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wrong. But for what fort of actions does he hold himself accountable? Not furely for an instinctive action, which is done blindly, without intention and without will neither for an involuntary action, because it is extorted from him against his will and least of all, for actions done without consciousness. What only remain are voluntary actions, which are done wittingly and willingly for these we must account, if at all accountable; and for these every man in confcience holds himself bound to account.

More particularly upon voluntary actions. To intend and to will, tho' commonly held fynonymous, fignify different acts of the mind. Intention respects the effect: Will respects the action that is exerted for producing the effect. It is my Intention, for example, to relieve my friend from diftrefs: upon feeing him, it is my Will to give him a fum for his relief: the external act of giving follows; and my friend is relieved, which is the effect intended. But thefe internal acts are always united: I cannot will the means, without intending the effect; and

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Some effects of voluntary action follow neceffarily: A wound is an effect that neceffarily follows the stabbing a person with a dagger death is a neceffary effect of throwing one down from the battlements of a high tower. Some effects are probable only: I labour in order to provide for my family; fight for my country to rescue it from oppreffors; take phyfic for my health. In fuch cafes, the event intended does not neceffarily nor always follow.

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A man, when he wills to act, must intend the neceffary effect: a perfon who ftabs, certainly intends to wound. But where the effect is probable only, one may act without intending the effect that follows a stone thrown by me at random into the market-place, may happen to wound a man without my intending it. One acts by instinct, without either will or intention voluntary actions that ne

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* To incline, to refolve, to intend, to will, are acts of the mind relative to external action. These feveral acts are well understood; tho' they cannot be defined, being perfectly fimple.

2

ceffarily

ceffarily produce their effect, imply intention voluntary actions, when the effect is probable only, are fometimes intended, fometimes not.

Human actions are diftinguished from each other by certain qualities, termed right and wrong. But as these make the corner-ftone of morality, they are referved to the following fection.

SECT. II.

Divifion of Human Actions into Right, Wrong, and Indifferent.

THE qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are univerfally acknowledged as the foundation of morality; and yet philofophers have been strangely perplexed about them. The history of their various opinions, would fignify little but to darken the fubject: the reader will have more fatisfaction in feeing these qualities explained, without entering at all into controversy.

VOL. IV.

B

No

No perfon is ignorant of primary and fecondary qualities, a distinction much infifted on by philofophers. Primary qualities, fuch as figure, cohefion, weight, are permanent qualities, that exift in a fubject whether perceived or not. Secondary qualities, fuch as colour, taste, fmell, depend on the percipient as much as on the fubject, being nothing when not perceived. Beauty and uglinefs are qualities of the latter fort: they have no existence but when perceived; and, like all other fecondary qualities, they are perceived intuitively; having no dependence on reafon nor on judgement, more than colour has, or smell, or tafte (a). guiɔts

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The qualities of right and wrong in yoluntary actions, are fecondary, like beauty and uglinefs and the other fecondary qualities mentioned. Like them, they are objects of intuitive perception, and depend not in any degree on reafon. No argument is requifite to prove, that to rescue an innocent babe from the jaws of a wolf, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, are right actions: they are perceived to be fo intuitively. As little is an argument

(a) Elements of Criticifin, vol. 1. p. 207, edit. 5.

requifite

requifite to prove, that murder, deceit, perjury, are wrong actions: they are perceived to be fo intuitively. The Deity has bestow'd on man, different faculties for different purposes. Truth and falfehood are investigated by the reasoning faculty. Beauty and uglinefs are objects of a sense, known by the name of tafte. Right and wrong are objects of a sense termed the moral fenfe or confcience. And fuppofing these qualities to be hid from our perception, in vain would we try to discover them by any argument or procefs of reafoning the attempt would be abfurd; no lefs fo than an attempt to discover by reafoning colour, or tafte, or fmell*.

* Every perception must proceed from fome faculty or power of perception, termed fenfe. The moral fenfe, by which we perceive the qualities of right and wrong, may be confidered either as a branch of the fenfe of feeing, by which we perceive the actions to which thefe qualities belong, or as a fenfe distinct from all others. The fenfes by which objects are perceived, are not feparated from each other by diftinct boundaries: the forting or claffing them, feems to depend more on tafte and fancy, than on nature. I have followed the plan laid down by former writers; which is, to confider the moral fenfe as a fenfe distinct from others, because it is the eafieft and clearest manner of conceiving it.

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