an agent, in a foreign port, signed a certificate that certain Sect. 168. sugars were damaged over 5 per cent., the Court held that he had exceeded his authority, and that the certificate so given was not binding on the underwriters (i). By the same instructions no Lloyd's agent "is to accept an abandonment as the representative of the underwriters;" and although such acceptance of an abandonment by a Lloyd's agent seemed in one case to have been regarded as binding in the Common Pleas (), Lord Tenterden remarked, that in the case referred to, the instructions to Lloyd's agents could not have been before the Court (1). (i) Drake v. Marryatt (1823), 1 B. & Cr. 473. (k) Read v. Bonham (1821), 3 Brod. & B. 147. See the dicta of Burroughs, J., as there reported at p. 155. (7) Lord Tenterden in Drake v. Description of the assured in the policy. Practice of effecting policies in blank. 25 Geo. 3, c. 44. Policies in Blank 169 Who may avail themselves of an Insurance ..............172, 173 Assignment of Policy ....174-181 Construction of 28 Geo. 3, c. 56. 170 Ratification of Insurance 171 169. We have already, in briefly noticing the main requisites of the policy, stated how the blanks in the common printed forms are generally filled up with the names either of the assured himself or of the insurance agent by whose instrumentality the policy is effected. We will now proceed to give, more at large, the history and present state of the law as it relates to the filling up of these blanks in the printed forms. A practice appears to have sprung up in this country in the middle of the eighteenth century of effecting policies in blank; i.e., without inserting the names either of the party for whom or by whom they were effected (a). In consequence of complaints on the part of the underwriters, an Act was passed in the year 1784 (b), directing that the name of the person interested, or of his agent, should in all cases be inserted in the policy. The provisions of this Act appear to have been founded on a misconception of the real nature of that grievance of which the underwriters complained. What the underwriters really wanted was merely to know the name of some one concerned (a) Pray v. Edie (1786), 1 T. R. 313; see also the judgment of Buller, J., in Wolff v. Horncastle (1798), 1 B. & P. 316, 321. (b) 25 Geo. 3, c. 44. in effecting the policy, no matter whether principal or agent, Sect. 169. to whom they could look as a responsible debtor. What the Legislature appears to have aimed at was, as far as possible, to compel a disclosure of the name of the person really interested as principal. The Courts interpreted the Act strictly. Very soon after it was passed an underwriter took advantage of it to evade his contract on the ground that the agent's name was not inserted, eo nomine, as agent (c); and another policy was held void under the same law, because the names of all the parties interested were not inserted therein (d). c. 56. 170. This was evidently going too far. Another statute, 28 Geo. 3, therefore, was passed in the year 1787 (e), which still remains the law of the land. This Act provides that no policy shall be effected without first inserting therein "the name or names, or the usual style and firm of dealing," either-1st, of "one or more of the persons interested;" or, 2nd, of the "consignor or consignee of the property to be insured;" or, 3rd, of the "persons resident in Great Britain who shall receive the order for and effect the policy;" or, 4th, of the "persons who shall give the order to the agent immediately employed to effect it." struction of The Courts of Law have given this Act the most liberal Liberal conconstruction the words will bear. Thus, in a case that arose this Act. very soon after the passing of the Act, it was held—(1) that the consignees of the bills of lading, who were also the general agents of a foreign merchant, had a right in their own names to effect an insurance on the goods, on the refusal of the consignees of the goods to do so, and might recover as "consignees," within the meaning of the Act, under a count alleging that they had effected the policy as agents for the foreign merchant, and averring the interest to be in him; (2) that, although the foreign merchant had given them no directions in the first instance to insure, yet, as it was (c) Pray v. Edie (1786), 1 T. R. 313. (d) Wilton v. Reatson (1787), 1 VOL. I. Park, 16; Cox v. Parry (1786), 1 (e) 28 Geo. 3, c. 56. See App. Р Sect. 170. clear from his original instructions that he intended the goods should be insured by someone, and also, as he had afterwards written to approve of their having done so, they might recover, under the same count, as "persons receiving the order to effect the insurance" within the meaning of the Act; (3) that as the plaintiffs had employed the broker by whom the policy was actually effected, they might recover under the same count, as "persons giving the order to make the insurance," within the meaning of the Act; and (4) that as they had accepted and paid a bill drawn by their principal upon them on the security of the bills of lading they were "parties interested" within the meaning of the Act, and to the extent of the bill entitled to recover on a count, which averred the interest to be in them, and that they had effected the policy on their own account (ƒ). Ratification of an insurance. It is not necessary to add the word "agent" or any other description to the name of the broker in the policy itself (g). Moreover, an agent for a limited purpose is as much within the Act as a general agent (h). Where the policy was in the names of the parties really interested, but named them merely as the "trustees of Messrs. A. B. & C.," this was considered as an insertion "of their usual style and firm of dealing" under the Act (i). 171. We have seen that one of the points determined in the case of Wolff v. Horncastle, was this-that the subsequent adoption of the policy by the party for whom it was intended to be made is equivalent to a previous authority to effect it, and constitutes the party making it "a person receiving the order to effect the insurance" within the meaning of the Act; and this, by virtue of the general principle of the law of agency, that omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato æquiparatur (k). As an instance of ratification the following (f) Wolff v. Horncastle (1798), 1 B. & P. 316. (g) De Vignier v. Swanson (1798), 1 B. & P. 346, n. (h) Bell v. Gilson (1798), 1 B. & P. 345. (i) Hibbert v. Martin (1808), Camp. 538. (k) See Lucena v. Craufurd (1808), 1 Taunt. 325; S. C., in the House of case may be cited:-A policy was effected in London, through Sect. 171. the medium of a broker, by the orders of Hagedorn, in the usual form, “as well in his own name as for and in the name and names of all whom it might concern." This policy was effected by Hagedorn for Schroeder, a foreign merchant, who had given him no previous authority for that purpose, and who did not do any act to adopt the policy till nearly two years after it was effected; and then, long after a loss had occurred, he wrote to Hagedorn "hoping that he had settled the loss with the underwriters on the policy in question." Such adoption was held by Lord Ellenborough and the rest of the Court to be equivalent to a previous authority to insure (1). Of course, as no act of one man can be ratified by another, unless that other is cognizant of what has previously been done, so the party for whom the insurance is intended to be made cannot, by any after authority to insure, be considered to adopt the previous insurance, unless at the time of giving such authority he knew as a fact that the prior insurance had been made. This, indeed, is so plain on principle, that it requires no authority to enforce it; and it is all that was really decided in the earlier case of Bell r. Janson, in which Lord Ellenborough had thrown doubt upon the application of the principle of ratification to the Act of 28 Geo. 3 (m). It may therefore be laid down as a well-established rule, that where a policy has been made, without any previous instruction or authority, by the broker, its adoption or ratification by his principal, after the fact of its having been so Lords (1806), 2 B. & P. N. R. 269; Stirling v. Vaughan (1809), 11 East, 623; Routh v. Thompson (1811), 13 East, 274; Hagedorn . Oliverson (1814), 2 M. & S. 485; Barlow v. Leckie (1819), 4 J. B. Moore, 8. See ante, ss. 140-143. The law is the same in the United States; see per Kent, J., in Steinback v. Rhinelander (1803), 3 John. New York Cases, 281; 1 Phillips on Ins. s. 388; 3 Kent, Com. 256. (1) Hagedorn v. Oliverson (1814), 2 M. & S. 485. So, also, Williams v. North China Ins. Co., C. A. (1875), 1 C. P. D. 757. (m) Bell v. Janson (1813), 1 M. & S. 201. N.B.-This case was also in a great measure decided upon the ground that the declaration contained an express averment that the parties effecting the policy were persons who had received the order to insure. |