at pleasure, would indeed be an invafion of the fundamental law of property; because, under pretext of taxing, it would fubject every man's property to the arbitrary will of the fovereign. But the argument has no weight, where the fovereign's power is limited. The reciprocal duties between fovereign and fubject imply, that the people ought to contribute what fums are neceffary for the fupport of government, and that the fovereign ought not to demand more. It is true, that there is no regular check against him, when he transgreffes his duty in this particular: but there is an effectual check in the nature of every government that is not legally defpotic, viz. a general concert among all ranks, to vindicate their liberty against a course of violence and oppreffion; and multiplied acts of that kind have more than once brought about such a concert. As every member of the body-politic is under protection of the government, every one of them, as obferved above, ought to pay for being protected; and yet this pro pofition has been controverted by an author of fome note (a); who maintains, (a) L'ami des hommes. VOL. II. "That "That the food and raiment furnished to "the fociety by husbandmen and manu 66 66 66 facturers, are all that thefe good people are bound to contribute: and fuppofing "them bound to contribute more, it is not "till others have done as much for the public." At that rate, lawyers and phyficians ought alfo to be exempted from contributing; efpecially those who draw the greatest fums, because they are fuppofed to do the moft good. That argument, the fuggeftion of a benevolent heart, is no proof of an enlightened understanding. The labours of the farmer, of the lawyer, of the phyfician, contribute not a mite to the public fund, nor tend to defray the expence of government. The luxurious proprietor of a great eftate has a still better title to be exempted than the husbandman; becaufe he is a great benefactor to the public, by giving bread to a variety of industrious people. In a word, every man ought to contribute for being protected; and if a husbandman be protected in working for himself one-and-fifty weeks yearly, he ought thankfully to work one week more, for defraying the expence of that protection. SECT SECT. III. Different Sorts of Taxes, with their Advantages and Difadvantages. AL LL taxes are laid upon perfons; but in different respects: a tax laid on a man perfonally, for himself and family, is termed a capitation-tax; a tax laid on him for his property, is termed a tax on goods. The latter is the only rational tax, because it may be proportioned to the ability of the proprietor. It has only one inconvenience, that his debts must be overlooked; because to take thefe into the account, would lead to endless intricacies. But there is an obvious remedy for that inconvenience: let the man who complains free himself of debt, by felling land or moveables; which will fo far relieve him of the tax. Nor ought this meafure to be confidered as a hardship: it is feldom the intereft of a landholder to be in debt; 'and with refpect to the public, the measure Z z 2x not not only promotes the circulation of property, but is favourable to creditors, by procuring them payment. A capitationtax goes upon an erroneous principle, as if all men were of equal ability. What prompts it is, that many men, rich in bonds and other moveables that can eafily be hid from public inspection, cannot be reached otherwife than by a capitationtax. But as, by the very fuppofition, such men cannot be diflinguifhed from the mass. of the people, that mode of taxing, miferably unequal, is rarely practifed among enlightened nations. Ruffia labours under a capitation-tax. Some years ago, a capitation-tax was impofed in Denmark, obliging even day-labourers to pay for their wives and children. Upon the fame abfurd plan, a tax was impofed on marriage. One would be tempted to think, that population was intended to be discouraged, The Danish ministry have been fenfible of the impropriety of fuch taxes; for a tax imposed on those who obtain titles of honour from the crown, is applied for relieving husbandmen of their capitation-tax. But a tax of this kind lies open to many other objections. It cannot fail to raise the the price of labour, a poisonous effect in a country of induftry; for the labourer will relieve himself of the tax, by heightening his wages more prudent it would be to lay the tax directly on the employer, which would remove the pretext for heightening wages. The taxing of day-labourers, whether by capitation or in any other manner, has befide an effect contrary to what is intended: instead of increasing the public revenue, it virtually leffens it, by raising the pay of foldiers, failors, and of every workman employ'd by government, Taxes upon goods are of two kinds, viz. upon things confumable, and upon things not confumable. I begin with the latter. The land-tax in Britain, paid by the proprietor according to an invariable rule, and levied with very little expence, is of all taxes the most just, and the most effectual. The proprietor, knowing beforehand the fum he is fubjected to, prepares accordingly and as each proprietor contributes in proportion to his eftate, the tax makes no variation in their relative opulence. The only improvement it is fufceptible of, is the Athenian regulation, of exempting fmall eftates that are no more than fuffi cient |