for fociety; and we have seen (a), that univerfal benevolence, were it a duty, would contribute to the general good perhaps lefs than abfolute selfishness. Man is too limited in capacity and in power for univerfal benevolence. Even the greatest monarch has not power to exercise his benevolence, but within a very narrow fphere; and if fo, how unfit would fuch a duty be for private perfons, who have very little power? Serving only to diftress them by inability of performance, they would endeavour to fmother it altogether, and give full fcope to selfishness. Man is much better qualified for doing good, by a conftitution in which benevolence is duly blended with felf-love. nevolence as a duty, takes place of selflove; a regulation essential to fociety: benevolence as a virtue, not a duty, gives place to felf-love; because as every man has more power, knowledge, and opportunity, to promote his own good than that of others, a greater quantity of good is produced, than if benevolence were our only principle of action. This holds, even fuppofing no harm done to any per(a) Sect. 4.

Be

fon:

fon: much more would it hold, were we permitted to hurt fome, in order to produce more good to others.

The foregoing final caufes refpect morality in general. We now proceed to particulars; and the first and most important is the law of restraint. Man is evidently framed for fociety: and as there can be no fociety among creatures who prey upon each other, it was neceffary to provide against mutual injuries; which is effectually done by this law. Its neceffity with refpect to perfonal fecurity is self-evident; and with refpect to property, its neceffity will appear from what follows. In the nature of every man there is a propenfity to hoard or store up things useful to himself and family. But this natural propenfity would be rendered ineffectual, were he not secured in the poffeffion of what he thus ftores up; for no man will toil to accumulate what he cannot fecurely poffefs. This fecurity is afforded by the moral fenfe, which dictates, that the first occupant of goods provided by nature for the fubfiftence of man, ought to be protected in the poffeffion, and that fuch goods ought to be inviolably his proL 2 perty.

perty. Thus, by the great law of restraint, men have a protection for their goods, as well as for their perfons; and are no less secure in fociety, than if they were feparated from each other by impregnable walls.

Several other duties are little less effential than that of restraint, to the existence of fociety. Mutual trust and confidence, without which fociety would be an uncomfortable ftate, enter into the character of the human fpecies; to which the duties of veracity and fidelity correfpond. The final cause of these correfponding duties is obvious: the latter would be of no use in fociety without the former; and the former, without the latter, would be hurtful by laying men open to fraud and deceit.

With respect to veracity in particular, man is fo conftituted, that he must be indebted to information for the knowledge of moft things that benefit or hurt him; and if he could not depend upon information, fociety would be very little beneficial. Further, it is wifely ordered, that we should be bound by the moral fenfe to fpeak truth, even where we perceive no harm

harm in tranfgreffing that duty; because it is fufficient that harm may enfue, tho' not foreseen. At the fame time, falfehood always does mifchief: it may happen not to injure us externally in our reputation, or in our goods; but it never fails to injure us internally: the sweetest and most refined pleasure of fociety, is a candid intercourfe of fentiments, of opinions, of defires, and wifhes; and it would be poisonous to indulge any falfehood in fuch intercourse.

Because man is the weakest of all animals in a state of feparation, and the very strongest in fociety by mutual aid and fupport; covenants and promises, which greatly contribute to thefe, are made binding by the moral sense.

The final cause of the law of propriety, which enforces the duty we owe to ourfelves, comes next in order. In difcourfing upon thofe laws of nature which concern fociety, there is no occafion to mention any felf-duty but what relates to fociety; of which kind are prudence, temperance, induftry, firmness of mind. And that fuch qualities fhould be made our duty, is wifely ordered in a double respect;

refpect; first, as qualifying us to act a proper part in fociety; and next, as intitling us to good-will from others. It is the intereft, no doubt, of every man, to fuit his behaviour to the dignity of his nature, and to the station allotted him by Providence; for fuch rational conduct contributes to happiness, by preserving health, procuring plenty, gaining the efteem of others, and, which of all is the greatest bleffing, by gaining a juflyfounded felf-esteem. But here interest folely is not relied on: the powerful authority of duty is added, that in a matter of the utmost importance to ourselves, and of fome importance to the fociety we live in, our conduct may be regular and fteady. These duties tend not only to render a man happy in himself; but also, by procuring the good-will and esteem of others, to command their aid and affiftance in time of need.

I proceed to the final caufes of natural rewards and punishments. It is laid down above, that controverfies about property and about other matters of intereft, must be adjusted by the standard of right and wrong. But to bring rewards and punifhments under the fame ftandard, with

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