pinions of men about right and wrong, to be as various, as about beauty and deformity. And that the fuppofition is not destitute of foundation, we are led to fufpect, upon difcovering that in different countries, and even in the fame country at different times, the opinions publicly espoused with regard to right and wrong, are extremely various; that among fome nations it was held lawful for a man to fell his children for flaves, and in their infancy to abandon them to wild beafts ; that it was held equally lawful to punish children, even capitally, for the crime of their parent; that the murdering an enemy in cold blood, was once a common practice; that human facrifices, impious no lefs than immoral according to our notions, were of old univerfal; that even in later times, it has been held meritorious, to inflict cruel torments for the slightest deviations from the religious creed of the plurality; and that among the most enlightened nations, there are at this day confiderable differences with respect to the rules of morality. These facts tend not to difprove the reality of a common fenfe in morals: they VOL. IV. C only only prove, that the moral fenfe has not been equally perfect at all times, nor in all countries. This branch of the history of morality, is referved for the fecond part. To give fome interim fatisfaction, I fhall fhortly obferve, that the favage state is the infancy of man; during which, the more delicate fenfes lie dormant, leaving nations to the authority of cuftom, of imitation, and of paffion, without any just taste of morals more than of the fine arts. But a nation, like an individual, ripens gradually, and acquires a refined taste in morals as well as in the fine arts: after which we find great uniformity of opinion about the rules of right and wrong; with few exceptions, but what may proceed from imbecillity, or corruptcd education. There may be found, it is true, even in the most enlightened ages, men who have fingular notions in morality, and in many other fubjects; which no more affords an argument against a common fenfe or ftandard of right and wrong, than a monfter doth against the ftandard that regulates our external form, or than an exception doth against the truth of a general propofition. That That there is in mankind an uniformity of opinion with refpect to right and wrong, is a matter of fact of which the only infallible evidence is obfervation and experience and to that evidence I appeal; entering only a caveat, that, for the reason above given, the enquiry be confined to enlightened nations. In the mean time, I take liberty to fuggeft an argument from analogy, That if there be great uniformity among the different tribes of men in feeing and hearing, in pleasure and pain, in judging of truth and error, the fame uniformity ought to be expected with respect to right and wrong. Whatever minute differences there may be to diftinguish one perfon from another, yet in the general principles that conftitute our nature, internal and external, there is wonderful uniformity. This uniformity of fentiment, which may be termed the common fenfe of mankind with respect to right and wrong, is effential to focial beings. Did the moral fentiments of men differ as much as their faces, they would be unfit for fociety: difcord and controverfy would be endlefs, and major C 2 major vis would be the only rule of right and wrong. But fuch uniformity of fentiment, tho' general, is not altogether univerfal: men there are, as above mentioned, who differ from the common sense of mankind with respect to various points of morality. What ought to be the conduct of fuch men? ought they to regulate their conduct by that standard, or by their private conviction? There will be occafion afterward to obferve, that we judge of others as we believe they judge of themselves; and that private conviction is the standard for rewards and punishments (a). But with respect to every controversy about property and pecuniary intereft, and, in general, about every civil right and obligation, the common fenfe of mankind is to every individual the standard, and not private conviction or confcience; for proof of which take what follows, We have an innate fenfe of a common nature, not only in our own fpecies, but in every species of animals. And that our perception holds true in fact, is verified by experience; for there appears a re(a) Sect. 5. markable markable uniformity in creatures of the fame kind, and a difformity, no lefs remarkable, in creatures of different kinds. It is accordingly a fubject of wonder, to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the fpecies, whether in its internal or external structure: a child born with averfion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, no lefs than if born without a mouth, or with more than one. Secondly, This fenfe dictates, that the common nature of man in particular, is invariable as well as univerfal; that it will be the fame hereafter as it is at prefent, and as it was in time paft; the fame among all nations, and in all corners of the earth nor are we deceived; because, allowing for flight differences occafioned by culture and other accidental circumstances, the fact correfponds to our perception. Thirdly, We perceive that this common nature is right and perfect, and that it ought to be a model or standard for every human being. Any remarkable deviation from it in the structure of an individual, appears imperfect or irregular; and raises a painful emotion: a monftrous birth, exciting curiofity in a philosopher, fails not at |