that army an unfit match for any poor and warlike invader. Hard may seem the fate of nations, laid thus open to destruction from every quarter. All that can be faid is, that fuch viciffitudes feem to enter into the scheme of providence.

The ftability of land fits it, above all other fubjects, for a public patrimony. But as crown-lands lie open to the rapacity of favourites, it becomes neceffary, when these are diffipated, to introduce taxes; which have the following properties, that they unite in one common interest the sovereign and his fubjects, and that they can be augmented or diminished according to exigencies,

The art of levying money by taxes was fo little understood in the fixteenth century, that after the famous battle of Pavia, in which the French King was made prifoner, Charles V. was obliged to disband his victorious army, tho' confifting but of 24,000 men, becaufe he had not the art to levy, in his extenfive dominions, a fum neceffary to keep it on foot. So little knowledge was there in England of political arithmetic in the days of Edward III. that L. 1: 2: 4 on each parifh was com

puted

puted to be fufficient for raifing a fubfidy of L. 50,000. It being found, that there were but 8700 parishes, exclufive of Wales, the parliament, in order to raise the faid fubfidy, affeffed on each parish L. 5, 16s.

In impofing taxes, ought not the expence of living to be deducted, and to confider the remainder as the only taxable fubject? This mode was adopted in the state of Athens. A rent of 500 measures of corn, burdened the landlord with the yearly contribution of a talent: a rent of 300, burdened him with half a talent: a rent of 200, burdened him with the fixth part of a talent; and land under that rent paid no tax. Here the tax was not in proportion to the eftate, but to what could be spared out of it; or, in other words, in proportion to the ability of the proprieAt the fame time, ability must not be estimated by what a man actually faves, which would exempt the profuse and figate from paying taxes, but by what a man can pay who lives with economy according to his rank. This rule is founded on the very nature of government: to tax a man's food, or the fubject that affords him bare neceffaries, is worse than

tor.

pro

him.

the denying him protection: it starves Hence the following propofition may be laid down as the corner-ftone of taxation - building, That every man

tr

ought to contribute to the public re

venue, not in proportion to his fub"ftance, but to his ability." I am forry to obferve, that this rule is little regarded in British taxes; tho' nothing would contribute more to sweeten the minds of the people and to make them fond of their government, than a regulation fraught with fo much equity.

Taxes were long in use before it was discovered, that they could be made fubfervient to other purposes, beside that of fupporting government. In the fifteenth century, the states of Burgundy rejected with indignation a demand made by the Duke, of a duty on falt; tho' they found no other objection, but that it would opprefs the poor people, who lived mostly on falt meat and falt fifh. It did not occur to them, that fuch a tax might hurt their manufactures, by raifing the price of labour. A tax of two fhillings on every hearth, known by the name of hearthmoney, was granted to Charles II. his heirs Y Y

VOL. II.

and

and fucceffors, for ever. It was abrogated by an act of William and Mary, ann, 1688, on the following preamble, "That "it is not only a great oppreffion upon "the poorer fort, but a badge of flavery

upon the whole people, expofing every "man's houfe to be entered into and "fearched at pleasure, by perfons un"known to him." Had the harm done by fuch a tax to our manufactures been at that time understood, it would have been urged as the capital reafon against it. Our late improvements in commercial politics have unfolded an important doctrine, That taxes are feldom indifferent to the public good; that frequently they are more oppreffive to the people, than beneficial to the fovereign; and, on the other hand, that they may be fo contrived, as to rival bounties in promoting industry, manufactures, and commerce. Thefe different effects of taxes, have rendered the fubject not a little intricate,

It is an article of importance in government, to have it afcertained, what proportion of the annual income of a nation may be drawn from the people by taxes, without impoverishing them. An eighth part

J

is held to be too much: husbandry, commerce, and population, would fuffer. Davenant fays, that the Dutch pay to the public annually, the fourth part of the income of their country; and he adds, that their strict economy enables them to bear that immense load, without raising the price of labour fo high as to cut them out of the foreign market. It was probably fo in the days of Davenant; but of late, matters are much altered: the dearness of living and of labour, has excluded all the Dutch manufactures from the foreign market. Till the French war in King William's reign, England paid in taxes but about a twentieth part of its annual income.

THat

SECT. II.

Power of impofing Taxes.

Hat to impofe taxes belongs to the fo vereign, and to him only, is undoubted. But it has been doubted, whether even King and parliament, who pof