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lefs extenfive; but none fo extenfive as to have for their end the good of mankind in general. The most extenfive duty is that of restraint, prohibiting us to harm others but even that duty has a limited end; for its purpose is only to protect others from mifchief, not to do them any pofitive good. The active duties of doing pofitive good are circumfcribed within still narrower bounds, requiring fome relation that connects us with others; fuch as thofe of parent, child, friend, benefactor. The flighter relations, unlefs in peculiar circumstances, are not the foundation of any active duty neighbourhood, for example, does not alone make benevolence a duty: but fuppofing a neighbour to be in diftrefs, relief becomes our duty, if it can be done without diftrefs to ourselves. The duty of relieving from diftrefs, feldom goes farther; for tho' we always fympathife with our relations, and with thofe under our eye, the diftreffes of the remote and unknown affect us very little. Pactions and agreements become neceffary, if we would extend the duty of benevolence beyond the limits mentioned. Men, it is true, are capable of doing more good

than

than is required of them as a duty; but every fuch good must be a free-will offering.

And this leads to arbitrary or difcretionary actions, fuch as may be done or left undone; which make the fecond general head of moral actions. With refpect to thefe, the moral fenfe leaves us at freedom: a benevolent act is approved, but the omiffion is not condemned. This holds strictly in fingle acts; but in viewing the whole of a man's conduct, the moral fenfe appears to vary a little. As the nature of man is complex, partly focial, partly felfifh, we have an intuitive perception, that our conduct ought to be conformable to our nature; and that in advancing our own intereft, we ought not altogether to neglect that of others. The man accordingly who confines his whole time and thoughts within his own little fphere, is condemned by all the world as guilty of wrong conduct; and the man himself, if his moral perceptions be not blunted by felfishness, must be fenfible that he deferves to be condemned. On the other hand, it is poffible that free bebe extended beyond proper

nevolence may

F 2

bounds:

bounds where it prevails, it commonly leads to excefs, by prompting a man to facrifice a great intereft of his own to a fmall intereft of others; and the moral fenfe dictates, that fuch conduct is wrong. The juft temperament, is a fubordination of benevolence to felf-love.

Thus, moral actions are divided into two claffes: the first regards our duty, containing actions that ought to be done, and actions that ought not to be done; the other regards arbitrary or difcretionary actions, containing actions that are right when done, but not wrong when left undone. Society is indeed promoted by the latter; but it can fcarce fubfift, unless the former be made our duty. Hence it is, that actions only of the first class are made indifpenfable; thofe of the other clafs being left to our free-will. And hence also it is, that the various propenfities that difpofe us to actions of the first clafs, are diftinguished by the name of primary virtucs; leaving the name of fecondary virtues to thofe propenfities which difpofe us to actions of the other clafs *.

The

* Virtue fignifies that difpofition of mind which

The deduction above given makes it evident, that the general tendency of right actions is to promote the good of fociety, and of wrong actions, to obftruct that good. Univerfal benevolence is indeed not required of man; because to put it in practice, is beyond his utmost abilities. But for promoting the general good, every thing is required of him that he can accomplish; which will appear from reviewing the foregoing duties. The prohibition of harming others is an easy task; and upon that account is made univerfal. Our active duties are very different: man is circumfcribed both in capacity and power: he cannot do good but in a flow fucceffion; and therefore it is wifely ordered, that his obligation to do good fhould be confined to his relations, his friends, his benefactors. Even diftrefs makes not benevolence a general duty: all a man can readily do, is to relieve thofe at hand; and accordingly we hear of diftant misfortunes with little or no con

cern.

gives the afcendant to moral principles. Vice fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives little or no afcendant to moral principles.

But

But let not the moral fyftem be misapprehended, as if it were our duty, or even lawful, to profecute what upon the whole we reckon the most beneficial to fociety, balancing ill with good. The moral fenfe permits not a violation of any person's right, however trivial, whatever benefit may thereby accrue to another. A man for example in low circumftances, by denying a debt he owes to a rich mifer, faves himself and a hopeful family from ruin. In that cafe, the good effect far outweighs the ill, or rather has no counterbalance but the moral fense permits not the debtor to balance ill with good; nor gives countenance to an unjust act, whatever benefit it may produce. And hence a maxim in which all moralifts agree, That we must not do ill to bring about good; the final caufe of which shall be given below (a).

(a) Sect. 7.

SECT.

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