fore of a lighter in which the goods were passing to the shore, is a "stranding" within the policy.1 But the cases have turned principally upon the meaning to be given to this word "stranding." Literally, its meaning is obvious enough. A vessel is stranded when she gets upon the strand, or shore. And as this occurs generally only when a vessel is wrecked, the word was originally used, as we have already intimated, in this sense. It is not so now. Both in England and in this country, it seems to be settled, that if the ship be literally stranded, that is enough, without much reference to the length of time that she remains on shore, or any regard to the effect of this stoppage. It is true, that the courts say it is not enough that the ship did just "touch and go "; her course must be arrested, and all progressive motion must cease.2 And in one case, where a vessel struck on a rock which made a hole in her bottom whereby the cargo was damaged, it was held not to be a stranding, because the course of the vessel was not delayed. But if, after a few minutes of delay upon the rock or strand, she is thrown off by wind or tide, or dragged off by human aid, still she was "stranded" within the legal meaning of the policy; and this, although neither ship nor cargo was at all injured.4 383. So she is "stranded" if she falls and rests on piles, or any 1 Hoffman v. Marshall, 2 Bing. N. C. the ship; some resting, or interruption of the voyage, so that the ship may pro tempore be considered as wrecked.” In the same case at nisi prius, 4 Campb. 283, he said: "Ex vi termini stranding means lying on the shore, or something analogous to that. To use a vulgar phrase, which has been applied to this subject, if there is touch and go' with the ship, there is no stranding." Lake v. Columbus Ins. Co., 13 Ohio, * Thus in Harman v. Vaux, 3 Campb. 429, Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said: "If the ship touches and runs, the circumstance is not to be regarded. Here she is never in a quiescent state. But if she is forced ashore, or is driven on a bank, and remains for any time on the ground, this is a stranding, without reference to the degree of damage she thereby sustains." And in M'Dougle v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co., 4 M. & S. 503, where the vessel rested but a minute and a half on the rock, it was held to be no stranding. Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said: "But I take it that stranding, in bank. its fair legal sense, implies a settling of 429. 48. A delay of fifteen or twenty minutes on a rock has been held to be a stranding. Baker v. Towry, 1 Stark. 436. So a delay of two hours on a artificial fabric, as much as if she lay on a rock, or a bank, or the shore. In one case it was held not to be a stranding where the vessel came into collision with another, and was forced ashore, where she remained an hour.2 It is not a "stranding" if she takes the ground in a tide harbor, in any usual way and place, merely by the effect of the tides. But if extraordinary circumstances or agencies mingle with these natural and customary events, and give to them their destructive or injurious efficacy, so that the vessel comes to the ground in an unusual and perilous way, this is held to be a "stranding." 4 "4 1 Dobson v. Bolton, Marsh. Ins. 239, Park, Ins. 148, n. The vessel in this case rested on the piles till they were cut away. 2 Baring v. Henkle, Marsh. Ins. 240. It was contended, in this case, that it could only be a stranding where the ship was either cast on shore by the violence of the winds and waves, or run aground to avoid a greater danger; and this doctrine seems to have been assented to by Lord Kenyon, C. J. * In Kingsford v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 458, 1 Moore & S. 657, the vessel entered a tide harbor, was moored as directed, and took the ground at low tide. This was held not to be a stranding, although in taking ground she struck against some hard substance, by which two holes were made in her bottom and her cargo was injured. In Hearne v. Edmunds, 1 Brod. & B. 388, the vessel was three days in going up Cork River. She took the ground every day, and on the third day was moored at the quay. When the tide ebbed, she took ground, made a list, and lay on her broadside two tides, in consequence of which the vessel and cargo were much injured. This was held not be a stranding, being in the usual course of navigation. See the preceding note. The question how far the taking ground is extraordinary in its nature is a difficult one, and has given rise to cases of great nicety in its application. Thus, where a vessel was fastened by a rope to a pier, in order that she might take the ground in an upright position, and the rope broke, in consequence of which she fell on her side and was bilged, it was held to be a stranding. Bishop v. Pentland, 7 B. & C. 219, 1 Man. & R. 49. See also Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 4 M. & S. 77. So in Wells v. Hopwood, 3 B. & Ad. 20, where the ship, at the time the tide was about to fall, was hauled off from the wharf and fastened by a rope from an adjoining wharf, so that she could avoid a heap of rubbish which lay near her own wharf, and take the ground in safety, but there being a strong wind the rope stretched, and, when the tide fell, one end of the vessel came upon the heap, in consequence of which her seams opened and the cargo was damaged, though when the tide rose the seams closed and no damage to the ship was apparent, it was held to be a stranding. In another case, the vessel was going through a canal, and it became necessary, in order to repair a lock, that the water should be drawn off. The vessel was moored in what was thought to be a secure place, and one where ves And it has been held, that, if the vessel be stranded voluntarily and of set purpose, this may be a stranding within the policy.1 And we see no good reason why this should not be considered as a stranding to all intents and purposes, provided only that it be done in good faith, and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion. In some policies, both in England and in this country, there seems to be some disposition to return to the original meaning of the provision, by using the word "bilging," with or instead of the word "stranding." We suppose this word to be the same with bulge," and to mean that part of a thing which swells or protrudes out. We should say that the bilge of a ship was that part where her bottom rounds or swells out; and that she is "bilged," in nautical phrase, when by some injury this part is broken so as to let in water. We place in our notes the only case which touches this question; and more adjudication is necessary to determine certainly the meaning of this word.3 sels were usually placed when the water gress but caused her to spring a leak, and she was afterwards moored in deep water, but, being in danger of sinking, was warped into shoaler water where she took ground, it was held to be a stranding. See the next note. 1 Bowring v. Elmslie, 7 T. R. 216, note; Burnett v. Kensington, 7 T. R. 210. * Worcester and Webster both give "bilge" and "bulge as synonymous terms. And in Burnet v. Kensington, 7 T. R. 210, it was averred that the vessel was "stranded, bulged, and destroyed" by the perils of the sea. In Ellery v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 3 Pick. 46, it was held that there must be a breach in the vessel to constitute a "bilging," and that it was not enough that the vessel was thrown on her beam ends, and that the seams opened and water entered; but it was not decided in what part of the hull the breach must be. C. Of the Clause limiting the Liability of the Insurers to a certain Amount. It is not uncommon for policies, both in England and in this country, to contain a further clause, which is also considered as a part of the memorandum, that the articles therein enumerated shall be "free from average under five per cent," or some other limitation. The purpose of this is similar to that of the provision about stranding; it is that the insurers shall not be called on for such small losses as may very probably have arisen from the natural deterioration of perishable articles. It is also a frequent provision, that the insurer shall not be liable for a loss on any property insured, unless that loss amounts to a certain percentage. This applies to all property, memorandum or other, and the purpose is to protect the insurers from frivolous demands, and from claims for loss arising more from wear and tear than from perils insured against. Among the questions which have arisen under these provisions, the most important is, whether successive losses may be added together to make up the required percentage. And the weight, both of reason and authority, would lead to the conclusion that successive losses may be so added, and that the insurers are liable if the aggregate equals the five or other per cent required. A distinction in this respect may exist between the ship and the cargo, because it is said that the damage done to the ship at different times may be more easily discriminated than the damage to the cargo, which can only be discovered at the end of the voyage.1 1 In Blackett v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co., 2 Cromp. & J. 244, 2 Tyrw. 266, where insurance was effected on a ship free from average under 31. per cent, it was held that the underwriters were liable if the several partial losses, each under 31. per cent, in the aggregate amounted to more. This decision was given on the ground that, in the absence of usage or authority to the point, the rule that exceptions must be taken most strongly against the persons for whose benefit they are introduced should govern. In Brooks v. Oriental Ins. Co., 7 Pick. 259, decided four years previous, it was held, that in regard to the ship distinct and successive losses were not to be added together, unless they happened at one time or in one continuous gale or storm. The court said it might “be otherwise in regard to the cargo, because the actual damage received at If insurance is effected on freight by a policy containing the clause that the underwriters shall not be liable for any partial loss on goods perishable in their nature, unless it amounts to seven per cent, nor for any partial loss on other goods, or on the vessel, or freight, unless it amounts to five per cent, it would seem that the insurers on freight, even on perishable goods, would be liable for a partial loss on freight exceeding five per cent, by a general ship, and on a cargo consisting of various articles, some perishable and others not.1 defendant refused to accept the policy and pay the note, on the ground that the policy was not made out in accordance with his order, which was as follows:— "On 26 horses valued at $2,200 at 15 per cent, $450 and 20 oxen 46 66 800 policy 1 $3,000 $ 451." If different articles are insured in the same policy under one valuation, free from average under a certain per cent, it has been held there must be a loss equal to the percentage on the whole valuation; but if the articles are separately valued, a loss on one equal to the specified percentage on its value renders the insurers liable. It has been held in a recent case, where the memorandum different times cannot be ascertained during the passage, or when it happens, but only when the cargo was unladed." In Donnell v. Columbian Ins. Co., 2 Sumner, 366, it was stipulated that the underwriters should not be liable "for any partial loss on other goods, or on the vessel and freight, unless it amount to five per cent, exclusive in each case of all charges and expenses incurred for the purpose of ascertaining and proving the loss." The court held that the words "in each case" referred to the three subjects insured, and required a damage of five per cent, to justify a claim in case, and that they did not mean "at each time of loss." In respect to the cargo, Mr. Justice Story held, that the successive losses in the course of the voyage were to be added together. He also was of the opinion that the same rule applied to the ship, though the point was not decided. Lord v. Neptune Ins. Co., 10 Gray, of the class, but of the species alone. 116. 2 Ocean Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 3 Conn. 357. The question in this case arose in a suit on a premium note. The A policy was made out for $3,000 on stock, etc. The court were divided on the question whether the above order meant that the valuation should be separate, three judges being in favor of the proposition and two opposed to it, but no doubt was expressed as to the effect of it. But in Louisville M. &. F. Ins. Co. v. Bland, 9 Dana, 143, this rule was not adopted, but it was held, that, in every case where there are several classes of goods, the value of the article lost is not to be compared with the value of the whole cargo, nor Under this rule, if tin plates and sheetiron are warranted free from average unless general, and hardware and brass wire free from average under fifteen per |