The most common form of this is the direct interest of absolute ownership. But it is certain that the insured need not be an owner, if he be so circumstanced with respect to the property that he will derive some pecuniary benefit from the safety of the thing or its continued existence, and some injury from its destruction. The very word "interest" seems to carry with it, by its own force, the idea of some relation to, or some concern in, the subject-matter of the insurance. But this interest must be pecuniary, involving on the one hand pecuniary benefit, and on the other pecuniary loss.1 A father may feel the greatest interest in an important adventure of his son; but this interest is not that which the law of insurance requires; for it is not enough that he should be afflicted by the loss of the property, but he must be in some way the poorer for it. “An insurable interest," says Mr. Justice Story, "is sui generis and peculiar in its texture and operation."2 We believe, however, that any interest whatever which comes under the above definition or description is sufficient to sustain a policy.

advantage or profit which but for such events they would acquire according to the ordinary and probable course of things. . . . . Interest does not necessarily imply a right to the whole, or part of a thing, nor necessarily and exclusively that which may be the subject of privation, but the having some relation to, or concern in, the subject of insurance, which relation or concern, by the happening of the perils insured against, may be so affected as to produce a damage, detriment, or prejudice to the person insuring; and where a man is so circumstanced with respect to matters exposed to certain risks or dangers, he may be said to be interested in the safety of the thing. To be interested in the preservation of a thing is to be so circumstanced with respect to it as to have benefit from its existence, prejudice from its destruction. property of a thing and the interest devisable from it may be very dif ferent; of the first the price is generally

The

the measure, but by interest in a thing every benefit and advantage arising out of, or depending on, such thing is being comprehended." Emerigon des Assurances, 203, c. 8, § 3, states a case where relatives of a person ransomed from slavery were considered to have an insurable interest in his safe return home. Duffell v. Wilson, 1 Campb. 401; Sterling v. Vaughan, 11 East, 619.

1 See opinion of Mr. Justice Lawrence in Lucena v. Craufurd, supra. 1 Phil. Ins. 174; Warder v. Horton, 4 Bin. 529; The Aurora, 4 Ch. Rob. 218.

* Hancox v. Fishing Ins. Co., 3 Sum. 140. The language is: "An insurable interest is sui generis, and peculiar in its texture and operation. It sometimes exists where there is not any present property, or jus in re, or jus ad rem. Inchoate rights, founded on subsisting titles, unless prohibited by the policy of the law, are insurable." See Lucena v. Craufurd, 2 Bos. & Pull. 294, infra.

Thus, it is certain, that it need not be a vested interest in possession. A mere expectancy is sufficient;1 provided, however, and this is essential, that it be connected with that thing concerning which the expectancy exists, either by an existing title to the thing, or by a definite and obligatory contract, the execution of which will give title. Thus, if a ship-owner expects to earn a large sum by carrying goods from one port to another, his interest in the freight is not insurable, unless at the time of the loss either the goods are on board so that he has a lien on them to carry them to their destination and so earn his freight, or he has made a definite contract that certain goods shall be put on board, so that he must earn his freight unless a loss intervenes and prevents him.

Inchoate rights unquestionably may suffice to give an insurable interest, provided those rights are founded on positive and subsisting contracts.2 As good examples of these may be mentioned.

1 See Lucena v. Craufurd, supra.

Lucena v. Craufurd, 2 Bos. & Pull. 294. In the opinion of the majority of the judges, this language is used: "Inchoate rights founded on subsisting titles, unless prohibited by positive laws, are insurable. Freight, respondentia, and bottomry are of this description; the profit is prospective, but they are founded on existing charter - parties, bonds, and agreements. Wages of seamen are in their nature insurable, though universally prohibited to be insured on principles of policy. . . . . The ancient definitions of insurance do not exclude contingent interest. The definition in Valin, article 1mo. fo. 26, is: Assecuratio est conventio de rebus tuto aliunde transferendis pro certo prœmio, seu est aversio periculi.' In Loccen. lib. 2, c. 5, note: Aversio periculi, ita dicta quod alterius periculum in mari aversum it; aut in se recipit.' In Roccus: Assecuratio est contractus quo quis alienæ rei periculum in se suscipit obligando si sub certo pretio ad eam compensandam si illa perierit. Ideo valet pactum ut si merces salvæ venierint in portum

solvatur certa summa si vero illæ perierint teneatur assecurator solvere damnum, vel æstimationem istarum mercium.' These definitions clearly embrace a contingent interest, which is subject to the perils of the sea, and for the loss of which a compensation may be made. All that these definitions require is that the insured shall be interested in the arrival of the thing insured and the event of the voyage, at the time of effecting the policy and at the time of loss. Nor is it any objection to this insurance that other persons might have insured to the full value. Where a ship and cargo are insured to the full value, and money lent on bottomry or respondentia, the lender may insure, as well as the owner of the ship or cargo. It has been expressly decided that a creditor may insure the life of his debtor; for, though he has no right depending upon the life of his debtor, he might be essentially injured by his death." And Arnould, 1 Ins. 230, says: “A vested interest in possession is not necessary to give the right of insuring. An expectancy, coupled with a present exist

lenders of money on respondenture and bottomry, who in the one case lose their debt if the goods be lost, and in the other if the ship be lost. It may be well, however, to consider the various subjects of this chapter more specifically.

SECTION II.- Insurable Interest in the Ship.

IF the owner of a ship mortgages it to secure a debt, he has still an insurable interest in the ship. For he may look upon it as the means by which he shall pay the debt, and when he pays the debt the ship becomes again wholly his own.

But the mortgagee has also an insurable interest.1 His title is defeasible by a payment of the debt; and the credit of the mortgagor is pledged to him for the debt independently of the ship. Nevertheless, the ship is in his hands as security, and he has a right to make this security still more secure by insuring it. Therefore both the mortgagor and the mortgagee have an insurable interest in the ship.

1 Irving v. Richardson, 2 Barn. & Ad. 498. In this case Parke, J., remarks: "The mortgagee of a ship has a distinct interest from that of the mortgagor to the extent prima facie of the value mortgaged." See also S. C. 1 Moody & Rob. 153; Traders' Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 9 Wend. 404; Carpenter v. Prov. Wash. Ins. Co., 16 Pet. S. C. R. 495. * Hobbs v. Hannum, 3 Camp. 93; Opinion of Eyre, C. J., in Curling v. Long, 1 Bos. & Pull. 636.

So too the ship-owner has an insurable interest in the ship, although he has let out the whole of the ship to a charterer.2 And the charterer also has an insurable interest in the ship.3 So the court, said: "The advance of the freight gives no right to insure beyond the amount of the advance; and where the owner of the vessel is liable to refund in case of loss, his right to insure that amount-resulting from the lien the charterer has upon the freight for his security-requires that proof should be made of the actual payment of the money alleged to be advanced. In most cases the charterer will have a lien upon the freight for the advances he makes the ship-owners, as his security against their inability to refund. That lien gives him an interest under the charter-party as or in the nature of a mortgage, which he may insure; and the better opinion seems to be, that he may insure it in general terms under the name of freight, without describing it as a mortgage interest. But to enable him to recover, he must prove the fact of the advance." In Sansom v. Ball, 4 Dallas, 459, in which case the plaintiff, having purchased the right to fill up three eighths of a ship, and paid the price, insured his interest under the general name of "freight advanced"; on the question whether this interest was insurable or not, Tilghman, C. J., said: "On this point, whether it is considered on principle, or on usage, I have no doubt the law is with the plaintiff." And see Oliver v. Greene, 3 Mass. 133.

Robbins v. New York Ins. Co., 1 Hall, S. C. 325. This was an action upon a policy of insurance for $ 1,000, made by the defendants in favor of the plaintiff, upon the freight of all kinds of goods, &c., laden or to be laden on board the schooner, &c., at and from New York to Wilmington, N. C., thence, &c., and back to New York. Declaration contained special count on the policy, together with common counts for money. Plea, the general issue. It appearing on the trial that the plaintiff's interest was that of assignee of a charter-party, a non-suit was ordered, and on motion to set this aside the point was raised that the evidence exhibited an insurable interest in the plaintiff, for as charterer he was to advance part of the hire of the vessel. A part of the freight had been advanced in New York. Jones, C. J., in delivering the opinion of

one who has contracted to purchase a ship has an insurable interest, and will recover, if before the loss occurs the title is absolutely in him, or if by the terms of the sale the ship is then at his risk.1 But we shall consider more fully the insurable interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee, of the ship-owner and charterer, and of the buyer and seller of the ship, as separate topics.

SECTION III. Insurable Interest in Freight.

-

IN maritime law the word "freight" sometimes means the cargo on board, and sometimes the money earned in the ship by carrying the cargo. These two meanings are both ancient.2 In law the word is very much restricted to the latter meaning, especially in the general law of shipping. It has however a somewhat wider significance as it is used in policies and in the law of insurance; and a very good definition of it in this sense is given by Lord Tenterden. It is "the benefit derived by the ship-owner from the employment of his ship." This definition includes first that which is strictly freight, or the price which the shipper of the goods pays to the ship-owner for carrying his goods; and as freight

1 Rider v. Ocean Ins. Co., 20 Pick. 259; Warder v. Horton, 4 Binney, 529.

The word "freight " is defined by Beawes (Lex Mercatoria, 118) as "the sum agreed upon for hire of a ship, entirely or in part, for the sale of goods." This is now the usual meaning of this word in law. In common conversation, however, it often means also the goods carried. And that this was, if not its original meaning, one of its early meanings, is certain from the case of Bright v. Cowper (1620, 1 Brownl. & G. 21), the report of which begins: "Action of covenant, brought upon a covenant made by the merchant with the master of a ship, that if he would bring his freight to such a port he would pay him such a sum." Now, however, it means the sum to be paid for such carriage, and also the sum which might

be payable therefor. For, if a shipowner carries his own goods only, he may insure his freight eo nomine, meaning what another would have paid him for carriage of the same goods on the same voyage; or he may include it in a valuation of his ship or of his cargo. See Robinson v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 1 Met. 143-145; Adams v. Penn. Ins. Co., 1 Rawle 87, 106; Flint v. Flemyng, 1 B. & Ad. 45; Wolcott v, Eagle Ins. Co., 4 Pick. 429; Clark v. Ocean Ins. Co., 16 Pick. 289; Allen v. Mackay, 16 Law Reporter, 1861; Hosmer, J., in Riley v. Hartford Ins. Co., 2 Conn. 373; 1 Phillips on Ins. 185, § 11; Giles v. Brig Cynthia, 1 Pet. Adm. 206, Blakey v. Dixon, 2 B. & P. 321; Scott v. Libby, 2 Johns. 336, S. C. 4 Dall, 439.

Flint v. Flemyng, 1 B. & Ad. 48.