thing from a notice of abandonment, though the ambiguous word 'abandonment' often leads to confounding the two." Rankin v. Potter (1873), L. R. 6 H. L. at pp. 118, 119, 156.

III. Where the insurer pays or settles for a total loss, the assured is bound to abandon or cede to the insurer, as from the date of the casualty causing the loss, whatever may remain of the subject-matter insured, together with all rights and remedies incident thereto. This cession is sometimes called abandonment, and sometimes is referred to as the "subrogation" of the insurer for the assured. See Castellain v. Preston (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 380, C. A. Abandonment in this sense of the term is not peculiar to marine insurance, but is a necessary incident of every contract of indemnity. It is to be noted that life insurance, unlike the insurance of property, is not a contract of indemnity. Rankin v. Potter (1873), L. R. 6 H. L. at pp. 118, 119.

"On general principles of equity, not at all peculiar to marine insurance, he who recovers on a contract of indemnity must and does by taking satisfaction from the person indemnifying him, cede all his right in respect of that for which he obtains indemnity. There is no notice of abandonment in fire insurance, but the salvage is transferred on the principle of equity, expressed by Lord Hardwicke, that the person who originally sustains the loss was the owner, but, after satisfaction made to him, the insurer." Per Blackburn, J., Rankin v. Potter (1873), L. R. 6 H. L. at p. 118 (loss of freight).

"Where the owners of an insured ship have claimed or been paid as for a total loss, the property in what remains of the ship, and all rights incident to the property, are transferred to the underwriters as from the time of the disaster in respect of which the total loss is claimed for and paid. The right to receive payment of freight accruing due but not earned at the time of the disaster is one of those rights so incident to the property in the ship, and it therefore passes to the underwriters, because the ship has become their property, just as it would have passed to a mortgagee of the ship who before the freight was completely earned had taken possession of the ship. This is at times very hard upon the insured owner of the ship; he can, however, avoid it by claiming only for a partial loss, keeping the property in himself, and so keeping the right to earn the accruing freight. In such a case he recovers an indemnity for the amount of the loss actually sustained, in calculating which all the benefits incident to the property retained by the shipowner must be considered.

"But the right of the assured to recover damages from a third person is not one of those rights which are incident to the property in the ship; it does pass to the underwriters in case of payment for a total loss, but on a different principle. And on this same principle

it does pass to the underwriters, who have satisfied a claim for a partial loss, though no property in the ship passes.

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"Mason v. Sainsbury (3 Douglas' Rep. 61) and Yates v. Whyte (4 Bing. N. C. 272) were both cases of partial loss only. The right of the underwriters could not arise in those cases by relation back to the passing of the property at the time of the loss, for there was no such passing of the property. It could only arise, and did only arise, from the fact that the underwriters had paid an indemnity, and so were subrogated for the person whom they had indemnified in his personal rights from the time of the payment of the indemnity." Per Lord Blackburn, Simpson v. Thomson (1877), 3 App. Cas. at pp. 292, 293.

In a later case, Brett, L.J., proceeds to point out that abandonment is applicable to every claim for a total loss, whether actual or constructive. "If there is anything to abandon, abandonment must take place; as, for instance, when there is an actual total loss, and that which remains of a ship is what has been called a congeries of planks, there must be an abandonment of the wreck . . . But that abandonment must take place at the time of the settlement of the claim. It need not take place before." Kaltenback v. Mackenzie (1878), 3 C. P. D. at p. 471.

NOTE E.-DEFINITION OF PIRACY.

PIRACY (from Lat. piratica, sea robbery).-Robbery with violence at sea is called piracy, but no precise general definition of the term can be given. There are certain acts which all civilized nations recognize as piratical, and which constitute piracy jure gentium. Then there is the common law definition of piracy, and then by the statute law of various countries certain acts are deemed to constitute piracy for the purposes to which the statutes apply. Thus "the slave trade is piratical in England and the United States, and in France the crew of an armed vessel navigating in time of peace with irregular papers become pirates upon the mere fact of irregularity, without the commission of any act of violence." Hall's International Law, Ed. 3, p. 264. It is obvious that different legal consequences may ensue according as an act comes within one or another of these overlapping but not coincident descriptions of piracy. For instance, the master of a ship might be criminally liable for piracy on facts which would not constitute piracy within the meaning of a mercantile document, such as a charter party or harine policy. The following definitions may be

cited :

1. “Piracy is defined by the text writers to be the offence of depredating on the seas without being authorized by any sovereign state, or with commissions from different sovereigns at war with each other." Wheaton, International Law, Ed. 2, p. 246. As to piracy by municipal law, see at p. 247.

2. "The crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high seas, is an offence against the universal law of society, a pirate being, according to Sir Edward Coke, hostis humani generis. The offence of piracy, by common law, consists in committing those acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas which if committed upon land would have amounted to felony there. But by statute some other offences are made piracy also." Blackstone Commentaries, vol. 4, pp. 71, 72, citing 2 Inst. 113. Cf. Cicero, off. 3, 29. Pirata non est perduellium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium.

3. "Piracy, by the law of nations, is taking a ship on the high seas, or within the jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral, from the possession or control of those who are lawfully entitled to it, and carrying away the ship itself, or any of its goods, tackle, apparel, or furniture, under circumstances which would have amounted to robbery if the act had been done within the body of an English county It is doubtful whether persons cruising in armed vessels with intent to commit piracies are pirates or not." Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law, Ed. 3, Art. 104; as to piracy by statute for criminal purposes, see Arts. 106-117.

4. "Piracy is forcible robbery at sea, whether committed by marauders from outside the ship or by mariners or passengers within it. The essential element is that they violently dispossess the master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself or any of the goods with felonious intent." Carver's Carriage by Sea, Ed. 3, § 94, citing A. G. v. Kwok-a-Sing (1870), L. R. 5 P. C. at p. 179.

5. "Piracy is robbery on the sea, or by descent from the sea upon the coast, committed by persons not holding a commission from or at the time pertaining to any established state. . . . Piracy, being a crime against nations, may be brought before any court, no matter what the nationality of the plaintiff or the origin of the pirate may be. The law of such state may enlarge the definition of the crime of piracy, but must confine the operation of the new definition to its own citizens and foreigners on its own vessels." Wolsey, International Law, § 137.

6. "The charge of Sir Charles Hedges (13 St. Tr. 454) contains a correct exposition of the law as to what constitutes piracy jure gentium. Piracy is only a sea term for robbery, piracy being a robbery within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. . . . If the mariners of any

ship shall violently dispossess the master and afterwards carry away the ship itself, or any of the goods, with a felonious intention in any place where the Lord Admiral hath jurisdiction, this is robbery and piracy." A. G. for Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing (1873), L. R. 5 P. C. at p. 199. (Murder of a Frenchman on a French ship by a Chinese. Piracy justiciable in any court.)

7. "The taint of piracy does not, in the absence of conviction or condemnation, continue, like a maritime lien, to travel with the ship through her transfers to various owners." R. v. Mc' Cleverty (1871), L. R. 3 P. C. at p. 689.

8. "Piracy may be said to consist in acts of violence done upon the ocean or unappropriated lands, or within the territory of a state through descent from the sea, by a body of men acting independently of any politically organized society." Hall's International Law (1892), Ed. 3, p. 257.

NOTE F.-HISTORY OF MARINE INSURANCE.

The origin of marine insurance is obscure. Loans on bottomry are of very ancient date. Money lent on bottomry is not repayable in case of loss, and marine insurance, the earliest form of insurance, may well have been a development of this maritime usage. There is evidence that marine insurance was known to the Lombards in the twelfth century, and some time later it was introduced into England, probably by the merchants of the Steelyard, the representatives of the Hanseatic League, whose treaty privileges in England were abolished in 1578. Its English history is ably and exhaustively traced by Mr. F. Martin in his History of Lloyd's and Marine Insurance, published in 1876. It will be sufficient here to give the leading dates in that history.1

1589.-First reported case, dnon, 6 Coke R. 47B, tried before Wray, C.J.

1601.-First mention in the statute book. The 43 Eliz. c. 12 established a special court for the trial of marine insurance cases. The court fell into disuse by the end of the seventeenth century, but the Act was not repealed expressly till 1863. See Martin, p. 49.

1613. Earliest extant English policy. It almost exactly resembles the form given in the Guidon de la Mer, published in France in 1600, and for the most part is in accord with the Lloyd's policy now in use. See Martin, p. 46.

1688.-First mention of Lloyd's coffee-house, resorted to by merchants and underwriters.

1720. The "Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation " and the "London Assurance Corporation,” incorporated by charter pursuant to the 6 Geo. I. c. 18, with the privilege of being the only corporations or societies who were allowed to insure marine risks or lend money on bottomry.

1726.—Lloyd's List established. See Martin, p. 107.

1730.-Lloyd's Register of Shipping first published. See Martin,

p. 325.

1745. The Marine Insurance Act, 1745 (19 Geo. II. c. 37), passed to prohibit wagering policies and re-insurance. See Martin, p. 139. 1749.-The "Memorandum " added to the common form of policy. See McArthur, Ed. 2, p. 274.

1756.-Lord Mansfield raised to the Bench. He sat till 1788, and settled the principles of English insurance law.

1769.-Lloyd's formed into a society with rules and regulations, and established in the Royal Exchange. See Martin, p. 145.

1779.-Lloyd's policy settled in its present form and printed. In 1850 a verbal alteration was made by omitting the introductory words "In the name of God, Amen," and substituting "Be it known that."

1788. The Marine Insurance Act, 1788 (28 Geo. III. c. 56), requires the name of the assured to be inserted in all policies.

1795.-Marine policies first required to be in writing and stamped by 35 Geo. III. c. 63. See Home Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith (1898), 1 Q. B. at p. 834.

1824.-Monopoly of "Royal Exchange" and "London Assurance" Corporations abolished by 5 Geo. IV. c. 114, and companies and partnerships allowed to engage in marine insurance. See Martin, p. 290.

1834. Establishment of "Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping" on modern basis. See Martin, p. 345.

1845.-The Gaming Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 109), makes void all contracts by way of gaming or wagering.

1862. The Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), provides for incorporation of limited companies, and prohibits associations of more than twenty persons from carrying on business unless incorporated. 1864.-Re-insurance again legalized by 27 & 28 Vict. c. 56. See Mackenzie v. Whitworth, 1 Ex. D. at p. 40.

1868.-The Policies of Marine Assurance Act (31 & 32 Vict. c. 86) provides for assignment of policies and empowers assignee to sue in his

own name.