such that the parties must be presumed to have had it in mind in making the contract, is allowed great weight in the construction of policies of insurance. And if we add that it has sometimes been resorted to quite too readily, we are not without high authority for this suggestion. At the same time, this resort to usage is often necessary and just, and it is perhaps enough to say that its liability to abuse calls for caution. If it be a general rule that the meaning of the words of a contract is not to be sought in their etymology, or in any nice inquiry into their origin or definition, but that common use gives us their true meaning, this must be especially true in construing policies of insurance; for the whole instrument and all its more special provisions are drawn, generally, at least, and not only in the beginning of the business of insurance but at the present time, by merchants without the aid of professional advice or dictionary definition; and they must be understood to have used the words in the way that others use them in similar business. Of words which are strictly technical words we have already treated. It has been remarked by high authority that there may be cases where. the words used may have two entirely distinct meanings.2 not differ from that applied to other mercantile instruments. Its sense and meaning are to be ascertained from the terms of the policy, taken in their plain and ordinary signification, unless such terms have by the known usage of trade, in respect to the subject-matter, acquired a meaning distinct from the popular sense of the same terms, or unless the instrument itself taken together shows that they were understood in some peculiar manner; and that while we may not enlarge or restrict the clear and explicit language of the contract, by proof of a custom or usage, yet in the application of the contract to its subjectmatter, in bringing it to bear upon any particular object, the customs and usages of trade are admissible to ascertain what subjects were within and what were excluded from its operation. Such evidence is proper on the same principle that proof of the meaning of technical words, and words of science and the arts, is permitted in arriving at the intention of the parties in the construction of contracts." See also cases cited supra, pp. 71-81. Rogers v. Mechanics' Ins. Co., 1 Story, 608; Howe v. Mut. Safety Ins. Co., 1 Sandf. 152. 2 Peisch v. Dickson, 1 Mason, 10. Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of the difficulty of the application of the rule about latent and patent ambiguities, to particular cases, where the shades of distinction are very nice, says that there seems indeed to be an intermediate class of cases, partaking of the nature both of patent and latent ambiguities, and that is where the words are all sensible and have a settled meaning, but at the same. time consistently admit of two interpretations, according to the subject-matter As, for example, the word "freight," which in common use means sometimes the goods which are carried, and sometimes the money paid for the carriage by the owner of the goods. If it means the first, the interest in the freight belongs to the owner of the goods; if it means the second, it belongs to the owner of the ship to whom the earnings belong. If there be an uncertainty as to which of these meanings this word bears in the instrument under consideration, parol evidence may be received to determine this meaning. So, too, if the words are in themselves indeterminate, as if such phrases be used (which we shall presently have to consider in another connection) as "for whom it may concern," "at and in the contemplation of the parties. And in such case he thinks that parol evidence might be admitted to show the circumstances under which the contract was made, and the subject-matter to which the parties referred. As in the instance of the word "freight," to show in which sense the parties intended to use the term. Birch v. Depeyster, 4 Campb. 385, where the master of a ship was hired for a voyage to the East Indies by a written agreement, which stipulated that he should receive £120 "in lieu of privilege." The question arose whether he was entitled to the freight of goods carried in the cabin, which depended chiefly upon the disputed meaning of the word "privilege." Held, that what the parties said upon the subject before and at the time when the agreement was entered into was admissible in evidence. Gibbs, C. J.: "The case turns upon the meaning of the word 'privilege.' This is a mercantile term, and I must learn its meaning from mercantile men. Then, if indifferent witnesses may be called to explain what is understood by 'privilege,' may we not hear the construction put upon the word by the parties themselves before the agreement was entered into?" Keate v. Temple, 1 Bos. & P. 158. The court will take into consideration not only the expressions used, but the particular situation of the defendant at the time of his undertaking. So, for instance, in Carruthers v. Sheddon, 6 Taunt. 13, where D. and W. being general partners under the firm of D. & Co., and D. & Co. taking a share with three others in a particular adventure, which D. & Co. manage and insure for the account of D. & Co., it is a latent ambiguity to be explained by evidence whether the D. & Co. for whose account the insurance is made means D. and W. only, or all who are partners of D. in that particular adventure. 1 Duer, Ins. 168 171. Nor is the evidence of extrinsic facts limited to the interpretation of particular words; it may equally be received where an entire clause or provision is indeterminate and ambiguous. Preston v. Greenwood, 4 Doug. 28; 2 Pars. Cont. 557 et seq., and generally conversations between the parties at the time of making a contract are competent evidence, as part of the res gestæ, to show the sense which they attached to a particular term used in the contract. 1 Greenl. Ev. 331; Gray v. Harper, 1 Story, 574. from," or the like, evidence may be received to determine the meaning. It is a common rule in the interpretation of contracts that and may be read in the place of or, and or for and. In the same way, if the intention of the parties requires it the words "or either of them" may be added.1 An inquiry is often made into the history of a clause in a policy, and the purpose for which it was introduced. But although this may afford some aid in arriving at its meaning, yet it cannot control the construction of its language.2 In none of these cases, however, can there be an uncertainty which calls for evidence from without, if the policy considered as a whole or in all its provisions cures this uncertainty, for the policy is the highest evidence of its own meaning, and not only should the whole policy be considered in construing every part, but every part should be so construed, so far as it can be without violence or unreasonableness as to give force and effect to the policy as a whole.3 1 Davis v. Boardman, 12 Mass. 80. The owner of the ship and cargo in this case had given orders to have them insured in England, but fearing that his letter might not have arrived, he caused insurance to be effected in this country by a policy containing the following memorandum: "Should this vessel and cargo be insured in England in time to attach, this policy is to be cancelled." The vessel was insured in England, but not the cargo. The court held, that the insurer on the cargo here was liable, and the clause was construed to mean, "should this vessel and cargo, or either of them, be insured in England," &c. "It is not uncommon," say the court in the same case, 66 in papers written without much attention to technical and grammatical rules, to find and used for or, and or for and." Rees v. Abbot, Cowp. 832, was an action on a promissory note; the declaration stating that the defendant and another made their promissory note, by which they jointly or severally promised to pay. Lord Mansfield said: “Or, in this case, is synonymous with and. They both promise that they, or one of them, shall pay. Then both and each is liable in solidum. The nature of the transaction forces this construction. It is said that judges should be astute in furtherance of right and the means of recovering it. And therefore one is ashamed to seeeither hitch or hang upon pins or particles, contrary to the true manifest meaning of the contract." See Hugg v. Augusta Ins. & Banking Co., 7 How. 595; Kettell v. Alliance Ins. Co., S. J. C., Mass., Nov. T. 1857; Heebner v. Eagle Ins. Co., 20 Law Rep. 578. The various provisions of the policy must, therefore, be considered and compared, and a construction be adopted that shall give effect to each and consistency to the whole; and, to accomplish this, an obscure intent must yield to that which is clear, and a subordinate and particular to that which is the principal and general. "Ex ante It is also a general principle in the construction of instruments to remember their general purpose or the object of the parties in cedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio." The reason for this rule is obvious. The same parties make all the contract, and may be supposed to have had the same purpose and object in view in all of it, and if this purpose is more clear and certain in some parts than in others, those which are obscure may be illustrated by the light of others. As there could not have been any repugnancy in the actual intentions of the parties, and they could not have meant that their agreement should be contradictory and self-destructive, all seeming discrepancies that the examination of the whole instrument may discover, must, if possible, be reconciled. 2 Pars. Cont. (5th ed.) 501 et seq. n. (u). The grave words of Lord Coke relative to the proper construction of statutes are quite as applicable to the interpretation of contracts: "The good expositor makes every sentence have its operation; he gives effect to every word in the statute; he does not construe it so that any word should be vain and superfluous; nor yet makes exposition against express words for 'viperina est expositio quæ corrodit viscera textus,' but so expounds it that one part of the act may agree with another, and all may stand together." 11 Rep. 34; National F. Ins. Co. of Baltimore v. Crane, 16 Md. 260. In the same way, in construing all written documents, and a policy of insurance no less than others, the construction of particular parts may be determined by the subject-matter of the writing. Thus, where liberty was given to cruise for six weeks, Lord Mansfield ruled, merely in consideration of the subject-matter of the policy, that this meant six consecutive weeks, without recurring to any testimony as to usage or common understanding of this language, as influencing the construction. Syers v. Bridge, Doug. 527. Lord Mansfield says: "The meaning of words depends upon the subject. The subject-matter is decisive to show, in my opinion, that the six weeks meant one continued period of time. A cruise is a well-known expression for a connected portion of time." See Frichette v. State Mut. F. &. M. Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 190; Grant v. Delacour, 1 Taunt. 466. In this case there was a policy of insurance upon a new ship still on her ways, drawn in the usual form of a marine policy, describing the period of risk "while being safely launched," and "until she be moored twenty-four hours in safety,” and describing the perils insured against by mentioning the usual perils named in a marine policy, and "all other sea-perils, losses, and misfortunes to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the vessel or any part thereof, except. those arising from the negligence, fraud, ignorance, or misconduct of the master." In the process of launching, the vessel stopped on the ways, in a most critical and dangerous position; her stern floated, and she strained; and she was in imminent danger of becoming hogged. After sixteen days, by great exertions, she was preserved and floated in safety; and it was held that the insured was entitled to recover the actual expenses necessarily incurred in the preservation of the vessel, and in her deliverance from danger of being injured; and that the policy was to be construed with reference to the manifest design of the insurance, its special nature, and its expressed application making the instrument. An application of this rule will sometimes call upon the court to consider the general purpose of all policies of insurance, which is to secure to the insured indemnity against actual loss, and no more than indemnity. This principle was much regarded in an important case in Massachusetts in determining the amount for which insurers are liable where the owners of the vessel insured were compelled to pay the owners of another vessel for damages caused by a collision with the vessel insured.1 SECTION X. As to the Time when the Policy goes into Effect. THE time when the policy of insurance goes into effect may be questioned. Here the first evidence is the policy itself, if it bears duty to give these terms and these policies an application and a signification appropriate to the manifest design of the insurance, and that the vessel was, therefore, covered by the policies from the moment the launching commenced." 1 Nelson v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 8 Cush. 477, 490. In Whiting v. Independent Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Md. 297, insurance was effected on a vessel in three different offices. A loss having occurred, the first office paid the entire loss, whereas it was liable to pay only its proportion with the other offices. The second office being sued by the insured for its proportion, claimed that the contract being one of indemnity, the insured was not entitled to recover more than his loss, which had already been paid. But the court held that this was no defence. After the first 'company had paid the loss, the suit against the second office was declared to be for the use of the first office, and the name was changed accordingly. 2 The date often becomes a very important part of a policy. The decisions, however, only establish that, when the execution and delivery of an instrument are subsequent to the date, the error may be corrected; when they precede the date, whether the necessary correction can be made in a court of law, is, upon the authorities, exceedingly doubtful. See 1 Duer, Ins. n. XVIII. p. 153, as to foreign laws in this respect. Mr. Arnould states the rule in England to be, that every underwriter shall set down day, month, and year on which he subscribes the policy. 1 Ins. 39. And such is also the practice in this country; and in time policies the hour is usually stated. Stone v. Ball, 3 Lev. 348; Earl v. Shaw, 1 Johns. Cas. 313; Jackson v. Bard, 2 Johns. 220, 234; Hall v. Cazenove, 4 East, 477. In United States v. Le Baron, 19 How. 73, Mr. Justice Curtis says: "The |