Sir 736. THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS (HENRY LAURENS) TO ISRAEL PUTNAM.1 YORK 14th. Novemr. 1777. Congress will leave no measure unattempted for stopping the progress of extortion. your Letters on that head are in the hands of a special Committee and I hope the subject of prices of the necessaries of life will soon be profitably debated and considered in the House. the difficulty of restraining within proper bounds is great but I hope not insurmountable.2. . . Sir, 737. THE PREsident of ConGRESS (HENRY LAURENS) TO YORK TOWN 14 Novem 1777. .. Inclosed you will find a Resolve of Congress touching the subject of paying the Troops for Rations which implies an approbation of the measures you had pursued in that branch, restricting the practice within the bounds of necessity to be determined by your judgement.2 Congress have not considered the necessity for sending any of its Members to liquidate extra Accounts. I shall remind the House again of the subject that at least somewhat more explicit may be said than I am authorized to offer at present. On the subject of Money, when I pressed the Chairman of the Treasury to send you an immediate supply, he informed me that 200000 Dollars were on the way to you when you wrote, besides the Order for the like Sum on the Connecticut Loan Office, that 200000 Dollars more [had] been] provided for your department and that with all possible expedition a further supply shall be sent. Demands for a greater Sum than ever was called for at one time, have at this juncture conspired to impoverish the Treasury. the business there has also been greatly obstructed by the removal of Congress but is now restored again to good order and the fund will soon be replenished [736]1 Library of Congress, President's Letter-Book, I. 25. 2 The reference is to Putnam's letters of Nov. 3, read in Congress Nov. 13. The special committee on the letter of Stephen Hopkins and the proceedings of a committee of the Eastern states was appointed Aug. 18, and enlarged Sept. 10. See the Journals, Aug. 18, Sept. 10, Oct. 27, Nov. 13, 22, 26, 27; also nos. 592, 723, ante, nos. 738, 746, 747, 749, 753, 754, 760, 764, 765, post. [737] N. Y. Hist. Soc., Gates Papers, XI.; Library of Congress, President's LetterBook, I. 26. 2 See the Journals, Nov. 10; also the commissary regulations under June 10 (p. 446). Cf. ibid., Aug. 11, Sept. 4, 11, Dec. 30. Probably the sums ordered sent by resolves of Oct. 10, 16, and Nov. 13 (see also the Journals, Nov. 19). Cf. ibid., Nov. 12. Dear Sir, 738. RICHARD HENRY LEE TO SAMUEL Adams.1 YORK the 15th of Novr. 1777 We have at length finished the Confederation and shall send it to the different States in a few days with strong exortation to give it quick consideration and speedy return.2 Taxation, Finance, and recruiting the Army will also be strongly recommended. Your utmost aid will no doubt be cordially applied to the expediting these important points." 739. THOMAS BURKE, NOTES ON THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.' [November 15, 1777.]2 Article 4th The Constitution of No. Carolina permits not the Privilege of Citizens to any who have not resided therein 12 months, and paid Taxes. (local protection is given to all within the Territory) the Legislature therefore cannot ratify an artikle which gives such priviliges to persons residing in other States. Our Commons are voted for by all free Citizens, and if the Inhabitants of our Neighboring States have the priviliges of Citizens in ours they might insist upon the right of voting for Members of Our Legislature which would be a political absurdity. it seems therefore proper that this article should be Amended by adding after the clause refer'd to not inconsistant with their respective Constitutions: The Provisionary clause of this article, in my opinion, deprives the States of every power to increase or regulate their particular Commerce, Agriculture or Manufactures. they cannot prevent by Duties or restrictions importations, or Exportations Injurious to any of them. this surely is what no staple state ought to admit, and that of all ours, who has so many Staples. Article 5th This article supposes that the appointment of delegates is at the will of the Legislature. tis an Error with respect to No. Carolina. Those officers are the creatures of the Constitution, are to be annually chozen by ballot, and if superceded must be in the same way. no choice can be made for less than one year. this article wants alteration if all the states are circumstanced as ours. for us I think the following would do " Dele [738] N. Y. Pub. Lib., Samuel Adams Papers; Letters of Richard Henry Lee (ed. Ballagh), I. 348. 2 See the Journals, Nov. 15, 17. Cf. nos. 733, 735, ante, 739, 740, 746, 747, 749, 753, 754, 760, 765, 766, post. 3 Cf. nos. 723, 736, ante, 753, 754, post. [739] Office of the North Carolina Historical Commission. 2 Although Burke has labeled these comments Some Notes on the Articles of Confederation while in Congress", they were probably not put together in their present form until after his return to North Carolina (see no. 725, ante). Possibly they were laid before the joint committee of the two houses of the assembly appointed Dec. 18 to report upon the Confederation (see no. 740, note 2, post; cf. note 3, below). The document is placed at this point because the Articles of Confederation as completed are recorded in the Journals under Nov. 15. gates Constitutionally appointed and Controlled by the respective States shall annually meet in Congress on the first Monday in November " The remaining part of this article tho unjust[?] in the mode of determining Questions, must be submitted to for the sake of public convenience, but if the latter clause exempts the Delegates from Prosecutions in their respective states for their misdemeanors in Congress, it takes away the control of the States, and being contrary to our Constitution cannot be admitted. Article 6th The first clause of this article in my opinion imposes very unnecessary restraints upon the States. the various affairs of a free commercial People will require them often to enter into Conferences and agreements with foreign states, and the commercial Interests of each state ought to be its own peculiar care; and subject [to] no control or Interposition from others I can see no propriety in such a Restraint as each State ought, in my opinion, to be at least at liberty to enter into any Commercial Treaty it may think proper so that it be not inconsistent with Treaties entered into by the United States. These seem to me to be of Importance to the Staple States. there can be no reason for subjecting them to restraints which may arise from the Jealousy or ambition of others. each should be at liberty to increase its wealth and strength as much as possible. tis sufficient that they be restrained from using them to the Injury of their Neighbors, and that they be obliged to contribute in Just proportion to the Common defence. The latter part of the first section of this article is right. The second Section goes too far. the Word Treaty ought to be left out. the States will often have occasion to Treat on subjects which concern none but those engaged in it; and there can be no reason for restraining them from it, if the United States have [power to?] prevent any alliance or Compact injurious to the whole it is sufficient, and this purpose will be answered by giving them a negative on all Compacts between two or more States. The third section is right. The fourth section so far as it regards the Navy appears to me to be impolitic. it speaks a Jealousy which I fear will forever prevent the United States from having a powerful Navy, tho' nothing is more Essential to its future Security against foreign Enemies. the Emulation of the States in this particular ought to be encouraged by every Means, for that Emulation will be the most powerful Instrument for giving to the whole a formidable Navy, and with such they will be secure against the World. I see no reason for the Jealousy. the fleet of one state cannot endanger another because they are accessable to each other by Land, and a Sea Invasion might very readily be counteracted by a Land Invasion. the rest of this Section is right. The fifth Section is right in everything but what relates to Indian Wars, and it will be difficult to frame an article to suit in this particular. I am inclined to think this might be left for the subject of partial alliances, for all the States are not Interested in it and yet Several States have one common Interest in it, and there are still some particular Interests in which but one or few states are concerned, Article 7th I have no objection to this provided the provision recommended by Connecticut takes place.3 Article 9th This article is exceedingly Comprehensive, its matter is of the greatest Importance, but its arrangement seems to me much too Complicated. My own Idea of the Power which Congress ought to possess is founded on the following proposition The United States ought to be as one Sovereign with respect to foreign Powers, in all things that relate to War or where the States have one Common Interest. But in all commercial or other peaceful Intercourse they ought to be as separate Sovereigns. The first is Necessary, because no one can be defended from the evils of war but by the united force of all, and to make this force the more Effectual their union for its Exertions should be as close and simple as possible. The Second is Necessary, in order that each may acquire strength to as great a degree as its circumstances may admit, without being subject to restraints which may arise from the Jealousy of its neighbors. and as the growth of each is its own proper concern, and cannot be prejudicial to the whole, but on the contrary advantageous to them as long as the force acquired is still subject to be applied for the common security, by one common Magistrate, I can perceive no reason for a power in any Common Council which can restrain the Commercial or other peaceful intercourse of the States, among themselves, or separately with foreign Powers, and it can answer no purpose but to subject the Property of the States to partial combinations in the common council. A private citizen who embarques a part of his fortune in a Copartnership would be deemed very unwise should he suffer the members of that partnership to possess a power that might restrain him from [improving] the remaining part of his Fortune to what extent he pleased consistent with the Common Interest. equally unwise in my opinion is it for a State who unites with others for common defence to submit to a power which may prevent the growth of her Strength and Oppulence. pursuant to these propositions my Ideas of the powers which ought to be in Congress are as follow. In General they should have the Power of declaring War, and peace. But wherever a war should be declared before actual Invasion or commencement or Threatening of some actual Hostilities, any State ought to be at Liberty to renounce the War and become a Neutral power but when Hostilities are actually commenced against any of the States, it ought to be deemed common cause, and none should withhold assistance. 3 The Connecticut proposition respecting article VII. does not appear in the Journals; but a motion affecting article IX. is found ibid., IX. 927. Also they should have the Power of Concluding Treaties of Alliance equally binding and affecting the whole for the purpose of strengthening the common security. this should be restrained like the former to defence, for it ought always to be in the Power of each state to remain Neuter in all offensive wars whether the United States be principles or allies in it. These Powers necessarily require that the Congress should send and receive Embassadors, but not that this Power should be sole and exclusive. I should like an Amendment to this purpose" shall have the sole and exclusive Power of declaring War and concluding Peace, and of sending, and receiving ambasadors in the name of the United States of Entering into Treaties and Alliances equally binding upon, and affecting the whole. here the Exceptions to those general rules should come by way of provision. The remaining powers in the first section of this article are Incident to the power of declaring War, they are only an execution of the Law of Nations quoad hoc The second section is [b]adly worded, "the United States shall be the last resort on appeal in all disputes between the States." I have no Idea of an appeal, or last resort unless their be some prior Jurisdiction and prior resort, and I know of no such thing between the States. but my objection to this section is more substantial. if the Congress are to nominate the persons who Constitute the Judicatory I can easily foresee it will not always if ever be impartial. the Congress cannot know any persons to appoint, but such as are Suggested by the parties and that State which has the prevailing Interest in Congress will thus nominate all the Judges. their being drawn from each State and afterwards drawn by Lot is no Security, because three persons in each State are easily corrupted. if this article were amended by giving the Nomination by ballot to the States not Interested it would answer better to my Idea of an Impartial arbiter between the States, and the Congress should have this Power only as the Official Instrument for erecting the occasional Tribunal, and for carrying its decrees into Execution. as it now stands they have it too much in their power to Influence the decisions which they themselves are to execute which in my Opinion is dangerous in any political Community. The third section might be easily fitted to the Amendment I propose The four [th] section includes many powers which I cannot perceive either to be necessary or proper for Congress. regulating the alloy of coin struck by authority of any of the States, fixing the standard of weights and measures, regulating the Trade and affairs with Indians, and all that Appertains to the Naval force which ought never in my opinion to be under any restraint or authority of Congress except in time of public War. the first is dangerous, because it gives to a council which is composed of but very few members from each state and which is without control an unlimited power over the property of Individuals. the power to increase the alloy is a power to pay off any Debt with less than the sum contracted for, and involves an extensive power over property. In the fifth Section the power to borrow money and emit Bills, is an unlimited power over all property. it is a power to Tax at pleasure, and |