pseudo-prophet Brothers, would have wrought any change in the sentiments of that admirable historian. Yet does he endeavour to persuade himself and his readers, that the inflexible and intolerant zeal of the early Christians is quite reason enough for their wonderful success in making proselytes.

I have considered the point merely as Mr. Gibbon himself has chosen to state it: but, in truth, his statement is most essentially defective. He simply considers pertinacious obstinacy in one man, as an infallible mean of inducing another man to change his opinion: whereas he ought to have considered pertinacious obstinacy in one man, as an infallible mean of inducing another man to change his opinion, notwithstanding this change of sentiment will expose the convert to torture and death. The genuine statement, therefore, of the matter, is as follows. In the judgment of Mr. Gibbon, provided only a man be endowed with a sufficient stock of zeal and obstinacy, he will certainly make numerous proselytes to his opinions, though his proselytes may be morally sure that they will be tortured and murdered for yielding to the wearisome importunity of this obstinate zealot.

This then is the first reason assigned by our great historian for the rapid propagation of primitive Christianity.

2. The second is the doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth.

Here again Mr. Gibbon eloquently discusses the uncertainty respecting a future state, which

prevailed among the philosophers of Greece and Rome; the defects inherent in the popular religions; the prevailing belief of the immortality of the soul among the Jews; the opinion entertained by many among the Christians, that the end of the world was near at hand; the doctrine of the millennium; the conflagration of Rome and the universe; and the stern declaration of Tertullian, that the unconverted pagans must expect no mercy hereafter. Of these materials his argument is composed; if such materials can be said to constitute an argument: and his conclusion, for so I presume it is meant to be, is summed up in the following terms. When the promise of eternal happiness was proposed to mankind, on condition of adopting the faith and observing the precepts of the Gospel, it is no wonder, that so advantageous an offer should have been accepted by great numbers of every religion, of every rank, and of every province in the Roman Empire.

I wish not to be captious; but of this conclusion I can no more see the validity, than I could discern the cogency of his first reason. That men should readily embrace an advantageous offer, when satisfied that the propounders of it could make it good, I can easily conceive and understand: but, why great numbers of every religion, of every rank, and of every province in the Roman Empire, should be eager to embrace such an offer, unless they had some reasonable grounds for believing the certainty of its completion, I must own myself quite unable to comprehend. Now, on Mr. Gibbon's principles, what were these grounds of assured belief? By dint of sheer obstinacy and intolerant zeal, it seems,

the primitive Christians teased the reluctant Pagans into a full admission of their religious opinions and, when once this matter was effected (which the historian thinks so easy, that he fearlessly lays it down as his first reason of the success of Christianity;) the world was prepared, without any further evidence, to believe every syllable which their pertinacious instructors might please to teach them, respecting a future

state.

Under circumstances so replete with conviction, it is no wonder, thinks Mr. Gibbon, that thousands upon thousands of every rank, age, temper, religion, and province, should become eager and satisfied proselytes; it is no wonder, that, after having first undergone the process of being harassed by importunity into a complete acquiescence in the opinions of their new teachers, they should next be fully prepared to believe every thing respecting the invisible world which their obstinate preceptors might choose to tell them.

In truth, it is no wonder, that those, who could be induced through the operation of mere importunity to embrace a religion which forthwith exposed them to obloquy and persecution, should, without any further hesitation, though without a shadow of evidence, assent to the naked dogmata of their masters in regard to a future state. The first step in the journey is every thing. Let that only be taken, and the remainder of their mental progress is perfectly

easy.

3. The third reason, assigned by Mr. Gibbon for the rapid propagation of Christianity, is

the miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive Church.

Had the historian assigned, as a reason, the miraculous powers possessed by the primitive Church; we should readily have perceived the cogency of it but he speaks only of the miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive Church; and, in the course of his discussion, he endeavours to establish the more than probability, that such powers were never really possessed and exercised. We have therefore to consider, how far miraculous powers, ascribed indeed to the Church, but never possessed by it, can be deemed a satisfactory reason for the rapid increase of the votaries of Christianity.

The argument, I apprehend, may be thrown, for the joint sake of brevity and precision, into the following syllogism.

Men are easily and naturally persuaded by the real working of miracles. The power of working miracles was ascribed to the primitive Church, but no miracles were ever performed. There fore men were easily and naturally persuaded by the non-performance of miracles.

This syllogism, I confess, is a very bad one : but I am unable to frame a better out of the materials, with which Mr. Gibbon has furnished me. The miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive Church, says he, constitute a satisfactory reason for the rapid diffusion of Christianity; though, all the while, no miraculous powers were ever either possessed or exercised by it. How can this be? we naturally ask. If miraculous powers were ascribed to the Church, without being really possessed; would not such a circumstance produce a

directly opposite effect to that propounded by Mr. Gibbon? A claim of working miracles is made by the primitive Church, as a likely mode of gaining proselytes. In effect, however, no miracles are wrought. What follows from this shameful failure of establishing such a claim? Will it gain proselytes, or excite ridicule ? Will it enlarge the boundaries of Christianity, or utterly destroy Christianity itself?

It is a whimsical circumstance, that Mr. Gibbon's zeal to throw discredit upon the primitive miracles produces the necessary and inevitable effect of completely stultifying his third reason.

4. The fourth reason is the pure and austere morals of the primitive Christians.

That the holy lives of the early believers had a natural tendency to recommend their doctrines, we may safely and readily allow at least we may allow it with certain limitations; for strictness and severity and purity, though they may sometimes gain veneration when they are fortunate enough to escape ridicule and contempt, are far from being always popular virtues. We allow then, to a certain extent, that the pure and austere morals of the primitive Christians had a natural tendency to recommend their doctrines : but, in this case, according to Mr. Gibbon's own statement, the wonder is, how such exact holiness should happen to be the leading characteristic of a set of shameless impostors. A bad tree does not commonly produce good fruit. What the tree of Paganism bore, is indignantly set forth by a Christian apostle:* and, though our

Rom. i. 1832,