to make head against a difciplined army of 70,000 men. Poland, which continues upon the ancient military establishment, wearied out Charles XII. of Sweden; and had done the fame to feveral of his predecellors. But Saxony, defended only by a ftanding army, could not hold out a fingle day against the prince now mentioned, at the head of a greater army. Mercenary troops are a defence ftill more feeble, against troops that fight for glory, or for their country. Unhappy was the invention of a standing army; which, without being any strong bulwark against enemies, is a grievous burden on the people; and turns daily more and more fo. Listen to a first-rate author on that point. "Sitôt "qu'un état augmente ce qu'il appelle "fes troupes, les autres augmentent les "leurs; de façon qu'on ne gagne rien. par-là que la ruine commune. Chaque monarque tient fur pied toutes les armées qu'il pourroit avoir fi fes peuples ❝étoient en danger d'être exterminées;

66

et on nomme paix cet état d'effort de 66 tous contre tous. Nous fommes pau66 vres avec les richeffes et le commerce de tout l'univers; et bientôt à force d'avoir "des

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"des foldats, nous n'aurons plus que des foldats, et nous ferons comme de Tar

But with refpect to Britain, and every free nation, there is an objection still more formidable; which is, that a standing army is dangerous to liberty. It avails very little to be fecure against foreign enemies, fuppofing a standing army to afford fecurity, if we have no fecurity against an enemy at home. If a warlike king, heading his own troops, be ambitious to render himself abfolute, there are no means to evade the impending blow; for what avail the greatest number of effeminate

* "As foon as one state augments the number of "its troops, the neighbouring states of courfe do "the fame; fo that nothing is gained, and the ef"fect is, the general ruin. Every prince keeps as

many armies in pay, as if he dreaded the exter"mination of his people from a foreign invafion; "and this perpetual struggle, maintained by all a

gainft all, is termed peace. With the riches and "" commerce of the whole univerfe, we are in a state "of poverty; and by thus continually augmenting ་ our troops, we fhall foon have none else but fol"diers, and be reduced to the fame fituation as the "Tartars."

(a) L'efprit des loix. liv. 13. chap. 17.

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cowards

cowards against a difciplined army, devoted to their prince, and ready implicitly to execute his commands? In a word, by relying entirely on a standing army, and by trufting the fword in the hands of men who abhor the restraints of civil law, a folid foundation is laid for military government. Thus a ftanding army is dangerous to liberty, and yet no fufficient bulwark against powerful neighbours.

Deeply fenfible of the foregoing objections, Harrington propofes a militia as a remedy. Every male between eighteen and thirty, is to be trained to military exercises, by frequent meetings, where the youth are excited by premiums to contend in running, wrestling, fhooting at a mark, &c. &c. But Harrington did not advert, that fuch meetings, enflaming the military fpirit, must create an averfion in the people to dull and fatiguing labour. His plan evidently is inconfiftent with industry and manufactures: it would be fo at least in Britain. An unexceptionable plan it would be, were defence our fole object; and not the lefs fo by reducing Britain to fuch poverty as scarce to be a tempting conquest. Our late war with France is a confpicuous

inftance

inftance of the power of a commercial state, entire in its credit; a power that amaz'd all the world, and ourselves no lefs than others. Politicians begin to confider Britain, and not France, to be the formi dable power that threatens univerfal monarchy. Had Harrington's plan been adopted, Britain must have been reduced to a level with Sweden or Denmark, having no ambition but to draw fubfidies from its more potent neighbours.

In Switzerland, it is true, boys are, from the age of twelve, exercised in running, wrestling, and fhooting. Every male who can bear arms is regimented, and fubjected to military difcipline. Here is a militia in perfection upon Harrington's plan, a militia neither forc'd nor mercenary; invincible when fighting for their country. And as the Swifs are not an idle people, we learn from this instance, that the martial spirit is not an invincible obstruction to induftry. But the original barrennefs of Switzerland, compelled the inhabitants to be fober and industrious: and industry hath among them become a fecond nature; there scarcely being a child above fix years of age but who is employ'd,

not

not excepting children of opulent families. England differs widely in the nature of its foil, and of its people. But there is little occafion to infift upon that difference; as Switzerland affords no clear evidence, that a fpirit of industry is perfectly compatible with a militia: the Swifs, it is true, may be termed industrious; but their industry is confined to neceffaries and conveniencies: they are lefs ambitious of wealth than of military glory; and they have few arts or manufactures, either to fupport foreign commerce, or to excite lu

xury.

Fletcher of Salton's plan of a militia, differs little from that of Harrington. Three camps are to be conftantly kept up in England, and a fourth in Scotland; into one or other of which, every man must enter upon completing his one and twentieth year. In these camps, the art of war is to be acquired and practised: thofe who can maintain themselves must continue there two years, others but a fingle year. Secondly, Those who have been thus educated,. fhall for ever after have fifty yearly meetings, and shall exercise four hours every meeting. It is not

faid,