silence that the prospect is extremely remote; in which case, all your objects will concentre in preparing for the ensuing campaign, and directing the operations as far as possible to this country. The success of the combined operations this summer will give great weight to your arguments, especially as they are such as would deserve, independent of that, the most serious attention. But, sir, you will have a difficult card to play to induce France to do what not only our, but her interests essentially require. Never was there a time in which money was more necessary to us than at present. The total abolition of paper, the length of the war, the restricted commerce we have carried on for the first five years of it, the arrears of debts, and the slender thread by which public credit hangs, put it totally out of our power to make any great exertions without the immediate supply of money. Taxation will be carried as far as it can go, but this will fall very far short of our wants. The richest nations in Europe, unable to carry on a war by taxation only, are compelled to borrow. How, then, will it be expected that a nation which has had every difficulty to struggle with, an enemy in the heart of its country, and all its considerable towns at one time or another in their possession, a superior navy on its coasts, and the consequential ruin of its agriculture and commerce, how, I say, can it be expected that such a nation should find resources within itself for so long and bloody a war? And yet, in this situation we are alarmed by our advices from you, by representations from the Minister of France, by assurances from every quarter, that we must expect no further assistance in money. Surely it is not possible that France, after having done so much for us, after having brought us within view of the desired haven, should oblige us to lose the advantage of all she has done; and yet be assured that the most serious consequence may attend her stopping her hand at this critical time. Public credit, which is growing very fast, will drop to the ground. The contracts made for the ensuing campaign must be given up; the troops, who were made to expect pay in specie, will be dissatisfied; and upon the least ill fortune, a failure in supplies will show their discontents; recruiting will be checked, and the conclusion of the war on those advantageous terms, which one vigorous exertion next spring in this country would secure, will be postponed to a later period, when in fact all we wish, to enable us to accomplish these great objects, is less than one year's continuance

of the war will cost France. You will, therefore, show the necessity of setting our credit upon a firm basis, the prospect we have of accomplishing it, from the great confidence in the integrity and abilities of the financier, from the economy which is introduced into our departments, from the industry which money excites, and which a fluctuating medium had destroyed, and from the total debility which must attend another shock to public credit.

You are perfectly acquainted, sir, with the natural resources of the country, you know the value of our exports, and the security they afford for any debt that we may contract; in short, there are a thousand arguments on this subject which will suggest themselves to you, not one of which will you, upon this occasion, omit to urge, since you must be perfectly convinced of its importance in every view, both to France and to us. The Superintendent will write more fully upon this subject, which relates so particularly to his department.

I would beg leave to remind you of another want, which we depend on your representations, and the good dispositions of the Court of Versailles to remove. The chase here seems to be pretty well over, the enemy, tired of running across the country, have taken to their burrows, and the whole business that remains to us, is to take measures for unearthing them next spring. In order to this, ships are absolutely necessary. The situation of New York and Charleston renders them untenable against a naval force, and extremely strong against an attack by land; besides that success in such an operation would not be decisive, since, after putting us to immense expense of men and ammunition of every kind, while they keep the command of the water, they might change their position and be as troublesome as ever. At any rate, the reduction of both these places, from their distance, and the difficulty of removing the men and stores, cannot be effected the same campaign without a naval force, and with it, it will be the business of a few weeks. The advantage to France, independent of her interests as they stand connected with ours, in keeping a great naval force on this continent is obvious.

1st. The expense to which they put the English, by obliging them to maintain an equal force at this distance from home at four times the cost at which the French navy may be maintained in this

country; which, with proper management, need not exceed what they expend even in France.

2dly. The number of seamen they employ in the transport service being so many deducted from what might supply their navy, with the same expense as if so employed.

3dly. The protection afforded to the trade on this coast, and the prospect of capturing the enemy's victuallers, and the consequent ruin of their affairs.

4thly. But above all, the decided advantage it will afford our combined operations, and the speedy termination of the war, by an advantageous peace. It is true, France may have other objects, which may interfere with these. To this we can say nothing; she must judge for herself. All we can do is to point out what we conceive will be most useful to her as well as to us, and submit to her determination. It would be well, however, if we were apprized of it as soon as possible.

If a negociation should open this winter, or there should be a probable prospect of it, you will do me the favor to give me the earliest advices of it. There are many delicate points, on which you would like to know the sentiments of people on this side of the water, which I will endeavor to acquaint you with.

I should inform you, that Congress have discharged the Commission for negociating a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, and taken that burthen from Mr. Adams's shoulders; that in compliment to the Marquis de la Fayette, they have made him the bearer of a letter to the King of France, which I enclose; that in answer to your favor of the 11th of June, they have passed the enclosed resolution.

Mr. Morris will write to you on this subject, and enable you to discharge the bills. Should France send a fleet next spring, it would be advantageous to have it unincumbered with such orders as may prevent its taking advantage of circumstances. This has unhappily prevented this campaign from being absolutely decisive. But neither this, nor any other great object can escape your observation, bent as it is upon promoting the happiness of your country.

In order to enable you to meet the claim of the Tories to the property that has been confiscated, I am endeavoring to collect for you an accurate account of the damages wantonly done by the

enemy in this country, which will, at least, serve to set against that claim.

Congress are preparing for an active campaign. They have directed eight millions of dollars to be raised by tax. There is not, however, the least idea that this, or even one half of it, will be collected in the time specified. You will not, therefore, suffer the Court to deceive themselves by hopes of exertions founded on this measure, but urge again and again the absolute necessity of supplying money.

I have conversed so freely with the Marquis de la Fayette on the general state of our politics, that I would rather refer you to him, than trouble you with a longer letter on the subject.

I cannot, however, close this without desiring you to inquire whether any intercepted letters from Mr. Deane to persons in this country have been published in Europe. Rivington has given us many, which are generally believed to be his.

The Marquis will satisfy your inquiries about them.

I am, dear sir, with sentiments of the highest respect and esteem,

&c.,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

WILLIAM ALEXANDER TO B. FRANKLIN.

Paris, December 15th, 1781.

My dear Sir,

I told you the last time I had the pleasure of seeing you at Passy, that I would make a trip to London, but had no notion it would be so soon. On coming to town last evening, I found such pressing letters, that I propose setting off this evening, or to-morrow at latest. I would have called, if possible, to receive your commands; but as I am pinched in time, I must content myself with sending for them. The bearer will call for them an hour after receiving this letter.

I shall probably be interrogated about the dispositions in this country to peace. My own idea is, that you seek only your independence; and that this country, were that secured, will be moderate in other matters, as the object of the war does not seem to be conquest. Let me know if this is proper language. I notice that a courtly argument has been used in Parliament for continuing the continental war, that withdrawing would make you insolent, and

give France exclusive advantages. Were it not proper that this were contradicted flatly? Any commissions you may have will be taken care of; and I shall be back, barring accidents, in three weeks.

Wishing you every thing that is good, I remain, with equal esteem and respect, dear sir, your most obedient, humble servant, W. ALEXANDER.

TO WILLIAM ALEXANDER.

Passy, December 15th, 1781.

Dear Sir,

I thank you for informing me of your intended journey. You know so well the prevailing sentiments here, and mine in particular, that it is unnecessary for me to express them; and having never been believed on that side of the water, it would be useless. I will say, however, that I think the language you mention very proper to be held, as it is the truth; though the truth may not always be proper. Wishing you a good voyage, and happy return to your children, I am, with great esteem, dear sir, yours, &c., &c.,

B. FRANKLIN.

TO DAVID HARTLEY.

Passy, December 15th, 1781.

My dear Friend,

I received your favor of September 26th, containing your very judicious proposition of securing the spectators in the opera and play houses from the danger of fire. I communicated it where I thought it might be useful. You will see by the enclosed, that the subject has been under consideration here. Your concern for the security of life, even the lives of your enemies, does honor to your heart and your humanity. But what are the lives of a few idle haunters of play houses, compared with the many thousands of worthy men and honest, industrious families butchered and destroyed by this devilish war? O! that we could find some happy invention to stop the spreading of the flames, and put an end to so horrid a conflagration! Adieu, I am ever yours most affectionately, B. FRANKLIN.