Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict EscalationCambridge University Press, 2008 M01 10 International conflict is neither random nor inexplicable. It is highly structured by antagonisms between a relatively small set of states that regard each other as rivals. Examining the 173 strategic rivalries in operation throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this book identifies the differences rivalries make in the probability of conflict escalation and analyzes how they interact with serial crises, arms races, alliances and capability advantages. The authors distinguish between rivalries concerning territorial disagreement (space) and rivalries concerning status and influence (position) and show how each leads to markedly different patterns of conflict escalation. They argue that rivals are more likely to engage in international conflict with their antagonists than non-rival pairs of states and conclude with an assessment of whether we can expect democratic peace, economic development and economic interdependence to constrain rivalry-induced conflict. |
Contenido
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Sección 2 | 39 |
Sección 3 | 41 |
Sección 4 | 43 |
Sección 5 | 45 |
Sección 6 | 47 |
Sección 7 | 49 |
Sección 8 | 73 |
Sección 9 | 101 |
Sección 10 | 132 |
Sección 11 | 161 |
Sección 12 | 189 |
Sección 13 | 219 |
Sección 14 | 240 |
Sección 15 | 275 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation Michael P. Colaresi,Karen Rasler,William R. Thompson Sin vista previa disponible - 2008 |
Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation Michael P. Colaresi,Karen Rasler,William R. Thompson Sin vista previa disponible - 2008 |
Términos y frases comunes
adversaries approach arms races autocracies capability ratios Change in probability Chapter clashes coefficients confidence intervals conflict escalation contested territory contiguity Correlates of War crisis behavior data set de-escalation decision-makers democracy Diehl and Goertz dispute-density dyadic effect empirical enduring rivalries examine expected external alliances findings Fisher's exact test hazard ratios hostility hypotheses interaction interstate rivalry involved joiner Multilateral Korean less major power status major power subsystem militarized disputes militarized interstate disputes military build-ups nonrivalry nonrivals number of actors number of rivalries onset outcome political positional issues positional rivalries power dyads previous crises prob probability of escalation probit model problem propensities protracted conflict question recurrent regime type regional relative rivalry context rivalry identifications rivalry initiation rivalry relationships RIVALRY TYPE sequence serial crisis significant spatial and positional spatial rivalries strategic rivalries Table territorial contests territorial disputes territorial issues threat types of rivalries variables Vasquez violence wars
Pasajes populares
Página 142 - All three are perceptions held by the highest-level decision makers of the state actor concerned: a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.
Página 240 - Mesalim, king of Kish, at the command of Ishtaran, measured the field and placed a stele. Ush, ruler of Umma, acted arrogantly. He ripped out the stele and marched unto the plain of Lagash. Ningirsu, the hero of Enlil, at the latter's command did battle with Umma. Upon EnliPs command he cast the great battlenet upon it.
Página 243 - But this sequence is based on the widespread view that rivalry should be defined in terms of the density of militarized disputes (see, for instance, Huth, 1996a, 2000; Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Tir and Diehl, 2002). If one accepts that assumption, this particular pattern is redundant because it suggests the following: contested territory -> militarized disputes -> war. This assumption also sacrifices the explanatory power of interstate rivalry in discriminating among territorial issues that may escalate...
Página 102 - They are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high— the conflicts involve whole societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity. While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination.
Página 108 - Each new day does not bring a new beginning; severe restrictions are placed on us by the expectations — including our own expectations about ourselves — that constitute the context within which we must behave. When clear points of choice occur, they are often structured by the settings in which they arise. The timing of decisions and events is important and at least partially beyond a decision maker's control. For example, the production schedule for new nuclear submarines has periodically presented...
Página 250 - By focusing on wars alone, scholars may make the mistake of relying on a biased sample that neglects to include cases in which disputes failed to result in war escalation. One solution to this problem is to estimate a unified model or the joint likelihood of dyads becoming involved in a dispute and the escalation of the dispute to war via a censored probit model (Reed, 2000: 87).
Página 245 - We maintain that the custom of conceptualizing rivalry as sets of densely timed militarized disputes has led to the expectation that rivalry is an outcome of heightened conflict relations. In other words, one starts with a disagreement of some sort, the disputants clash repeatedly, and then their actions escalate to a series of militarized disputes and rivalry which may or may not escalate further to war.