accounts of the matter by Eliphalet Dyer and others (see nos. 594-597, 607, 627, 631, 636, 659), practically all of which now appear for the first time. Laurens in particular, careful, systematic man of business that he was, had been thoroughly disgusted, upon his coming to Congress, with the methods of doing business which were in vogue there, and toward this measure his impatience knew no bounds. In the sequel the project proved almost to be a boomerang.

Next to the conduct of the war the outstanding achievement in Congress during the period with which this volume is concerned was the framing and adoption of the Articles of Confederation. The volume covers, indeed, almost the precise time which Congress occupied, albeit by fits and starts, in putting that instrument of union into form. For, although at the moment when Congress began to weigh the question of declaring the colonies independent it also set strenuously about the endeavor speedily to consummate their union as a necessary concomitant of their independence, the task of confederating proved to be far more difficult than that of declaring independence; accordingly the undertaking lagged and halted through many months, and it was not until near the end of the year 1777 that it was at last put into grudging and reluctant form and sent to the states for their approval. There were too many local prejudices that could be worn away only by a period of co-operation; too many sectional jealousies that could be assuaged only by the softening process of time; too many colonial fears of one another that must needs be overcome by fears more potent. The struggle to make good their Declaration of Independence must become more desperate; the iron must be brought to a whiter heat before the welding could begin.

The idea of an organic union of the colonies had in some form long existed. To go no further back than the first meeting of the Continental Congress, Joseph Galloway had in September, 1774, offered a plan of union, designed to bind Great Britain and the colonies closer together and having for its primary object the forestalling of revolution and the preservation of the British empire. The plan was, however, summarily rejected. Then, in July, 1775, Franklin had brought forward a tentative plan as a basis for discussion; but the time was not yet ripe, and that plan also was laid aside, with not so much as a record of its presentation appearing upon the minutes of Congress. In the winter of 1776, efforts to have it brought under consideration failed, but events were nevertheless rapidly giving strength to the conviction that some sort of union was necessary, a union more precise in form, more definite in its implications, more substantial in its foundations, than a mere assembly of colonial ambassadors, such as Congress was generally deemed to be. In fact, as the great turning-point in the struggle with Great Britain drew near, the sentiment for the confederation outran that for independence, winning many adherents who revolted at the idea of separation from the mother country, or

else stood hesitant and aloof. A factor that contributed greatly to the strength of this sentiment was the belief that, whatever the ultimate aim of the contest, assistance from foreign powers, from France in particular, would be necessary, and it was the conviction of many members of Congress that such assistance could most successfully be obtained through a firm union of the colonies.

When therefore Richard Henry Lee, on the 7th of June, 1776, presented his resolution for independence, he coupled with it resolutions looking to a foreign alliance and also to a confederation. In Lee's mind at that time the idea of a foreign alliance appears to have had precedence over that of a confederation, although in the view of John Adams and some others the programme of measures should have had a different order. Committees for both these purposes were appointed on the 12th of June, and while the report on the confederation was earlier presented, the plan for a foreign alliance, or a “plan of treaties ", as the resolution of Congress had worded it, was sooner brought to maturity. The latter may accordingly be appropriately first dealt with here. Indeed, except in connection with the confederation, members of Congress indulge in but little comment upon it during this earlier period.

On the 18th of July the committee reported a " Plan of Treaties" to be proposed to France, which, after some amendments, was adopted on the 17th of September. On the 24th instructions to the commissioners who should propose the treaty were adopted, to which some additions were made October 16, and meanwhile, on the 26th of September, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Thomas Jefferson were appointed commissioners to the court of France. Deane was already in France as the agent of the secret committee, Jefferson presently declined, and Arthur Lee, who was also already abroad, was chosen in his place; and at the end of October Franklin departed on his mission. On the same day that these commissioners were appointed, steps were taken with a view to entering into treaties with other courts, although it was not until the following May that this measure came to maturity. To what a fiasco, or series of fiascoes, this venture toward other European courts was a preliminary it is not needful now to speak. There were not wanting, however, even then, those who looked upon the venture as no more than a ridiculous, even if a somewhat frantic, gesture (see, for instance, the letter of William Hooper to Robert Morris, December 28).

Such were the preliminary preparations for negotiations with foreign powers. During the period under consideration the states drew indeed some aid from France, but they also drew a problem that vexed the souls of Congress to distraction, a horde of French officers, clamorous for commissions and perquisites. It was not until the beginning of 1778, after the victory over Burgoyne, that France saw fit to enter into an alliance with the United States and that an opportunity arose for making

use of the plan of a treaty which had been prepared with so much care. The plan nevertheless had an interesting subsequent history; for it became the core and centre of nearly all the treaties entered into by the United States prior to the adoption of the Constitution..

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The committee to prepare and digest the form of a confederation set earnestly about its task, entrusting the work of drafting the instrument to John Dickinson. We are not given many glimpses into the committee room, but we are told that there were warm disputes over some questions, and Edward Rutledge, in particular, manifested great alarm over what was proposed. Rutledge soon became nevertheless one of the stoutest champions of a confederation. The committee laid its draft of the articles before Congress on the 12th of July, and a few days later Congress, in committee of the whole, took it into consideration. Of the principal debates upon it at this time (July 25 to August 2) both John Adams and Jefferson have left notes, and these notes constitute the basis of the most that has been known or said by historians concerning the Articles of Confederation during the process of their formation. There are, however, many letters of the members which throw much additional light upon individual views and the attitudes of their respective states upon the questions involved. It is clear enough, from all sources, that there were three points around which practically all the discussions and controversies revolved. These were: first, whether in the Congress of the Confederation each state should have a single vote, as in the existing Congress, or whether the votes should be in proportion to population or to wealth or to contributions to the general treasury; second, by what criterion should these quotas of contribution to the general expense be determined, whether on the basis of population, land. values, or general property values; and, third, whether Congress should have authority to limit the dimensions of those states which possessed claims extending to the South Sea.

The first of these points involved the question whether, on the one hand, a few of the most populous states might dominate the confederation, or whether, on the other hand, a group of the smaller states might have it in their power to ride rough-shod over the interests of the larger. The question involved in the third point was similar, whether those states possessing large unoccupied territories might not so expand in population and resources as to smother out the states which had no such territory, meanwhile meeting their obligations by the sale of vacant lands. The second point involved less of controversy, although there inhered in it, as also in the first, the question whether in counting population slaves should be included. The question of the claims extending to the South Sea was early injected into the discussion by Samuel Chase of Maryland, and it was this point that was to remain longest the stumbling-block to the acceptance of the Confederation.

In spite of these strongly antagonistic views on the important questions involved, it seems to have been generally believed that in some way or other the obstacles to union would be overcome. Bartlett, for example, thought (July 29) that it " may possibly take a week or ten days' time". A confederation was an absolute essential to success, therefore there must be, there will be, a confederation. If we do not confederate, said Samuel Chase (July 30), "we shall remain weak, distracted, and divided in our councils. . . . What contract will a foreign State make with us, when we cannot agree among ourselves?" There were nevertheless those who had but small hope of success. Joseph Hewes, for instance, wrote July 28: "I think it probable that we may Split on these great points, if so our mighty Colossus falls to pieces." Abraham Clark spoke (August 1) of the difficulties as " alarming ", and William Williams declared (August 7) that "every Inch of Ground is disputed, and very jarring Claims and Interests are to be adjusted among us "; while Chase confessed (August 9) that he was afraid "the Day is far distant". A few days later it appears that Chase took pains to shake off the dust of his shoes as a testimony against the confederation as it then stood, declaring, according to William Williams, that his state had no further concern with it. Some delegates, who had lingered in Congress with the hope that the instrument might soon be completed, gave up hope and early in August took their departure. Among these were William Whipple and Samuel Adams.

Some remarks of Edward Rutledge at this, stage of the matter are of especial interest; for, while he declared concerning the confederation (August 19), “it is of little consequence if we never see it again; for we have made such a Devil of it already that the Colonies can never agree to it", he goes on to indicate what he regards as the proper mode of procedure, namely, the appointment of "a special Congress to be composed of new Members for this purpose". What Rutledge was proposing, that a constitution should be framed by a convention chosen for that purpose and that only, came presently to be the accepted mode of constitutionmaking; but at the time he was writing the idea was only beginning to seep into the minds of statesmen.

On the 20th of August, after a lull of nearly two weeks, the discussion of the confederation was renewed in the committee of the whole, the preliminary revision completed, and the results laid before the whole Congress, which would of course again thresh over the entire subject. It appears to have been the view of members that this consideration would shortly be begun and as quickly as possible pushed to a conclusion. There now intervened, however, in the early days of September, the conference with Lord Howe. That conference at an end, and even the hesitant among the members convinced that they could not hope for a reconciliation on terms which were acceptable, the thought of Congress once more turned to the confederation as an essential means for carrying on the contest.

It is probably significant that Edward Rutledge, one of the committee to confer with Lord Howe, now became one of the most eager to press forward to completion the Articles of Confederation. On the 1st of October, with a view to resuming the consideration of the confederation, Rutledge moved to have absent members of Congress recalled (see his letter of October 2 to Robert R. Livingston). How deficient the attendance had become is strikingly shown by the fact that the President's urgent call for fuller representation was sent to no fewer than eleven of the thirteen states (see no. 154, note 1). The dearth of representation was probably, however, not the sole cause of the neglect of the Confederation. Many members doubtless hesitated to renew a discussion which would bring out once more and perhaps in a more accentuated form the discordant views which had so pointedly manifested themselves in the debates before the same body of delegates sitting as a committee of the whole. For antagonisms had not been reconciled; they had only temporarily been smothered. At all events, for a period of more than six months a profound silence falls upon the whole business of the Confederation. In December Congress was compelled to decamp from Philadelphia, and the atmosphere of Baltimore, whither it had betaken itself, appears to have been anything but conducive to the calm consideration of constitutional principles and practices, let alone the adjustment of sharp sectional differences. Moreover, if it had before been difficult to keep up a proper representation, the task was greatly augmented now. By the end of the Baltimore period, however, there had come about a great change in the membership of Congress (see, for instance, John Adams's remarks in his letter to Warren, February 17), and this change of personnel may have offered hope for the Confederation.

At all events, as soon as Congress once more became settled in Philadelphia it resolved to devote two days of each week to the Confederation until the instrument should be finished. This was the 8th of April. It was actually the 21st before Congress set about the task, but it then kept diligently at it for three or four weeks. Of the discussions at this time but little record has been left. The most significant account is found in a letter of Thomas Burke, April 29, wherein he relates that he had secured an amendment designed to save state sovereignty. It was about this time also that Burke offered his curious general amendment to the Confederation, providing for a sort of bicameral body (the amendment is found in the Library of Congress edition of the Journals under May 5).

John Adams expressed his confidence May 3 that the confederation would soon be passed, but on the 26th he confessed that it " draggs heavily on", although he did not despair of it, while Roger Sherman insisted (May 13, 14) that not much progress had been made. It was now, however, thrust aside for a while, first by the Schuyler controversy, and then, after two or three more days devoted to it, by the Vermont affair. "A