in motion is continually changing place, is true: but change of place is not motion; it is the effect of motion. Gravefend (a) defines motion thus, "Motus eft tranflatio de loco in lo

cum, five continua loci mutatio*;" which is the fame with the former. Yet this very author admits locus or place to signify a fimple idea, incapable of a definition. Is it more fimple or more intelligible than motion? But, of all, the most remarkable definition of motion is that of Aristotle, famous for its impenetrability, or rather abfurdity, viz. "Actus entis in potentia, quatenus in "potentia †."

Extenfion enters into the conception of every particle of matter; because every particle of matter has length, breadth, and thickness. Figure in the fame manner enters into the conception of every particle of matter; because every particle of matter is bounded. By the power of abstraction, figure may be conceived independent of the body that is figured; and extenfion may be conceived independent of the body that is extended. These particulars are abundantly plain and obvious; and yet obferve what a heap of jargon is employ'd by the followers of Leibnitz, in their fruitless endeavours to define extenfion. In order to that end, they begin with fimple exiftences, which they fay are unextended, and without parts. According to that definition, fimple existences cannot belong to matter, because the smallest particle of matter has both parts and extenfion. But to let that pass, they endeavour to fhow as follows, how the idea of extenfion arifes from thefe fimple exiftences. "We may look upon fimple existences, as having mutual

(a) Elements of Phyfics, p. 28.

"Motion is, the removing from one place to another, or a continual change "of place."

+ "The action of a being in power, fo far as it is in power."

"relations

"relations with respect to their internal state; relations that form a "certain order in their manner of existence. And this order or arrangement of things, coexifting and linked together, but fo as we do not distinctly understand how, causes in us a confused idea, from whence arifes the appearance of extenfion." A Peripatetic philofopher being asked, What fort of things the fenfible fpecies of Aristotle are? anfwered, That they are neither entities nor nonentities, but fomething intermediate between the two. The famous aftronomer Ifmael Bulialdus lays down the following propofition, and attempts a mathematical demonftration of it, "That

light is a mean-proportional between corporeal substance and "incorporeal."

I clofe with a curious fort of reafoning, fo fingular indeed as not to come under any of the foregoing heads. The first editions of the latest version of the Bible into English have a preface, in which the translators make the following apology for not keeping close to the words of the original. "Another thing we think good

to admonish thee of, gentle reader, that we have not tied our"felves to an uniformity of phrasing, or to an identity of words, as fome peradventure would wish that we had done, because they obferve, that fome learned men fomewhere have been as "exact as they could be that way. Truly, that we might not 66 vary from the sense of that which we have tranflated before, if "the word fignified the fame in both places, (for there be fome "words that be not of the fame fenfe every where), we were e

specially careful, and made a confcience according to our duty. "But that we should exprefs the fame notion in the fame parti"cular word; as, for example, if we tranflate the Hebrew or "Greek word once by purpofe, never to call it int journeying, never travelling; if one where think, "if one where pain, never ache; if one where joy, "&c.; thus to mince the matter, we thought to favour more

X 2

if one where never fuppofe; never gladness,

" of

(6 of curiofity than wisdom, and that rather it would breed fcorn "in the Atheist, than bring profit to the godly reader. For is the

kingdom of God become words or fyllables? Why should we "be in bondage to them, if we may be free; use one precisely, "when we may use another, no lefs fit, as commodiously? We might also be charged by fcoffers, with fome unequal dealing "toward a great number of good English words. For as it is "written by a certain great philofopher, that he should say, that "thofe logs were happy that were made images to be worship"ped; for their fellows, as good as they, lay for blocks behind "the fire: fo if we fhould fay, as it were, unto certain words, "Stand up higher, have a place in the Bible always; and to o"thers of like quality, Get ye hence, be banished for ever, we "might be taxed peradventure with St James his words, name

ly, to be partial in ourselves, and judges of evil thoughts." Quæritur, Can this tranflation be fafely rely'd on, as the rule of faith, when fuch are the translators ?

A P

APPENDIX.

165

IN reviewing the foregoing sketch, it occurred, that a fair analyfis of Ariftotle's logics, would be a valuable addition to the historical branch. A diftinct and candid account of a fyftem that for many ages governed the reafoning part of mankind, cannot but be acceptable to the public. Curiofity will be gratified, in feeing a phantom delineated, that fo long fascinated the learned world; a phantom, which, like the pyramids of Egypt, or hanging gardens of Babylon, is a structure of infinite genius, but abfolutely useless, unless for raising wonder. Dr Reid, profeffor of moral philofophy in the college of Glasgow, relifhed the thought; and his friendship to me prevailed on him, after much folicitation, to undertake the laborious task. No man is better acquainted with Ariftotle's writings; and, without any enthusiastic attachment, he holds that philofopher to be a first-rate ge

nius.

The logics of Aristotle have been on the decline more than a century; and are at present relegated to schools and colleges. They have occafionally been criticifed by different writers; but this is the first attempt to draw them out of their obfcurity into day-light. By what follows, one will be enabled to pafs a true judgement on them, and to determine, whether they ought, or ought not, to make a branch of education. The Doctor's effay, as a capital article in the progrefs and history of the fciences, will, I hope, be made welcome, even with the fatigue of fqueezing through many thorny paths, before a proper view can be obtained of that ancient and ftupendous fabric.

It

It will at the fame time fhow the hurt that Ariftotle has done to the reafoning faculty, by drawing it out of its natural course into devious paths. His artificial mode of reasoning, is no lefs fuperficial than intricate. I fay, fuperficial; for in none of his logical works, is a fingle truth attempted to be proved by fyllogifm that requires a proof: the propofitions he undertakes to prove by fyllogifm, are all of them felf-evident. Take for inftance the following propofition, That man has a power of self-motion, To prove this, he affumes the following axiom, upon which indeed every one of his fyllogifms are founded, viz. That whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together, holds true of every one separately; which is thus expreffed in logical terms, Whatever is true of the genus, holds true of every fpecies. Founding upon that axiom, he reasons thus: "All animals have a power of felf-motion: man is an animal: ergo, man has a power "of of felf-motion." Now if all animals have a power of self-motion, it requires no argument to prove, that man, an animal, has that power and therefore, what he gives as a conclufion or confequence, is not really fo; it is not inferred from the fundamental propofition, but is included in it. At the fame time, the felf-motive power of man, is a fact that cannot be known but from experience. I add, that the felf-motive power of man, is more clearly afcertained by experience, than that of nimal: and in attempting to prove man to be a felf-motive animal, is it not abfurd, to found the argument on a propofition lefs certain than that undertaken to be demonftrated? What is here obferved, will be found applicable to the bulk, if not the whole, of his fyllogifms.

any

other a

It appears fingular, that Aristotle himself never attempts to apply his fyllogiftic mode of reafoning, to any fubject handled by him on ethics, on rhetoric, and on poetry, he argues like a rational being, without once putting in practice any of his own rules.

But