interpolated. These fufpicions are justified by the fate of Ariftotle's writings, which is judiciously related, from the best authorities, in Bayle's dictionary, under the article Tyrannion, to which I refer.

His books in logic which remain, are, 1. One book of the Categories. 2. One of Interpretation. 3. First Analytics, two books. 4. Laft Analytics, two books. 5. Topics, eight books. 6. Of Sophifms, one book. Diogenes Laertius mentions many others that are loft. Thofe I have mentioned have commonly been published together, under the name of Ariftotle's Organon, or his Logic; and for many ages, Porphyry's Introduction to the Categories has been prefixed to them.

SECT. 2. Of Porphyry's Introduction.

In this Introduction, which is addreffed to Chryfoarius, the author obferves, That in order to understand Ariftotle's doctrine concerning the categories, it is neceffary to know what a genus is, what a Species, what a specific difference, what a property, and what an accident; that the knowledge of thefe is also very ufeful in definition, VOL. III. Rr

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in divifion, and even in demonstration : therefore he propofes, in this little tract, to deliver shortly and fimply the doctrine of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning these five predicables; avoiding the more intricate questions concerning them; fuch as, Whether genera and Species do really exift in nature? or, Whether they are only conceptions of the human mind? If they exist in nature, Whether they are corporeal or incorporeal? and, Whether they are inherent in the objects of fenfe, or disjoined from them? Thefe, he says, are very difficult questions, and require accurate difcuffion; but that he is not to meddle with them.

After this preface, he explains very minutely each of the five words above mentioned, divides and fubdivides each of them, and then purfues all the agreements and differences between one and another through fixteen chapters.

SECT. 3. Of the Categories.

The book begins with an explication of what is meant by univocal words, what

by

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by equivocal, and what by denominative. Then it is obferved, that what we fay is either fimple, without compofition or ftructure, as man, horfe; or, it has compofition and structure, as, a man fights, the borse runs. Next comes a diftinction between a fubject of predication; that is, a fubject of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and a fubject of inhefion. These things are faid to be inherent in a fubject, which although they are not a part of the fubject, cannot poffibly exift without it, as figure in the thing figured. Of things that are, fays Aristotle, fome may be predicated of a fubject, but are in no fubject; as man may be predicated of James or John, but is not in any fubject. Some again are in a subject, but can be predicated of no fubject. Thus, my knowledge in grammar is in me as its fubject, but it can be predicated of no fubject; because it is an individual thing. Some are both in a fubject, and may be predicated of a fubject, as fcience; which is in the mind. as its fubject, and may be predicated of geometry. Lastly, Some things can neither be in a fubject, nor be predicated of any fubject. Such are all individual sub

stances, which cannot be predicated, because they are individuals; and cannot be in a fubject, because they are substances. After fome other fubtilties about predicates and fubjects, we come to the categories themselves; the things above mentioned being called by the schoolmen the antepredicamenta. It may be observed, however, that notwithstanding the distinction now explained, the being in a fubject, and the being predicated truly of a fubject, are in the Analytics used as fynonymous phrafes; and this variation of ftyle has led fome perfons to think that the Categories were not written by Aristotle.

Things that may be expreffed without compofition or structure, are, says the author, reducible to the following heads. They are either fubftance, or quantity, or quality, or relatives, or place, or time, or having, or doing, or fuffering. These are the predicaments or categories. The first four are largely treated of in four chapters; the others are flightly paffed over, as sufficiently clear of themfelves. As a fpecimen, I shall give a fummary of what he fays on the category of substance,

Subftances are either primary, to wit, individual

individual substances, or secondary, to wit, the genera and fpecies of substances. Primary substances neither are in a fubject, nor can be predicated of a subject; but all other things that exift, either are in primary substances, or may be predicated of them. For whatever can be predicated of that which is in a fubject, may alfo be predicated of the subject itself. Primary substances are more substances than the secondary; and of the secondary, the species is more a fubftance than the genus. If there were no primary, there could be no fecondary fubftances.

The properties of fubftance are these: 1. No substance is capable of intension or remiffion. 2. No fubftance can be in any other thing as its fubject of inhefion. 3. No fubftance has a contrary; for one substance cannot be contrary to another; nor can there be contrariety between a substance and that which is no fubftance. 4. The most remarkable property of fubstance, is, that one and the fame fubstance may, by fome change in itself, become the fubject of things that are contrary. Thus, the fame body may be at one time hot, at another cold.

Let