ewer, which decided no such point, but merely established that the underwriter on ship could not be liable for the consumption of such provisions while the ship was detained by an embargo (g). It was admitted, in Brough v. Whitmore, that all the ship's stores and tackle were also included in the insurance on ship in the common form (h). The word "outfit" is sometimes used to denote the necessary stores and provisions put on board the ship for the use of the crew on the voyage; and, in this sense, outfit is included in (d) See per Kennedy, J., in Roddick v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Ins. Co., [1895] 1 Q. B. 842. (e) See Oppenheim v. Fry (1863), 3 B. & S. 873; in the Ex. Ch. (1864), 5 id. 348; 33 L. J. Q. B. 267. (f) Brough v. Whitmore (1791), 4 T. R. 206. (g) Robertson v. Ewer (1786), 1 T. R. 127; and see per Buller, J., 4 T. R. 210. Mr. Maclachlan points out that if provisions for the crew are laid in double, for reasons of economy or necessity, the policy on the ship will only cover the provisions for the voyage insured; the provisions in excess being cargo. a He also says that provisions intended (h) 4 T. R. 206. In Roddick v. Stores and included in tackle also insurance on the sense of Sect. 219. general insurance on ship. It is in this sense that Lord Ellenborough uses the word when he says that "hull and outfit are both protected by an insurance on ship" (i). Not so the for whaling voyages. In whaling voyages, however, the word "outfit" has a pecufishing stores liar sense, and means the fishing stores of the ships so employed; i.e., the harpoons, lances, spears, and whale lines, for the purpose of catching whales and seals on the voyage, and the casks, cisterns, boilers, &c., for preparing and containing the oil and blubber: in a word, all the instruments and apparatus necessary for taking the fish, and preparing and bringing home their animal produce (k). It is established, in accordance with the general custom of whaling voyages, that outfits in this sense are not protected by a general insurance in the common form on the "body, tackle, apparel, &c., of the ship" (7); and the practice in the United States, accordingly, is stated by Phillips to be to describe the different interests insured in a fishing voyage as "ship, outfit, and cargo” (m). Mode of insuring whaling risks in the United States. Fittings and dunnage. According to Mr. McArthur, temporary dunnage, ballast or fittings are in practice not treated as covered by a general policy on ship, but the rule is different when they are in permanent use on a ship regularly employed in a particular trade (n). In a recent case, " furniture," in a time policy on a ship employed in the grain trade, has been held to cover separation cloths and dunnage mats required for the proper carriage of grain cargoes, although in the particular voyage, not being in use, they were temporarily stowed away in the fore-peak (0). (i) Per Lord Ellenborough in Hill v. Patten (1807), 8 East, 375, and in Forbes v. Aspinall (1811), 13 East, 323, 325. (k) 8 East, 375; Gale v. Laurie (1826), 5 B. & Cr. 156. (7) Hoskins v. Pickersgill (1783), 3 Dougl. 222; 1 Marshall, Ins. 241; 1 Park, Ins. 126. Admitted in the case of The Dundee by Lord Stowell (1823), 1 Hagg. Ad. R. 109, 123 (see 1 Marshall, Ins. 241); and by Lord Tenterden in Gale v. Laurie (1826), 5 B. & Cr. 156, 164. See Hill v. Patten (1807), East, 373, 375. (m) 1 Phillips, Ins. ss. 496, 497. (n) McArthur, Mar. Ins. 58; and see the Marine Ins. Bill, Sched. I. r. 16. (0) Hogarth v. Walker, [1899] 2 Q. B. 400; 68 L. J. Q. B. 888; affirmed by the Court of Appeal, [1900] 2 Q. B. 283, |