ted. It is one of the general rules of divifion in all systems of logic, That the divifion should be adequate to the subject divided: a good rule, without doubt; but very often beyond the reach of human power. To make a perfect divifion, a man must have a perfect comprehenfion of the whole subject at one view. When our knowledge of the fubject is imperfect, any divifion we can make, must be like the firft fketch of a painter, to be extended, contracted, or mended, as the subject shall be found to require. Yet nothing is more common, not only among the ancient, but even among modern philofophers, than to draw, from their incomplete divifions, conclufions which fuppofe them to be perfect.

A divifion is a repository which the philofopher frames for holding his ware in convenient order. The philofopher maintains, that fuch or fuch a thing is not good ware, because there is no place in his ware-room that fits it. We are apt to yield to this argument in philofophy, but it would appear ridiculous in any other traffic.

Peter Ramus, who had the spirit of a re

former

former in philosophy, and who had force of genius fufficient to fhake the Ariftotelian fabric in many parts, but infufficient to erect any thing more folid in its place, tried to remedy the imperfection of philofophical divifions, by introducing a new manner of dividing. His divifions always confifted of two members, one of which was contradictory of the other; as if one fhould divide England into Middlesex and what is not Middlefex. It is evident that these two members comprehend all England for the logicians obferve, that a term along with its contradictory, comprehend all things. In the fame manner, we may divide what is not Middlefex into Kent and what is not Kent. Thus one may go on by divifions and fubdivifions that are abfolutely complete. This example may ferve to give an idea of the fpirit of Ramean divifions, which were in no fmall reputation about two hundred years ago.

Aristotle was not ignorant of this kind of divifion. But he ufed it only as a touchftone to prove by induction the perfection of fome other divifion, which indeed is the beft ufe that can be made of it. When

applied

applied to the common purpose of divifion, it is both inelegant, and burdenfome to the memory; and, after it has put one out of breath by endless fubdivifions, there is ftill a negative term left behind, which fhows that you are no nearer the end of your journey than when you began.

Until fome more effectual remedy be found for the imperfection of divifions, I beg leave to propose one more fimple than that of Ramus. It is this: When you meet with a divifion of any fubject imperfecly comprehended, add to the last member an et cætera. That this et cætera makes the divifion complete, is undeniable; and therefore it ought to hold its place as a member, and to be always understood, whether expreffed or not, until clear and pofitive proof be brought that the division is complete without it. And this fame et cætera is to be the repofitory of all members that fhall in any future time fhew a good and valid right to a place in the fubject..

SECT. 3. On Diftinctions.

Having faid fo much of logical divi

fions, we shall next make fome remarks upon distinctions.

Since the philosophy of Aristotle fell into disrepute, it has been a common topic of wit and raillery, to enveigh against metaphyfical distinctions. Indeed the abuse of them in the scholastic ages, feems to justify a general prejudice against them : and shallow thinkers and writers have good reason to be jealous of distinctions, because they make fad work when applied to their flimfy compofitions. But every man of true judgement, while he condemns diftinctions that have no foundation in the nature of things, muft perceive, that indifcriminately to decry distinctions, is to renounce all pretenfions to just reasoning: for as false reasoning commonly proceeds from confounding things that are different; fo without diftinguishing such things, it is impoffible to avoid error, or detect fophistry. The authority of Aquinas, or Suarez, or even of Aristotle, can neither stamp a real value upon distinctions of base metal, nor hinder the currency of thofe of true metal.

Some diftinctions are verbal, others are real. The first kind distinguish the va

rious

rious meanings of a word; whether proper, or metaphorical. Diftinctions of this kind make a part of the grammar of a language, and are often abfurd when tranflated into another language. Real diftinctions are equally good in all languages, and fuffer no hurt by tranflation. They distinguish the different species contained under fome general notion, or the different parts contained in one whole.

Many of Aristotle's diftinctions are verbal merely; and therefore, more proper materials for a dictionary of the Greek language, than for a philofophical treatise. At least, they ought never to have been tranflated into other languages, when the idiom of the language will not justify them: for this is to adulterate the language, to introduce foreign idioms into it without neceffity or ufe, and to make it ambiguous where it was not. The dif tinctions in the end of the Categories of the four words, prius, fimul, motus, and habere, are all verbal.

The modes or fpecies of prius, according to Aristotle, are five. One thing may be prior to another; firft, in point of time; fecondly, in point of dignity; thirdly, in VOL. III, U u point