clares against young horfes for the fervice of an army.

That the military branch of the British government is fufceptible of improvements, all the world will admit. To improve it, I have contributed my mite; which is humbly fubmitted to the public, a judge from which their lies no appeal. It is fubmitted in three views. The first is, Whether an army modelled as above, would not fecure us against the boldest invader; the next, Whether fuch an army be as dangerous to liberty, as an army in its prefent form; and the laft, Whether it would not be a school of industry and moderation to our people.

With respect to the first, we should, after a few years, have not only an army of fixty thousand well-difciplined troops, but the command of another army, equally numerous and equally well difciplined. It is true, that troops inured to war have an advantage over troops that have not the fame experience: but with affurance it may be pronounced impracticable, to land at once in Britain an army that can ftand against 100,000 British foldiers well difciplined, fighting, even the first time,

for

for their country, and for their wives and children.

A war with France raifes a panic on every flight threatening of an invafion. The fecurity afforded by the propofed plan, would enable us to act offenfively at fea, instead of being reduced to keep our fhips at home for guarding our coafts. Would Britain any longer be obliged to fupport her continental connections? No fooner does an European prince augment his army, or improve military difcipline, than his neighbours, taking fright, must do the fame. May not one hope, that by the plan propofed, or by fome fuch, Britain would be relieved from jealoufy and folicitude about its neighbours ?

This is a fubject that deferves deep attention, being of the utmost importance to Great Britain. The importance will clearly appear upon confidering our late war with France, and our prefent war with France, Spain, and our American colonies, all united against us. France and Britain have made frequent attempts to distress one another by threatening an invafion. But they are not upon an equal footing: England has many good harbours, not a VOL. III. fingle

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fingle fortified town; France has few harbours and many fortified towns. It is provided with a standing army much greater in proportion than Britain; and above all, our capital is open to a fudden attack by fea, which the capital of France is not. Our Bank may in an inftant be ruined, and public credit fuffer a ftupifying blow. We accordingly are terrified at the very thought of a flat-bottom'd boat; and it is acknowledged on all hands, that we have no fecurity against an invasion but a fuperior fleet. This unhappy fituation has, in the prefent war, thrown our minifters into great perplexity. Our field of action is America and the Weft Indies, and yet our grand fleet is locked up at home, while the French and Spaniards are at liberty to direct all their force to that part of the world. Our intelligence of the motions of our enemies must be always late, often uncertain; and in fact feveral capital blows have been ftruck before we could give any reinforcement to our fleets in thofe parts. Now if the military branch proposed above had been adopted early during intervals of peace, our miniftry would have been at liberty to employ our whole naval force

where

where it could do the greatest execution, and would foon have brought the war to an end.

With respect to the fecond view, having long enjoy'd the fweets of a free government under a fucceffion of mild princes, we begin to forget that our liberties ever were in danger. But droufy fecurity is of all conditions the most dangerous; because the state may be overwhelmed before we even dream of danger. Suppofe only, that a British King, accomplished in the art of war and beloved by his foldiers, heads his own troops in a war with France; and after more than one fuccessful campaign, gives peace to his enemy, on terms advantageous to his people : what fecurity have we for our liberties, when he returns with a victorious army, devoted to his will? I am talking of a standing army in its prefent form. Troops modelled as above would not be fo obfequious: a number of the prime nobility and gentry ferving without pay, who could be under no temptation to enflave themselves and their country, would prove a firm barrier against the ambitious views. of fuch a prince. And even fuppofing that

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that army to be totally corrupted, the prince could have little hope of fuccefs against the nation, fupported by a veteran army, that might be relied on as champions for their country

*

And as to the laft view mentioned, the plan propofed would promote industry and virtue, not only among the foldiers, but among the working people in general. To avoid hard labour and severe difcipline in the army, men would be fober and induftrious at home; and such untractable spirits as cannot be reached by the mild laws. of a free government, would be effectually tamed by military law. At the fame time, as fobriety and innocence are constant àttendants upon industry, the manners of our people would be much purified; a

*While it was a law in Rome that a man muft ferve ten years in the army before he could be admitted to a civil office, the republic had nothing to dread from their armies. But when by luxury the fatigues of war appeared unfupportable to men of condition, there was a neceffity to fill the legions with the low and indigent, who followed their leaders implicitly, and were as ready to overturn the republic as to protect it. Hence the civil war between Marius and Sylia; and hence the overthrow of the republic by Julius Caefar.