;

death itself, rather than procure our own fafety by laying violent hands upon an innocent perfon. And we are under the fame restraint with respect to the property of another; for robbery and theft are never upon any pretext indulged. It is indeed true, that in extreme hunger I may lawfully take food where it can be found and may freely lay hold of my neighbour's horfe, to carry me from an enemy who threatens death. But it is his duty as a fellow-creature to affift me in distress; and when there is no time for delay, I may lawfully ufe what he ought to offer were he prefent, and what I may prefume he would offer. For the fame reason, if in a storm my fhip be driven among the anchor-ropes of another fhip, I may lawfully cut the ropes in order to get free. But in every cafe of this kind, it would be a wrong in me to ufe my neighbour's property, without refolving to pay the value. If my neighbour be bound to aid me in diftrefs, confcience binds me to make up his lofs *

The

* This doctrine is obviously founded on justice; and yet, in the Roman law, there are two paffages

I

which

The prohibition of hurting others internally, is perhaps not effential to the formation of focieties, because the tranfgreffion of that law doth not much alarm plain people but where manners and refined fentiments prevail, the mind is fuf

ceptible

which deny any recompence in fuch cafes. "Item "Labeo fcribit, fi cum vi ventorum navis impulfa "effet in funes anchorarum alterius, et nautæ fu

nes præcidiffent; fi nullo alio modo, nifi præcifis "funibus, explicare fe potuit, nullam actionem "dandam ;" . 29. § 3. ad leg. Aquil. "Quod di"citur damnum injuria datum Aquilia perfequi, fic "erit accipiendum, ut videatur damnum injuria da"tum quod cum damno injuriam attulerit; nifi "magna vi cogente, fuerit factum. fuerit factum. Ut Celfus "fcribit circa eum, qui incendii arcendi gratia "vicinas ædes intercidit: et five pervenit ignis, "five antea extinctus eft, exiftimat legis Aqui"liæ actionem ceffare." l. 49. § 1. eod. [In Englib thus: "In the opinion of Labeo, if a fhip "is driven by the violence of a tempeft among the "anchor-ropes of another fhip, and the failors cut "the ropes, having no other means of getting free, "there is no action competent. The Aquilian "law must be understood to apply only to fuch da.

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mage as carries the idea of an injury along with "it, unless fuch injury has not been wilfully done, "but from neceffity. Thus Celfus puts the cafe of

a person who, to stop the progrefs of a fire, pulls "down his neighbour's houfe; and whether the VOL. IV.

E

" fire

ceptible of more grievous wounds than the body; and therefore, without that law, a polished fociety could have no long endu

rance.

By adultery, mischief is done both external and internal. Each fex is fo conftituted, as to require ftrict fidelity and attachment in a mate. The breach of thefe duties is the greateft external harm that can befal them: it harms them alfo internally, by breaking their peace of mind. It has indeed been urged, that no harm will enfue, if the adultery be kept fecret; and confequently, that there can be no crime where the fact is kept fecret.

"fire had reached that houfe which is pulled down,

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or was extinguished before it got to it, in neither cafe, he thinks, will an action be competent from "the Aquilian law."] Thefe opinions are undoubtedly erroneous. And it is not difficult to fay

what has occafioned the error: the cafes mentioned are treated as belonging to the lex Aquilia; which being confined to the reparation of wrongs, lays it justly down for a rule, That no action for reparation can lie, where there is no culpa. But had Labeo and Celfus adverted, that thefe cafes belong to a different head, viz. the duty of recompence, where one fuffers lofs by benefiting another, they themselves would have had no difficulty of fustaining a claim for making up that lofs.

But

But fuch as reafon thus do not advert, that to declare fecret adultery to be lawful, is in effect to overturn every foundation of mutual trust and fidelity in the matrimonial state. It is clear beyond all doubt, fays a reputable writer, that no man is permitted to violate his faith; and that the man is unjust and barbarous who deprives his wife of the only reward fhe has for adhering to the auftere duties of her fex. But an unfaithful wife is ftill more criminal, by diffolving the whole ties of nature: in giving to her husband children that are not his, fhe betrays both, and joins perfidy to infidelity (a).

Veracity is commonly ranked among the active duties; but erroneously: for if a man be not bound to speak, he cannot be bound to fpeak truth. It is therefore only a restraining duty, prohibiting us to deceive others, by affirming what is not true. Among the many correfponding principles in the human mind that in conjunction tend to make fociety comfortable, a principle of veracity, and a principle that leads us to

rely on human teftimony, are two: without the latter, the former would be an useless principle; and without the former, the latter would lay us open to fraud and treachery. The moral fenfe accordingly dictates, that we ought to adhere strictly to truth, without regard to confequences.

It must not be inferred, that we are bound to explain our thoughts, when truth is demanded from us by unlawful means. Words uttered voluntarily, are naturally relied on, as expreffing the speaker's mind; and if his mind differ from his words, he tells a lie, and is guilty of deceit. But words drawn from a man by torture, are no indication of his mind; and he is not guilty of deceit in uttering whatever words may be agreeable, how

iffue of the mind: it requires no art nor training, no inducement nor temptation, but only that we yield to natural impulfe. Lying, on the contrary, is doing violence to our nature; and is never practifed, even by the worst of men, without fome temptation. Speaking truth is like ufing our natural food, which we would do from appetite altho' it anfwered no end: lying is like taking phyfic, which is naufeous to the tafte, and which no man takes but for fome end which he cannot otherwife attain. Dr Reid's Enquiry into the human mind.