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I begin with the principles of morality, fuch as ought to govern at all times, and in all nations. The present sketch accordingly is divided into two parts. In the first, the principles are unfolded; and the fecond is altogether historical.

PART I.

Principles of Morality.

SECT. I.

Human Actions analysed.

HE hand of God is no where more

TH

visible, than in the nice adjustment of our internal frame to our fituation in this world. An animal is endued with a power of felf-motion; and in performing animal functions, requires no external aid. This in particular is the cafe of man, the noblest of terreftrial beings. His heart beats, his blood circulates, his ftomach digefts, evacuations proceed, &c. &c. By

what

what means? Not furely by the laws of mechanism, which are far from being adequate to fuch operations. They are effects of an internal power, bestow'd on man for preserving life. The power is exerted uniformly, and without interruption, independent of will, and without confcioufnefs.

Man is a being fufceptible of pleasure and pain: these generate defire to attain what is agreeable, and to fhun what is difagreeable; and he is enabled by other powers to gratify his defires. One power, termed inftinct, is exerted indeed with confcioufnefs; but without will, and blindly without intention to produce any effect. Brute animals act for the most part by instinct: hunger prompts them to eat, and cold to take fhelter; knowingly indeed, but without exerting any act of will, and without forefight of what will happen. Infants of the human fpecies, little fuperior to brutes, are, like brutes, governed by instinct: they lay hold of the nipple, without knowing that fucking will fatisfy their hunger; and they weep when pained, without any view of relief. Another power is governed by intention and will:

A 2

will in the progress from infancy to maturity, the mind opens to objects without end of defire and of averfion; the attaining or fhunning of which depend more or lefs on our own will: we are placed in a wide world, left to our own conduct; and we are by nature provided with a proper power for performing what we intend and will. The actions performed by means of this power are termed voluntary. Some effects require a train of actions; walking, reading, finging. Where these actions are uniform, as in walking, or nearly fo, as in playing on a musical instrument, an act of will is only neceffary at the com→ mencement: the train proceeds by habit without any new act of will. The body is antecedently adjusted to the uniform progrefs; and is disturbed if any thing unexpected happen; in walking, for example, a man feels a fhock if he happen to tread on ground higher or lower than his body was prepared for. The power thus acquired by habit of acting without will, is an illuftrious branch of our nature; for upon it depend all the arts, both the fine and the ufeful. To play on the violin, requires wonderful fwiftness of

fingers,

fingers, every motion of which in a learner is preceded by an act of will: and yet by habit folely, an artist moves his fingers with no lefs accuracy than celerity. Let the most handy perfon try for the first time to knit a stocking: every motion of the needle demands the ftricteft attention 3 and yet a girl of nine or ten will move the needle fo fwiftly as almoft to escape the eye, without once looking on her work.

If every motion in the arts required a new act of will, they would remain in infancy for ever; and what would man be in that cafe? In the foregoing inftances, we are confcious of the external operation without being conscious of a caufe. But there are various internal operations of which we have no confcioufnefs; and yet that they have existed is made known by their effects. Often have I gone to bed with a confused notion of what I was ftudying; and have wakened in the morning completely mafter of the fubject. I have heard a new tune of which I carried away but an imperfect conception. A week or perhaps a fortnight after, the tune has occurred to me in perfection; recollecting with difficulty where I heard it. Such

things have happened to me frequently, and probably alfo to others. My mind must have been active in these instances, tho' I knew nothing of it.

There still remain another species of actions, termed involuntary; as where we act by fome irresistible motive against our will. An action may be voluntary, tho' done with reluctance; as where a man, to free himself from torture, reveals the fecrets of his friend: his confeffion is voluntary, tho' drawn from him with great reluctance. But let us fuppofe, that after the firmest resolution to reveal nothing, his mind is unhinged by exquifite torture: the discovery he makes is in the ftrictest fenfe involuntary: he fpeaks indeed; but he is compelled to it abfolutely against his

will.

Man is by his nature an accountable being, anfwerable for his conduct to God and man. In doing any action that wears a double face, he is prompted by his nature to explain the fame to his relations, his friends, his acquaintance; and above all, to those who have authority over him. He hopes for praise for every right action, and dreads blame for every one that is

wrong.

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