Outlines of Moral ScienceC. Scribner, 1852 - 272 páginas |
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Términos y frases comunes
according acted differently admitted animal appetite approve argument argument from design arise ascer Atheist beauty benevolence Bishop Butler cause CHAPTER choice conceive conscious considered constitution contrary creature degree deny desires and affections determine dictates of conscience disapprobation disposition distinct doctrine duty emotion ence error evident exercise exerted existence fluence free agency governed habits happiness human hypothesis idea impartial indifference influence intelligent intuitive ject judge kind liberty moral act moral actions moral agent moral character moral evil moral faculty moral feelings moral nature moral obligation moral qualities moral sense nature of virtue necessary never obey opinion pain Paley Pantheist perceived performed person possess principles produced question racter reason regard relation rience Samuel Clarke self-determining power soul specting suppose tain taste of honey theory thing THOMAS REID tion true truth tween virtuous actions volition voluntary wisdom wrong
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Página 165 - It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence...
Página 22 - Now the question is, whether, if this story were related to the wild boy caught some years ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without experience, and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and, consequently, under no possible influence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit; whether, I say, such a one would feel, upon the relation, any degree of that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius's conduct which we feel, or not?
Página 168 - The fact, then, appears to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery.
Página 52 - when he is urged by a violent motive, resulting from the command of another" FIRST, "The motive must be violent.
Página 177 - We consider how our conduct would appear to an impartial spectator; we approve of it if we feel that he would approve; we disapprove it if we think that he would disapprove. According to Dr. Smith, we are able to form a judgment as to our own conduct, because we have previously judged of the moral conduct of others; that is, have sympathized with the feelings of others. And but for the supposed presence of some impartial spectator, as a mirror to represent us to ourselves, we should as little have...
Página 53 - And then let it be asked, Why am I obliged to keep my word ? and the answer will be, Because I am " urged to do so by a violent motive" (namely, the expectation of being after this life rewarded, if I do, or punished for it, if I do not) " resulting from the command of another...
Página 162 - the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.
Página 166 - ... benevolence and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice ; for if this were the case, in the review of one's own character or that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to everything but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting.
Página 22 - ... when they found him. The old man, more anxious for the safety and fortunes of his son than about the little that might remain of his own life, began immediately to inquire of the officers who seized him, whether his son was well, whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of his generals ? ' That son,' replied one of the officers, ' so dear to thy affections, betrayed thee to us; by his information thou art apprehended, and diest.
Página 57 - ... discern what will most contribute to happiness. And if what we call vice or sin could be made to contribute to happiness, then it would change its nature and become virtue. The definition of obligation, given by Dr, Paley, upon his own principles, is unnecessarily encumbered with what adds nothing to its im8* port. Why should the " violent motive" result from the command of another?