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tion. A man is tempted by avarice to accept a bribe: if he refift upon the principle of duty, he is led by the prevailing motive if he refift without having any reafon or motive for refifting, 1 cannot discover any merit in fuch resistance: it feems to refolve into a matter of chance or accident, whether he refift or do not refift. Where can the merit lie of refifting a vitious motive, when refistance happens by mere chance? and where the demerit of refifting a virtuous motive, when it is owing to the fame chance? If a man, actuated by no principle, good or bad, and having no end or purpose in view, fhould kill his neighbour, I fee not that he would be more accountable, than if he had acted in his fleep, or were mad.

Human punishments are perfectly confiftent with the neceffary influence of motives, without fuppofing a power to withftand them. If it be urged, That a man ought not to be punished for committing a crime when he could not refift: the anfwer is, That as he committed the crime intentionally and with his eyes open, he is guilty in his own opinion of all men.

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opinion, and in the Here is a juft foundation

dation for punishment. And its utility is great; being intended to deter people from committing crimes. The dread of punishment is a weight in the scale on the fide of virtue, to counterbalance vitious motives.

The final caufe of this branch of our nature is admirable. If the neceffary influence of motives had the effect either to leffen the merit of a virtuous action, or the demerit of a crime, morality would be totally unhinged. The most virtuous action would of all be the least worthy of praise; and the most vitious be of all the leaft worthy of blame. Nor would the evil stop there: instead of curbing inordinate paffions, we fhould be encouraged to indulge them, as an excellent excufe for doing wrong. Thus, the moral fentiments of approbation and disapprobation, of praise and blame, are found perfectly confistent with the laws above mentioned that govern human actions, without neceflity of recurring to an imaginary power of acting against motives.

The only plaufible objection I have met with against the foregoing theory, is the remorfe a man feels for a crime he fudVOL. IV. denly

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denly commits, and as fuddenly repents of. During a fit of bitter remorse for having flain my favourite fervant in a violent paffion, without just provocation, I accuse myself for having given way to paffion; and acknowledge that I could and: ought to have reftrained it. Here we find remorfe founded on a fyftem directly oppofite to that above laid down ; a system that acknowledges no neceffary connection between an action and its motive; but, on the contrary, fuppofes that it is in a man's power to refift his paffion, and that he ought to refift it. What fhall be faid upon this point? Can a man be a neceffary agent, when he is confcious of the contrary, and is fenfible that he can act in contradiction to motives? This objection is ftrong in appearance; and would be invincible, were we not happily relie-. ved of it by a doctrine laid down in Elements of Criticifin (a) concerning the irregular influence of paffion on our opinions and fentiments. Upon examination, it will be found, that the present cafe may be added to the many examples there given of that irregular influence.

(a) Chap. 2. part 5.

In a peevish fit, I take exception at some flight word or gefture of my friend, which I interpret as if he doubted of my veracity. I am inftantly in a flame in vain he protests that he had no meaning, for impatience will not fuffer me to liften. I bid him draw, which he does with reluctance; and before he is well prepared, I give him a mortal wound. Bitter remorse and anguifh fucceed inftantly to rage. "What have I done? I have murdered

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my innocent, my best friend; and yet "I was not mad-with that hand I did "the horrid deed; why did not I rather 66 turn it against my own heart?" Here every impreffion of neceffity vanishes my mind informs me that I was abfolutely free, and that I ought to have fmothered my paffion. I put an oppofite cafe. A brutal fellow treats me with great indignity, and proceeds even to a blow. My paffion rises beyond the poffibility of restraint: I can fcarce forbear fo long as to bid him draw; and that moment I ftab him to the heart. I am forry for having been engaged with a ruffian; but have no contrition nor remorfe. In this cafe, I never once dream that I could have refifted the impulfe of P 2 paffion:

paffion on the contrary, my thoughts and words are, "That flesh and blood

could not bear the affront; and that I "must have been branded for a coward, "had I not done what I did." In reality, both actions were equally necessary. Whence then opinions and fentiments fo oppofite to each other? The irregular influence of paffion on our opinions and sentiments, will folve the question. All violent paffions are prone to their own gratification. A man who has done an action that he repents of and that affects him with anguish, abhors himself, and is odious in his own eyes: he wishes to find himself guilty; and the thought that his guilt is beyond the poffibility of excufe, gratifies the paffion. In the first case accordingly, remorfe forces upon me a conviction that I might have restrained my paffion, and ought to have restrained it. I will not give way to any excufe ; because in a fevere fit of remorse, it gives me pain to be excufed. In the other cafe, as there is no remorfe, things appear in their true light without disguise. To illustrate this reafoning, I obferve, that paffion warps my judgement of the actions of o

thers,

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