conspicuous in every part of the universe: and, the wider our physical researches are extended, the more conspicuously does this design appear. Therefore, just as we argue the existence of a watchmaker from the evident design which may be observed in a watch, so we argue the existence of a Creator from the evident design which may be observed in the universe. To bring out any other conclusion involves the same palpable absurdity, as to contend, that a watch assumed its orderly form by chance, and that it certainly never had a maker. The cogency of this argument I most readily allow, so far as its principle is concerned: but I must be permitted to doubt, how far it will serve the purpose of a deist, who depends solely upon his own reason and who rejects the authority of revelation. It is perfectly true, that evident design must needs imply a designer: and it is equally true, that evident design shines out in every part of the universe. But we reason incon clusively, if, with the deist, we thence infer the existence of one and only one, supreme designer. That a universe, upon which design is so evidently impressed, must have been created, is indeed abundantly clear: nor will this point be ever controverted, save by the gross folly of Atheism. But, that a universe, thus characterized, was created by one Supreme God, is not at all clear upon the principles of deistical Infidelity. It may, for ought the deist knows to the contrary, have been created by a collective body of Gods, perfectly harmonizing in design, and jointly bringing the great work to a compietion. The argument, from the evident design im pressed upon the universe, proves indeed, that the universe must have been first designed and then created but is incapable of proving, that the universe had no more than a single designer. Whether we suppose one designer or many designers, and thence one creator or many creators, the phenomenon of evident design in the creation will be equally accounted for: and, beyond this, the argument in question, as managed upon deistical principles, neither does nor can reach. The deist, I allow, can prove very satisfactorily and without the aid of revelation, that the universe, marked as it is in all its parts by evident design, must have been itself designed and therefore created: but he never did, and he never can, prove, without the aid of revelation, that the universe was designed by a single designer. He rejects, however, the aid of revelation: therefore, on his own principles, he cannot prove so much as the very dogma from which he borrows his name. To this objection he will answer, (I am fully aware) that the theory of one designer is much more simple than the theory of many designers, and therefore that it ought to be preferred and adopted. What he says may be true enough: but still, on deistical principles, where is the proof? On those principles, it is highly probable, that there is no more than one God. But probability is not certainty and I will venture to say, without any fear of well-grounded contradiction, that, even in the first article of his creed, the deist can attain to no greater elevation than bare probability. Nay, were we so disposed, we might contest even this point with him. On the same ground, that he pleads for the higher probability of a single designer, in the case of the universe; he stands pledged, would he preserve consistency, to plead for the higher probability of a single designer, in the case of a watch. Yet that instrument, as we all know, was not struck out at a heat, by one intellect; and still less are its several component parts fashioned by a single hand. In short, when the deist has arrived at the conclusion, that the universe must have been designed and created: he must search for some new argument to prove that it had only a single designer and creator. If he fail in demonstrating this vital point, his system will limp from its very birth and, to style himself a deist rather than a polytheist, will be a virtual begging of the question. He has no solid ground for maintaining, either the unity of the Godhead on the one hand, or a plurality of Gods on the other hand. For aught he knows to the contrary, there may be only one God: and, for aught he knows to the contrary, there may be many Gods. He thinks fit indeed to worship only one God; and, from that circumstance, he chooses to borrow his title: but, whether he be right or wrong in so doing, and whether his title be properly or improperly adopted, he is of necessity, on his principles, wholly and irremediably ignorant. II. Let us however suppose, that by some powerful argument hitherto unproduced, the deist has satisfactorily proved the existence of one only God: we shall then have next to inquire, what certain information he possesses respecting the divine attributes. He will be quite sure, that God is a very powerful being; because, otherwise, he plainly could not be the creator and governor of the universe: and he will perhaps guess that he is omnipotent, though he may find it difficult absolutely to prove that point. He will also not unreasonably infer, that God must be eternal: for, unless he be eternal retrospectively, his existence will have commenced without a cause; and, unless he be eternal prospectively, his existence must needs cease through the instrumentality of some cause brought by himself into being and therefore weaker than himself, which is a palpable contradiction. But in the present enigmatical state of the world, enigmatical to all who reject revelation, how will the deist establish, what I presume he holds, the moral attributes of the Divinity? 1. The deist and the Christian, unless I wholly mistake, alike contend, that God is a God of perfect justice. Here the Christian, taking his stand upon revelation, feels himself to be planted upon sure ground: but how does the deist make good this position? If we look around us into the world, we shall find nothing more proverbially common than the triumph of successful worthlessness and the depression of unsuccessful worthiness. The worst of mankind perpetually enjoy the largest share of the good things of life, while they seem to receive them as if for the sole purpose of abusing them and the best of mankind are often destitute even of bare necessaries, though they of all others would plainly make the best use of riches. Nor yet is this the whole that may be remarked in the perplexing world, which we in habit. If there be any such thing as the moral sense, and if we can form any clear idea of an impartial moral governor, we must be compelled to anticipate a priori, that rewards will uniformly follow virtue, and that punishment will uniformly follow vice. But, if we look out into the world, no arrangement of this description actually takes place. The whole is one mass of inextricable confusion. Bodily pain and sickness, bodily comfort and health, are indifferently distributed with little or no regard to moral character. Some vices, it is true, are apt to bring after them their own punishment: but this is by no means the case invariably. So far from it, in very many instances, the vicious are almost wholly free from pain and sickness, while the virtuous never know what it is to be exempt from them. Now, if God be a God of perfect justice, how will the deist account for these notorious facts? He may say indeed, that worldly prosperity and adversity, depending as they do in a good measure upon the exertions either of men themselves or of their ancestors, cannot be described as so directly proceeding from the Deity, and therefore cannot be alleged as so directly affecting our estimate of his justice. But this solution will by no means hold good in the case of pain and sickness and (what are styled) casualties, together with the opposites of each: because they are wholly out of the reach of man, and depend altogether upon the will of God the moral governor of the universe. How then does the deist reconcile such a disposition of things with God's attribute of perfect justice? Or rather, to put the question in a more correct form, by what E |