募 a rational man wish seriously to have such a power? or can he seriously think, that God would make man fo whimsical a being? To endue man with a degree of felf-command fufficient to refift every vitious motive, without any power to refift those that are virtuous, would indeed be a valuable gift; too valuable indeed for man, because it would exalt him to be an angel. But fuch felf-command as to refift both equally, which is the present fuppofition, would be a great curse, as it would unqualify us for being governed either by God or by man. Better far to be led as rational creatures by the profpect of good, however erroneous our judgement may fometimes be. While all other animals are fubjected to divine government and unerringly fulfil their destination, and confidering that man is the only terreftrial being who is formed to know his Maker and to worfhip him; will it not found harfh that he alone fhould be withdrawn from divine government? The power of refifting the strongest motives, whether of religion or of morality, would render him independent of the Deity. This reasoning is too diffuse: if it can be comprehended in a fingle view, it will make the deeper impreffion. There may be conceived different systems for governing man as a thinking and rational being. One is, That virtuous motives should always prevail over every other motive. This, in appearance, would be the most perfect government: but man is not fo constituted; and there is reafon to doubt, whether fuch perfection would in his prefent ftate correfpond to the other branches of his nature (a). Another fystem is, That virtuous motives fometimes prevail, fometimes vitious; and that we are always determined by the prevailing motive. This is the true system of nature; and hence great variety of character and of conduct among men. A third fyftem is, That motives have influence; but that one can act in contradiction to every motive. This is the fyftem I have been combating. Observe only what it refolves into. How is an action to be accounted for that is done in contradiction to every motive? It wanders from the region of com (a) See book 2. sketch 1. at the end. mon mon fenfe into that of mere chance. If fuch were the nature of man, no one could rely on another: a promise or an oath would be a rope of fand: the utmost cordiality between two friends would be no fecurity to either against the other: the firft weapon that comes in the way might be lethal. Would any man with to have been formed according to fuch a model? He would probably wish to have been formed according to the model firft mentioned: but that is deny'd him, virtuous motives fometimes prevailing, fometimes vicious; and from the wifdom of Providence we have reafon to believe, that this law is of all the best fitted for man in his prefent ftate. To conclude this branch of the subject: In none of the works of Providence, as far as we can penetrate, is there difplay'd a deeper reach of art and wisdom, than in the laws of action peculiar to man as a thinking and rational being. Were he left loose to act in contradiction to motives, there would be no place for prudence, forefight, nor for adjusting means to an end: it could not be foreseen by others what a man would do the next hour; nay it could not be foreseen even by himfelf. Man would not be capable of rewards and punishments: he would not be fitted, either for divine or for human government: he would be a creature that has no resemblance to the human race. But man is not left loofe; for tho' he is at liberty to act according to his own will, yet his will is regulated by defire, and defire by what pleases and displeases. This connection preferves uniformity of conduct, and confines human actions within the great chain of caufes and effects. By this admirable fyftem, liberty and neceffity, feemingly incompatible, are made perfectly concordant, fitting us for fociety, and for government both human and divine. Having explained the laws that govern human actions; we proceed to what is chiefly intended in the prefent fection, which is, to examine how far the moral fentiments handled in the foregoing fections are confiftent with thefe laws. Let it be kept in view, that the perception of a right and a wrong in actions, is founded entirely upon the moral fenfe. And that upon the fame fenfe are founded the fenti VOL. IV. Q 1 ments ments of approbation and praise when a man does right, and of disapprobation and blame when he does wrong. Were we deftitute of the moral fenfe, right and wrong, praife and blame, would be as little understood as colours are by one born blind *. The formidable argument urged to prove that our moral fentiments are inconfiftent with the fuppofed neceffary influence of motives, is what follows. " If "motives have a neceffary influence on our actions, there can be no good rea"fon to praise a man for doing right, nor to blame him for doing wrong. What * In an intricate fubject like the prefent, great care fhould be taken to avoid ambiguities. The term praife has two different fignifications: in one fenfe it is opposed to blame; in another, to dif praife. In the former fenfe it expreffes a moral fentiment in the latter, it expreffes only the approving any object that pleafes me. I praife one man for his candour, and blame another for being a doubledealer. Thefe, both of them, imply will and intention. I praife a man for being acute; but for being dull, I only difpraife him. I praise a woman for beauty; but blame not any for uglinefs, I only difpraise them. None of thefe particulars imply will or intention. "foundation |