Right and wrong, as mentioned above, are qualities of voluntary actions, and of no other kind. An inftinctive action may be agreeable, may be difagreeable; but it cannot properly be denominated either right or wrong. An involuntary act is hurtful to the agent, and difagreeable to the fpectator; but it is neither right nor wrong. Thefe qualities alfo depend in no degree, on the event. Thus, if to fave my friend from drowning I plunge into a river, the action is right, tho' I happen to come too late. And if I aim a stroke at a man behind his back, the action is wrong, tho' I happen not to touch him. The qualities of right and of agreeable, are infeparable; and fo are the qualities of wrong and of difagreeable. A right action is agreeable, not only in the direct perception, but equally fo in every fubfequent recollection. And in both circumftances equally, a wrong action is difagreeable. Right actions are distinguished by the moral fenfe into two kinds, what ought to be done, and what may be done, or left undone. Wrong actions admit not that distinction: they are all prohibited to be done. done. To say that an action ought to be done, means that we are tied or obliged to perform; and to fay that an action ought not to be done, means that we are reftrained from doing it. Tho' the neceffity implied in the being tied or obliged, is not phyfical, but only what is commonly termed moral; yet we conceive ourfelves deprived of liberty or freedom, and neceffarily bound to act or to forbear acting, in oppofition to every other motive. The neceffity here' defcribed is termed duty. The moral neceffity we are under to forbear harming the innocent, is a proper example: the moral fenfe declares the restraint to be our duty, which no motive whatever will excufe us for tranfgreffing. The duty of performing or forbearing any action, implies a right in fome perfon to exact performance of that duty; and accordingly, a duty or obligation neceffarily infers a correfponding right. My promise to pay L. 100 to John, confers a right on him to demand performance. The man who commits an injury, violates the right of the perfon injured; which entitles that perfon to demand reparation of the wrong. Duty Duty is twofold; duty to others, and duty to ourselves. With refpect to the former, the doing what, we ought to do, is termed juft the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed unjust. With refpect to ourselves, the doing what we ought to do, is termed proper: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed improper. Thus, right, fignifying a quality of certain actions, is a genus; of which just and proper are species: wrong, fignifying a quality of other actions, is a genus; of which unjust and improper are fpecies. Right actions left to our free will, to be done or left undone, come next in order. They are, like the former, right when done; but they differ, in not being wrong when left undone. To remit a just debt for the fake of a growing family, to yield a fubject in controverfy rather than go to law with a neighbour, generously to return good for ill, are examples of this species. They are univerfally approved as right actions: but as no perfon has a right or title to oblige us to perform fuch actions, the leaving them undone is not a wrong: wrong: no person is injured by the forbearance. Actions that come under this clafs, fhall be termed arbitrary or difcre tionary, for want of a more proper defig So much for right actions, and their divifions. Wrong actions are of two kinds, criminal and culpable. What are done intentionally to produce mischief, are criminal rafh or unguarded actions that produce mifchief without intention, are culpable. The former are restrained by punishment, to be handled in the 5th fection; the latter by reparation, to be handled in the 6th, The divifions of voluntary actions are not yet exhausted. Some there are that, properly speaking, cannot be denominated either right or wrong. Actions done merely for amufement or paftime, without intention to produce good or ill, are of that kind; leaping, for example, running, jumping over a ftick, throwing a stone to make circles in the water. Such actions' are neither approved nor difapproved: they may be termed indifferent. There is no caufe for doubting the exiftence of the moral fenfe, more than for doubting doubting the exiftence of the fenfe of beauty, of feeing, or of hearing. In fact, the perception of right and wrong as qualities of actions, is no lefs diftinct and clear, than that of beauty, of colour, or of any other quality; and as every perception is an act of fenfe, the fenfe of beauty is not with greater certainty evinced from the perception of beauty, than the moral fenfe is from the perception of right and wrong. We find this fenfe diftributed among individuals in different degrees of perfection: but there perhaps never exifted any one above the condition of an idiot, who poffeffed it not in fome degree; and were any man entirely destitute of it, the terms right and wrong would be to him no lefs unintelligible, than the term colour is to one born blind. That every individual is endued with a fense of right and wrong, more or less diftinct, will probably be granted; but whether there be among men what may be termed a common fenfe of right and wrong, producing uniformity of opinion as to right and wrong, is not fo evident, There is no abfurdity in fuppofing the opinions I |