No tranfgreffion of felf-duty escapes punishment, more than tranfgreffion of

cent; all in vain. Gilles being profecuted before the three eftates of the province for high treafon, was unanimoufly abfolved; which irritated the Duke more and more. Arthur of Montauban artfully fuggefted to his mafter to try poifon; which having mifcarried, they next refolved to ftarve the prifoner to death. The unfortunate prince, through the bars of a window, cried aloud for bread; but the paffengers durft not supply him. One poor woman only had courage more than once to flip fome bread within the window. He charged a priest, who had received his confeffion, to declare to the Duke, "That seeing justice was refufed him in this "world, he appealed to Heaven; and called upon "the Duke to appear before the judgement-feat of "God in forty days." The Duke and his favourite, amazed that the prince lived fo long without nourishment, employ'd affaffins to fmother him with his bed-cloaths. The priest, in obedience to the orders he had received, prefented himself before the Duke, and with a loud voice cited him in name of the deceased Lord Gilles to appear before God in forty days. Shame and remorfe verified the prediction. The Duke was seized with a fudden terror; and the image of his brother, expiring by his orders, haunted him day and night. He decay'd daily without any marks of a regular difeafe, and died within the forty days in frightful agony.

See this fubject further illuftrated in the Sketch Principles and Progress of Theology, chap. 1.

VOL. IV.

H

duty

duty to others. The punishments, tho' not the fame, differ in degree more than in kind. Injuftice is punished with remorfe impropriety with fhame, which is remorfe in a lower degree. Injustice raises indignation in the beholder, and so doth every flagrant impropriety: flighter improprieties receive a milder punishment, being rebuked with fome degree of contempt, and commonly with derifion (a). ·

So far we have been led in a beaten track; but in attempting to proceed, we are entangled in mazes and intricacies. An action well intended may happen to produce no good; and an action ill intended may happen to produce no mifchief: a man overawed by fear, may be led to do mischief against his will; and a perfon, mistaking the ftandard of right and wrong, may be innocently led to do acts of injustice. By what rule, in fuch cafes, are rewards and punishments to be apply'd? Ought a man to be rewarded when he does no good, or punished when he does no mischief: ought he to be punished for doing mischief against his will,

(a) See Elements of Criticifm, chap. 10.

or

or for doing mischief when he thinks he is acting innocently? Thefe questions fuggeft a doubt, whether the standard of right and wrong be applicable to rewards and punishments.

We have seen that there is an invariable ftandard of right and wrong, which depends not in any degree on private opinion or conviction. By that ftandard, all pecuniary claims are judged, all claims of property, and, in a word, every demand founded on intereft, not excepting reparation, as will afterward appear. But with respect to the moral characters of men, and with respect to rewards and punishments, a different ftandard is erected in the common sense of mankind, neither rigid nor inflexible; which is, the opinion that men have of their own actions. It is mentioned above, that a man is esteemed innocent in doing what he himself thinks right, and guilty in doing what he himfelf thinks wrong. In applying this standard to rewards and punishments, we reward those who in doing wrong are however convinced that they are innocent; and punish thofe who in doing right are however convinced that they are guilty.

H 2

guilty. Some, it is true, are fo perverted by improper education or by fuperftition, as to espouse numberless abfurd tenets, contradictory to the ftandard of right and wrong; and yet fuch men are no exception from the general rule: if they act according to confcience, they are innocent, and safe against punishment however wrong the action may be; and if they act against conscience, they are guilty and punishable however right the action may be it is abhorrent to every moral perception, that a guilty perfon be rewarded, or an innocent perfon punished, Further, if mifchief be done contrary to Will, as where a man is compelled by fear or by torture, to reveal the fecrets of his party; he may be grieved for yielding to the weakness of his nature, contrary to his firmeft refolves; but he has no check of confcience, and upon that account is not liable to punishment. And lastly, in order that perfonal merit and demerit may

* Virtuous and vicious, innocent and guilty, fignify qualities both of men and of their actions. Approbation and disapprobation, praise and blame, fignify certain emotions or fentiments of thofe who fee or contemplate men and their actions.

not

not in any measure depend on chance, we are fo conftituted as to place innocence and guilt, not on the event, but on the intention of doing right or wrong; and accordingly, whatever be the event, a man is praised for an action well intended, and condemned for an action ill intended.

But what if a man intending a certain wrong, happen by accident to do a wrong he did not intend; as, for example, intending to rob a warren by fhooting the rabbits, he accidentally wounds a child unfeen behind a bufh? The delinquent ought to be punished for intending to rob; and he is alfo fubjected to repair the hurt done to the child: but he cannot be punished for the accidental wound; because our nature regulates punishment by the intention, and not by the event *.

A

*During the infancy of nations, pecuniary compofitions for crimes were univerfal; and during that long period, very little weight was laid upon intention. This proceeded from the cloudinefs and obfcurity of moral perceptions among barbarians, making no diftinction between reparation and pecuniary punishment. Where a man does mifchief intentionally, or is verfans in illicito, as expreffed in the Roman law, he is juftly bound to repair all the harm