from the home port is a circumstance which would justify a more liberal allowance for salvage. It is said, on high authority, that the Court of Admiralty has no power to decree salvage merely for saving life. We should be reluctant to admit this as a rule, unless where no property is saved; and then, of course, there can be no salvage, because that means a proportion of the property saved. But when property is saved, and the question of amount of salvage arises, there is no argument for enlargement more operative upon the court than one founded upon earnest and meritorious efforts to save life.

SECTION X.-Of the General Clause respecting other Perils.

THERE is nothing in the law of insurance which prevents parties from agreeing upon insurance against other perils than those usually enumerated, and specifying them in the policy. But the general clause which is usually inserted against "all other risks and perils," enlarges the scope and operations of the policy very little, because, by a common principle of construction (that general words are restrained by the particular recital), it is always construed to mean other perils of like nature or character with those enumerated, which would therefore be included, generally at least, in the other clauses. But these words have been declared by courts to be material and operative, and insurers have been held liable under them; although, as it seems, in most of these cases they might have been held liable as well under other clauses.

1 Port v. Jones, 19 How. 150.

2 The Zephyrus, 1 W. Rob. 329, 331. This was a claim for salvage for rescuing the master and crew, the vessel itself not having been saved. Dr. Lushing ton, in delivering the opinion of the court, observed: "The jurisdiction of the court in salvage causes is founded on a proceeding against property which has been saved, and I am at a loss to conceive upon what principle the owners can be made answerable for the mere saving of life."

32 Rolle, Abr. 409; Payler v. Homersham, 4 M. & S. 423; Moore v. Ma

It

grath, 1 Cowp. 9; Rich v. Lord, 18 Pick. 322; Jackson v. Stackhouse, 1 Cowp. 122.

In Cullen v. Butler, 5 M. & S. 461, the vessel was lost by being fired into through mistake. Held, that the loss was covered by the general clause. Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said: “The extent and meaning of general words have not yet been the immediate subject of any judicial construction in our courts of law. As they must, however, be considered as introduced into the policy in furtherance of the objects of marine insurance, and may have the

has been held that an extraordinary duty laid on goods at the port of destination, between the time of the capture of a vessel and her release and arrival, is not covered by an insurance against

"all unavoidable perils, losses, and misfortunes to the damage of the goods," the loss being occasioned by a political event not insured against.1 Courts have been disposed to construe "against all risks," when written and not printed, as an insurance against everything but the fraud of the assured; but it may be doubted whether, in practice, even this phrase should be permitted to extend its operation quite so indefinitely.2

The general clause may also sometimes depend for its construction on the intention of the parties as manifested in the express declarations of the policy. Thus, where a vessel was insured "while being safely launched," and the policy enumerated the ordinary perils as in a marine policy," and all other sea perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said vessel, or any part thereof, not arising from negligence, fraud, ignorance, or misconduct of the master," it was held, that the insurers were liable for the expenses incurred in launching the vessel after she had stopped on the ways, and was in a condition of great danger, not owing to any fault on the part of the assured or his agents.3

SECTION XI. Of excepted Risks and Losses.

As nothing prevents the parties from extending the contract of insurance at their own pleasure, so they may limit it as they think proper, by expressly excepting, or, which is the same thing, warranting against some of the perils usually insured against. most usual exception relates to illicit or prohibited trade. This is not the same with contraband trade, although the words are

1 De Peau v. Russell, 1 Brev. 441.

In Goix v. Knox, 1 Johns. Ca. 337, the court said: "This expression is vague and indefinite, but if we allow it any force, it must be considered as creating a special insurance, and extending to other risks than are usually contemplated. We are inclined to give it a liberal construction, and apply it to all losses, except such as arise from the fraud of the assured." See also Skidmore v. Desdoity, 2 Johns. Ca. 77. In

The

Marcy v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 11 La. Ann. 748, insurance was effected on a floating dock against "all risks." It was held that this term meant all river and harbor risks, so far as they were applicable to floating docks, and that evidence as to the general meaning of the phrase was not admissible, it not being shown to be so used in reference to floating docks.

Fritchette v. State Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 190.

sometimes used as if synonymous; for, as has been seen, it is not against the law, either of nations or of any neutral nation, for its subjects to break through a blockade, or supply a belligerent, if they can; they take the risk of capture for so doing, but if they please they may encounter that risk. Illicit or prohibited trade, on the contrary, is one which cannot be carried on without a distinct violation of some positive law of the country where the transaction is to take place. Of course such trade, or an attempt at such trade, exposes the guilty party to the consequences of it, which are usually seizure and condemnation. But no loss by forfeiture for such cause throws any responsibility on the insurers, if there be an exception of this risk, or a warranty against it, as is the case in many American policies; because such an exception at once intimates that the insured expects to attempt such trade, and agrees to stand his own insurer against its peril. It should be noticed, however, that this exception relates only to the property insured in the same policy, and not to other goods in the same ship; for if there be this warranty against "loss by illicit trade," and both insurers and insured know that other goods than those covered by the policy are on board, which other goods are contraband, and the ship and cargo are seized, condemned, and lost, on account of these other goods, the insurers are still held, because this warranty is to be read as if it were against "loss by illicit trade in the goods hereby insured." 1

This exception may give rise to three classes of questions: one where there has actually been this excepted trade and a consequent forfeiture; one where there has been an attempt at such a trade, never carried into effect, but followed by a seizure and condemnation for the attempt; the third where there has been neither the trade nor an attempt at the trade, but nevertheless a seizure and condemnation, grounded on an alleged violation of law, but not justified in fact. In the first case the insurers are certainly exonerated. In the second, they are exonerated where the seizure and condemnation were legal and justifiable by reason of any endeavor to do the thing embraced within the exception or

1 Cucullu v. Orleans Ins. Co., 18 Mart. La. 11, 13. In Bowne v. Shaw, 1 Caines, 489, both parties knew that other goods were on board, which were

illicit, and the underwriters were held. So in De Peyster v. Gardner, 1 Caines, 492, where the underwriters knew the fact, but the insured did not.

warranty. In the third case, the insurers are not exonerated. That they are not liable for the consequences of an attempt to do that which is not done, if they would not be liable if the thing were done, seems to follow from the fact that the insured take upon themselves, by the exception, all the risks springing from the trade, and it is fair to say that a peril arising from an attempt to enter into it is one of them.1 On the other hand, if the property is lost by the illegal and unjustifiable conduct of a foreign court, this is a loss which the insurers cannot say arose from a prohibited trade, when there never was any such trade and no attempt at it; for the insurers have no right to defend themselves under a false pretence, merely because a foreign court have defended themselves under that same false pretence; 2 and the same principle applies to an exception of breach of blockade.3

1 Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187; Higginson v. Pomeroy, 11 Mass. 104. See also Smith v. Delaware Ins. Co., 3 Wash. C. C. 127. It has so been held also where the vessel was not allowed to enter her port of destination. Smith v. Univ. Ins. Co., 6 Wheat. 176; Suydam v. Mar. Ins. Co., 1 Johns. 181; Speyer v. New York Ins. Co., 3 Johns. 88. In Tucker v. Juhel, 1 Johns. 20, the government of Antigua had given permission for American vessels to export sugar on certain conditions. These were complied with, and the vessel began to load. After the conditions

In Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335, a vessel was insured "at and from Tobago to one or more ports in the West Indies, and at and from thence to Norfolk," against all risks, blockaded ports and Hispaniola excepted. The vessel sailed for a port which was then blockaded in fact, although this was not known when she sailed. Being warned off, the master directed his course for Norfolk, but on the way the vessel was plundered by a French privateer, and ordered to St. Domingo for trial. The under

were complied with, but before she began to load, the permission to export was revoked. The president of the island gave an opinion that vessels which had complied with the conditions might be cleared with their sugar. This was done in the present case, but the vessel was captured and the cargo condemned for a breach of the laws of trade. Held, that the president had no authority to so interpret the law, and that the underwriters were not liable.

2 Mr. Justice Story, in Carrington v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 8 Pet. 495, states the law as follows: "A seizure or deten

writers were held liable. In Radcliff v. United Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 38, 9 Johns. 277, the policy contained this clause: "The insurers take no risk of a blockaded port, but if turned away, the assured to be at liberty to proceed to a port not blockaded." The vessel was taken and condemned for a breach of blockade. Held, that it made no difference whether this seizure was legal or illegal. See Laing v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ca. 174, 487; Johnston v. Ludlow, 2 Johns. Ca. 481, 1 Caines, Ca. xxix.