point of order; and fo forth. The modes of fimul are only three. It feems this word was not used in the Greek with fo great latitude as the other, although they are relative terms.

The modes or fpecies of motion he makes to be fix, to wit, generation, corruption, increase, decrease, alteration, and change of place.

The modes or fpecics of having are eight. 1. Having a quality or habit, as having wifdom. 2. Having quantity or magnitude. 3. Having things adjacent, as having a fword. 4. Having things as parts, as having hands or feet. 5. Having in a part or on a part, as having a ring on one's finger. 6. Containing, as a cafk is said to have wine. 7. Poffeffing, as having lands or houfes. S. Having a wife.

Another diftinction of this kind is Ariftotle's diftinction of caufes; of which he 'makes four kinds, efficient, material, formal, and final. These diftinctions may deferve a place in a dictionary of the Greek language; but in English or Latin they adulterate the language. Yet fo fond were the schoolmen of diftinctions of this kind, that they added to Ariftotle's enumeration,

an

an impulfive cause, an exemplary cause, and I don't know how many more. We feem to have adopted into English a final cause; but it is merely a term of art, borrowed from the Peripatetic philofophy, without neceffity or ufe: for the English word end is as good as final cause, though not fo long nor fo learned,

SECT. 4. On Definitions.

It remains that we make fome remarks on Aristotle's definitions, which have expofed him to much cenfure and ridicule. Yet I think it must be allowed, that in things which need definition and admit of it, his definitions are commonly judicious and accurate; and had he attempted to define fuch things only, his enemies. had wanted great matter of triumph. I believe it may likewife be faid in his favour, that until Locke's effay was wrote, there was nothing of importance delivered by philofophers with regard to definition, beyond what Aristotle has faid upon that fubject.

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He confiders a definition as a speech declaring what a thing is. Every thing ef fential to the thing defined, and. nothing more, must be contained in the definition. Now the effence of a thing confifts of these two parts: First, What is common to it with other things of the fame kind; and, fecondly, What distinguishes it from other things of the fame kind. The first is called the genus of the thing, the fecond its specific difference. The definition therefore confists of these two parts. And for finding them, we must have recourfe to the ten categories; in one or other of which every thing in nature is to be found. Each category is a genus, and is divided into fo many fpecies, which are distinguished by their fpecific differences. Each of these fpecies is again fubdivided into fo many fpecies, with regard to which it is a genus. This divifion and fubdivifion continues until we come to the loweft fpecies, which can only be divided into individuals, diftinguished from one another, not by any specific difference, but by accidental differences. of time, place, and other circumstances.

The category itfelf being the highest genus, is in no refpect a fpecies, and the

lowest

every

lowelt species is in no refpect a genus; but intermediate order is a genus compared with those that are below it, and a fpecies compared with thofe above it. To find the definition of any thing, therefore, you must take the genus which is immediately above its place in the category, and the specific difference, by which it is diftin guished from other fpecies of the fame ge nus. These two make a perfect definition. This I take to be the substance of Aristotle's fyftem; and probably the system of the Pythagorean fchool before Aristotle, concerning definition.

But notwithstanding the fpecious appearance of this system, it has its defects. Not to repeat what was before said of the imperfection of the divifion of things into ten categories, the fubdivifions of each category are no less imperfect. Aristotle has given fome fubdivifions of a few of them; and as far as he goes, his followers pretty unanimously take the fame road. But when they attempt to go farther, they take very different roads. It is evident, that if the series of each category could be completed, and the divifion of things into categories could be made perfect, still the highest

highest genus in each category could not be defined, because it is not a species; nor could individuals be defined, because they have no fpecific difference. There are alfo many fpecies of things, whofe fpecific difference cannot be expreffed in language, even when it is evident to fenfe, or to the understanding. Thus green, red, and blue, are very distinct fpecies of colour; but who can exprefs in words wherein green differs from red or blue?

Without borrowing light from the ancient fyftem, we may perceive, that every definition must confift of words that need no definition; and that to define the common words of a language that have no ambiguity, is trifling, if it could be done; the only use of a definition being to give a clear and adequate conception of the meaning of a word..

The logicians indeed diftinguish between the definition of a word, and the definition of a thing; confidering the former as the mean office of a lexicographer, but the last as the grand work of a philofopher. But what they have faid about the definition of a thing, if it have a meaning, is beyond my comprehenfion. All

the