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foundation can there be either for praise 66 or blame, when it was not in a man's

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power to have acted otherwise. A man "commits murder, inftigated by a fudden fit of revenge: why should he be punished, if he acted neceffarily, and could not resist the violence of the pas"fion ?" Here it is fuppofed, that a power of resistance is effential to praise and blame. But upon examination it will be found, that this fuppofition has not any fupport in the moral fenfe, nor in reason, nor in the common fenfe of mankind.

With respect to the first, the moral sense, as we have feen above, places innocence and guilt and confequently praise and blame, entirely upon will and intention. The connection between the motive and the action, fo far from diminishing, enhances the praife or blame. The greater influence a virtuous motive has, the greater is the virtue of the actor, and the more warm our praise. On the other hand, the greater influence a vitious motive has, the greater is the vice of the actor, and the more violently do we blame him. As this is the cardinal point, I wish to have it confidered in a general view.

It is effential both to human and divine government, that the influence of motives fhould be neceffary. It is equally effential, that that neceffary influence fhould not have the effect to leffen guilt in the eftimation of men. To fulfil both ends, guilt is placed by the moral fense entirely upon will and intention: a man accordingly blames himfelf for doing mischief willingly and intentionally, without once confidering whether he acted neceffarily or not. And his fentiments are adopted by all the world: they pronounce the fame sentence of condemnation that he himself does. A man put to the torture, yields to the pain, and with bitter reluctance reveals the fecrets of his party: another does the fame, yielding to a tempting bribe. The latter only is blamed as guilty of a crime; and yet the bribe perhaps operated as ftrongly on the latter, as torture did on the former. But the one was compelled against his will to reveal the fecrets of his party; and therefore is innocent: the other acted willingly, in order to procure a great fum of money; and therefore is guilty.

With refpect to reafon, I obferve, that

the

the moral fenfe is the only judge in this controverfy, not the faculty of reafon. I fhould however not be afraid of a fentence against me, were reason to be the judge. For would not reafon dictate, that the lefs a man wavers about his duty, or, in other words, the lefs influence vitious motives have, the more praife-worthy he is; and the more blameable, the lefs influence virtuous motives have.

Nor are we led by common fense to differ from reafon or from the moral fense. A man commits murder, overcome by a fudden fit of revenge which he could not refift: do we not reflect, even at first view, that the man did not will nor wifh to refift? on the contrary, that he would have committed the murder, tho' he had not been under any neceffity? A person of plain understanding will fay, What fignifies it whether the criminal could refift or not, when he committed the murder wittingly and willingly? A man gives poifon privately out of revenge. Does any one doubt of his guilt, when he never once repented; tho' after administering the poison it no longer was in his power to draw back? A man may be guilty

and

and blame-worthy, even where there is external compulfion that he cannot refift. With fword in hand I run to attack an enemy my foot flipping, I fall headlong upon him, and by that accident the sword is push'd into his body. The external act was not the effect of Will, but of accident but my intention was to commit murder, and I am guilty. All men acknowledge, that the Deity is neceffarily good. Does that circumftance detract from his praise in common apprehenfion? On the contrary, he merits from us the highest praise on that very account.

It is commonly faid, that there can be no virtue where there is no ftruggle. Virtue, it is true, is best known from a struggle: a man who has never met with a temptation, can be little confident of his virtue. But the observation taken in a ftrict fenfe, is undoubtedly erroneous. A man, tempted to betray his truft, wavers; but after much doubting refuses at last the bribe. Another hefitates not a moment, but rejects the bribe with disdain: duty is obftinate, and will not fuffer him even to deliberate. Is there no virtue in the lat

ter?

ter? Undoubtedly more than in the formèr.

Upon the whole, it appears that praise and blame rest ultimately upon the difpofition or frame of mind *. Nor is it obvious, that a power to act against motives,

could vary in any degree these moral fen

timents. When a man commits a crime, let it be fuppofed that he could have refifted the prevailing motive. Why then did he not refift, instead of bringing upon himself fhame and mifery? The anfwer must be, for no other can be given, that his difpofition is vitious, and that he is a deteftable creature. Further, it is not a little difficult to conceive, how a man can resist a prevailing motive, without having any thing in his mind that fhould engage him to refift it. But letting that pafs, I make the following fuppofi

*Malice and refentment, tho' commonly joined together, have no refemblance but in producing mifchief. Malice is a propensity of nature that o perates deliberately without paffion: refentment is a paffion to which even good-natured people are fubject. A malicious character is esteemed much more vitious than one that is irafcible. Does not this fhew, that virtue and vice confift more in dif pofition than in action?

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