rarely attained, is, to exhaust the fubject divided; fo that nothing that belongs to it fhall be omitted. It is one of the general rules of divifion in all systems of logic, That the divifion fhould be adequate to the fubject divided: a good rule, without doubt; but very often beyond the reach of human power. To make a perfect divifion, a man must have a perfect comprehenfion of the whole fubject at one view. When our knowledge of the subject is imperfect, any divifion we can make of it, must be like the first fketch of a painter, to be extended, contracted, or mended, as the fubject fhall be found to require. Yet nothing is more common, not only among the ancient, but even among modern philofophers, than to draw, from their incomplete divifions, conclufions which fuppofe them to be perfect.

A division is a repository which the philofopher frames for holding his ware in convenient order. The philofopher maintains, that fuch or fuch a thing is not good ware, because there is no place in his ware-room that fits it. We are apt to yield to this argument in philosophy, but it would appear ridiculous in any other traffic.

Peter Ramus, who had the spirit of a reformer in philosophy, and who had a force of genius fufficient to fhake the Ariftotelian fabric in many parts, but infufficient to erect any thing more folid in its place, tried to remedy the imperfection of philofophical divifions, by introducing a new manner of dividing. His divifions always confifted of two members, one of which was contradictory of the other; as if one fhould divide England into Middlefex and what is not Middlefex. It is evident that these two members comprehend all England: for the logicians observe, that a term, along with its contradictory, comprehend all things. In the fame manner, we may divide what is not Middlefex into Kent and what is not Kent. Thus one may go on by divifions and fubdivifions that are abfolutely complete. This example may

ferve

ferve to give an idea of the spirit of Ramean divifions, which were in no fmall reputation about two hundred years ago.

Aristotle was not ignorant of this kind of divifion. But he ufed it only as a touchstone to prove by induction the perfection of fome other divifion, which indeed is the beft ufe that can be made of it; when applied to the common purpose of divifion, it is both inelegant, and burdenfome to the memory; and, after it has put one out of breath by endless fubdivifions, there is still a negative term left behind, which shows that you are no nearer the end of your journey than when you began.

Until fome more effectual remedy be found for the imperfection of divisions, I beg leave to propose one more fimple than that of Ramus. It is this: When you meet with a divifion of any fubject imperfectly comprehended, add to the last member an et cætera. That this et cetera makes the divifion complete, is undeniable; and therefore it ought to hold its place as a member, and to be always understood, whether expreffed or not, until clear and pofitive proof be brought, that the divifion is complete without it. And this fame et cætera fhall be the repofitory of all members that shall in any future time fhew a good and valid right to a property in the subject.

SECT. 3. On Diftinctions.

Having faid fo much of logical divifions, we shall next make fome remarks upon diftinctions.

Since the philofophy of Ariftotle fell into difrepute, it has been a common topic of wit and raillery, to enveigh against metaphyfical diftinctions. Indeed the abufe of them in the fcholaftic ages, feems to justify a general prejudice against them: and fhallow thinkers and writers have good reason to be jealous of dif

tinctions,

tinctions, because they make fad work when applied to their flimfy compofitions. But every man of true judgement, while he condemns diftinctions that have no foundation in the nature of things, must perceive, that indiscriminately to decry distinctions, is, to renounce all pretenfions to just reafoning: for as false reafoning commonly proceeds from confounding things that are different, fo without distinguishing fuch things, it is impoffible to avoid error, or detect fophiftry. The authority of Aquinas, or Suarez, or even of Ariftotle, can neither stamp a real value upon distinctions of base metal, nor ought it to hinder the currency of those that have intrinfic value.

Some distinctions are verbal, others are real. The firft kind distinguish the various meanings of a word; fome of which may be proper, others metaphorical. Diftinctions of this kind make a part of the grammar of a language, and are often abfurd when translated into another language. Real diftinctions are equally good in all languages, and fuffer no hurt by translation. They distinguish the different species contained under fome general notion, or the different parts contained in one whole.

Many of Aristotle's diftinctions are verbal merely; and therefore more proper materials for a dictionary of the Greek language than for a philofophical treatife. At least, they ought never to have been tranflated into other languages, when the idiom of the language will not juftify them: for this is to adulterate the language, to introduce foreign idioms into it without neceffity or ufe, and to make it ambiguous where it was not. The diftinctions in the end of the Categories of the four words prius, fimul, motus, and habere, are all verbal.

The modes or fpecies of prius, according to Aristotle, are five. One thing may be prior to another; firft, in point of time; fecondly, in point of dignity; thirdly, in point of order; and fo forth. The modes of fimul are only three. It seems this word was

not

not used in the Greek with fo great latitude as the other, although they are relative terms.

The modes or fpecies of motion he makes to be fix, to wit, generation, corruption, increase, decrease, alteration, and change of place.

The modes or fpecies of having are eight. 1. Having a quality or habit, as having wisdom. 2. Having quantity or magnitude. 3. Having things adjacent, as having a fword. 4. Having things as parts, as having hands or feet. 5. Having in a part or on a part, as having a ring on one's finger. 6. Containing, as a cask is said to have wine. 7. Poffeffing, as having lands or houses. 8. Having a wife.

Another diftinction of this kind is Ariftotle's diftinction of caufes; of which he makes four kinds, efficient, material, formal, and final. Thefe diftinctions may deferve a place in a dictionary of the Greek language; but in English or Latin they adulterate the language. Yet fo fond were the schoolmen of diftinctions of this kind, that they added to Ariftotle's enumeration, an impulfive cause, an exemplary cause, and I don't know how many more. We seem to have adopted into English a final cause; but it is merely a term of art, borrowed from the Peripatetic philosophy, without neceffity or use: for the English word end is as good as final caufe, though not so long nor fo learned.

SECT. 4. On Definitions.

it remains that we make fome remarks on Ariftotle's definitions, which have expofed him to much cenfure and ridicule. Yet I think it must be allowed, that in things which need definition, and admit of it, his definitions are commonly judicious and accuand had he attempted to define fuch things only, his eneA a

rate;

VOL. II,

mies

mies had wanted great matter of triumph. I believe it may likewife be faid in his favour, that until Locke's effay was wrote, there was nothing of importance delivered by philofophers with regard to definition, beyond what Ariftotle has faid upon that fubject.

He confiders a definition as a speech declaring what a thing is. Every thing effential to the thing defined, and nothing more, must be contained in the definition. Now the effence of a thing confifts of these two parts: First, What is common to it with other things of the fame kind; and, fecondly, What distinguishes it from other things of the fame kind. The firft is called the genus of the thing, the fecond its Specific difference. The definition therefore confists of these two parts. And for finding them, we must have recourse to the ten categories; in one or other of which eve

to

ry thing in nature is to be found. Each category is a genus, and is divided into fo many fpecies, which are diftinguished by their fpecific differences. Each of these fpecies is again fubdivided info many fpecies, with regard to which it is a genus. This division and fubdivifion continues until we come to the loweft fpecies, which can only be divided into individuals, distinguished from one another, not by any specific difference, but by accidental differences of time, place, and other circumstances. The category itself being the highest genus, is in no refpect a fpecies, and the lowest Species is in no respect a genus ; but every intermediate order is a genus compared with those that are below it, and a fpecies compared with those above it. To find the definition of any thing, therefore, you must take the genus which is immediately above its place in the category, and the specific difference, by which it is diftinguifhed from other fpecies of the fame genus. These two make a perfect definition. This I take to be the substance of Aristotle's fyftem; and probably the system of the Pythagorean school before Ariftotle, concerning definition.

But