in action, it certainly prevails not in fentiment and affection: all men confpire to put a high estimation upon generofity, benevolence, and other focial virtues; while even the most felfish are difgufted with felfishness in others, and endeavour to hide it in themselves. The most zealous patron of the selfish principle will not venture to maintain, that it renders us altogether indifferent about our fellow-creatures. Laying afide felf-interest, with every connection of love and hatred, good fortune happening to any one is agreeable to all, and bad fortune happening to any one is difagreeable to all. On the other hand, the fyftem of univerfal benevolence, is no less contradictory to experience; from which we learn, that men commonly are difpofed to prefer their own interest before that of others, especially where there is no Arict connection: nor do we find that fuch bias is oppofed by the moral fenfe. Man in fact is a complex being, compofed of principles, fome benevolent, fome selfish: and these principles are fo justly blended in his nature, as to fit him for acting a proper part in fociety. It would indeed be lofing time to prove, that without fome affection for his fellow-creatures he would be ill qualified for fociety. And it will be made evident afterward (a), that univerfal benevolence would be more hurtful to fociety, than even abfolute selfishness *.

(a) Sea. 4.

• "Many moralifts enter fo deeply into one paffion or bias of human nature, "that, to ufe the painter's phrafe, they quite overcharge it. Thus I have feen a "whole fyftem of morals founded upon a single pillar of the inward frame; and "the entire conduct of life, and all the characters in it, accounted for, fometimes "from fuperftition, fometimes from pride, and most commonly from intereft. "They forget how various a creature it is they are painting; how many springs and weights, nicely adjusted and balanced, enter into the movement, and re"quire allowance to be made for their feveral clogs and impulfes, ere you can de"fine its operation and effects." Enquiry into the life and writings of Homer.

VOL. II.

K k

We

V

We are now prepared for investigating the laws that result from the foregoing principles. The feveral duties we owe to others fhall be firft difcuffed, taking them in order, according to the extent of their influence. And for the fake of perfpicuity, I fhall first prefent them in a general view, and then proceed to particulars. Of our duties to others, one there is fo extenfive, as to have for its object all the innocent part of mankind. It is the duty that prohibits us to hurt others: than which no law is more clearly dictated by the moral fenfe; nor is the tranfgreffion of any other law more deeply stamped with the character of wrong. A man may be hurt externally in his goods, in his perfon, in his relations, and in his reputation. Hence the laws, Do not steal; Defraud not others; Do not kill nor wound; Be not guilty of defamation. A man may be hurt internally, by an action that occafions to him distress of mind, or by being impreffed with false notions of men and things. Therefore confcience dictates, that we ought not to treat men difrepectfully; that we ought not causelessly to alienate their affections from others; and, in general, that we ought to forbear whatever may tend to break their peace of mind, or tend to unqualify them for being good men, and good citizens.

The duties mentioned are duties of restraint. Our active duties regard particular perfons; fuch as our relations, our friends, our benefactors, our mafters, our fervants. It is our duty to honour and obey our parents; and to establish our children in the world with all advantages internal and external: we ought to be faithful to our friends, grateful to our benefactors, fubmiffive to our masters, kind to our fervants, and to aid and comfort every one of these perfons when in diftrefs. To be obliged to do good to others beyond these bounds, muft depend on pofitive engagement; for, as will appear afterward, univerfal benevolence is not a duty.

This

This general sketch will prepare us for particulars. The duty of restraint comes firft in view, that which bars us from harming the innocent; and to it corresponds a right in the innocent to be fafe from harm. This is the great law preparatory to fociety; because without it, fociety could never have existed. Here the moral fenfe is inflexible: it dictates, that we ought to fubmit to any distress, even death itself, rather than procure our own fafety by laying violent hands upon an innocent perfon. And we are under the fame restraint with refpect to the property of another; for robbery and theft are never upon any pretext indulged. It is indeed true, that in extreme hunger I may lawfully take food where it can be found; and may freely lay hold of my neighbour's horfe, to carry me from an enemy who threatens death. But it is his duty as a fellow-creature to affist me in distress; and when there is no time for delay, I may lawfully use what he ought to offer were he prefent, and what I may prefume he would offer. For the fame reason, if in a storm my fhip be driven among the anchor-ropes of another fhip, I may lawfully cut the ropes in order to get free. But in every cafe of this kind, it would be a wrong in me to use my neighbour's property, without refolving to pay the value. If my neighbour be bound to aid me in diftrefs, confcience binds me to make up his loss *.

The

This doctrine is obviously founded on juftice; and yet, in the Roman law, there are two paffages which deny any recompence in fuch cases. "Item Labeo "fcribit, fi cum vi ventorum navis impulfa effet in funes anchorarum alterius, et nautæ funes præcidiffent; fi nullo alio modo, nifi præcifis funibus, explicare se potuit, nullam actionem dandam;" I. 29. § 3. ad leg. Aquil. "Quod dicitur. “damnum injuria datum Aquilia perfequi, fic erit accipiendum, ut videatur dam"num injuria datum quod cum damno injuriam attulerit; nifi magna vi cogente, "fuerit factum. Ut Celfus fcribit circa eum, qui incendii arcendi gratia vicinas "ædes intercidit: et five pervenit ignis, five ante extinctus eft, exiftimat legis AKk 2

"quiliæ

The prohibition of hurting others internally, is perhaps not ef fential to the formation of focieties, because the tranfgreffion of that law doth not much alarm plain people: but where manners and refined fentiments prevail, the mind is fufceptible of more grievous wounds than the body; and therefore, without that law, a polished fociety could have no long endurance,

By adultery, mischief is done both external and internal. Each fex is so constituted, as to require strict fidelity and attachment in a mate and the breach of thefe duties is the greatest external harm that can befal them: it harms them alfo internally, by breaking their peace of mind. It has indeed been urged, that no harm will enfue, if the adultery be kept fecret; and confequently, that there can be no crime where there is no difcovery. But fuch as reafon thus do not advert, that to declare fecret adultery to be lawful, is in effect to overturn every foundation of mutual trust and fidelity in the married ftate. It is clear beyond all doubt, fays a reputable writer, that no man is permitted to violate his

quiliae actionem ceffare." . 49. § 1. eod. [In English thus: " In the opinion "of Labeo, if a flip is driven by the violence of a tempeft among the anchorropes of another fhip, and the failors cut the ropes, having no other means of getting free, there is no action competent. The Aquilian law muft "be understood to apply only to fuch damage as carries the idea of an injury a"long with it, unlefs fuch injury has not been wilfully done, but from neceflity.

Thus Celfus puts the cafe of a perfon who, to ftop the progress of a fire, pulls "down his neighbour's houfe; and whether the fire had reached that houfe which " is pulled down, or was extinguifhed before it got to it, in neither cafe, he thinks, "will an action be competent from the Aquilian law."]-These opinions are undoubtedly erroneous. And it is not difficult to fay what has occafioned the erFor the cafes mentioned are treated as belonging to the lex Aquilia; which being confined to the reparation of wrongs, lays it justly down for a rule, That no action for reparation can lie, where there is no culpa. But had Labeo and Celfus adverted, that these cases belong to a different head, viz. the duty of recompenfe, where one fuffers lofs by benefiting another, they themselves would have had no difficulty of fuftaining a claim for making up that lofs. faith;

Sk. II. i. 3.

faith; and that the man is unjust and barbarous who deprives his wife of the only reward fhe has for adhering to the auftere duties of her fex. But an unfaithful wife is still more criminal, by diffolving the whole ties of nature: in giving to her husband children that are not his, fhe betrays both, and joins perfidy to infidelity (a).

:

A

Veracity is commonly ranked among the active duties; but erroneously for if a man be not bound to fpeak, he cannot be bound to speak truth. It is therefore only a restraining duty, prohibiting us to deceive others, by affirming what is not true. mong the many correfponding principles in the human mind that in conjunction tend to make fociety comfortable, a principle of veracity *, and a principle that leads us to rely on human testimony, are two: without the latter, the former would be an uselefs principle; and without the former, the latter would lay us open to fraud and treachery. The moral sense accordingly dictates, that we ought to adhere ftrictly to truth, without regard to confequences.

It must not be inferred, that we are bound to explain our thoughts, when truth is demanded from us by unlawful means. Words uttered voluntarily, are naturally relied on, as expreffing the speaker's mind; and if his mind differ from his words, he tells a lie, and is guilty of deceit. But words drawn from a man

(a) Emile, liv. 5.

Truth is always uppermoft, being the natural iffue of the mind: it requires no art nor training, no inducement nor temptation, but only that we yield to natural impulfe. Lying, on the contrary, is doing violence to our nature; and is never practifed, even by the worst of men, without fome temptation. Speaking truth is like using our natural food, which we would do from appetite altho' it anfwered no end: lying is like taking phyfic, which is naufeous to the tafte, and which no man takes but for fome end which he cannot otherwife attain. Dr Reid's Enquiry into the human mind.

by