insurance;" and "that the said policy of insurance was so made by the said H. & J. Johnston & Co. as the agents for him the plaintiff and on his account, and for his the plaintiff's use and benefit, and that the said H. & J. Johnston & Co. did receive the order for and effect the said policy of insurance as such agents as aforesaid." It appears on the face of the declaration, therefore, that the policy was effected in the name of H. & J. Johnston & Co. as agents for the plaintiff, and, as alleged on the policy, as agents for the party interested: and the consideration is thus alleged :-"In consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendants, had then paid to the defendants a certain sum of money, to wit, the sum of 1577. 10s., as a premium or reward for the insurance of 30007. of and upon the premises in the said policy of insurance mentioned, and had then promised the defendants to perform and fulfil all things in the said policy of insurance contained on the part and behalf of the insured to be performed and fulfilled, the defendants then promised the plaintiff that they the defendants would become and be insurers to the plaintiff of the sum of 3000l. upon the said premises in the said policy of insurance mentioned, and would perform and fulfil all things in the said policy of insurance mentioned on their part and behalf as such insurers of the said sum of 3000l. to be performed, fulfilled, and observed." Under non assumpsit it would be incumbent on the plaintiff to produce the policy described in the declaration, and to prove that H. & J. Johnston & Co. made the assurance as his agents. Therefore, it seems to me that precisely the same evidence must be given under non assumpsit as would be requisite to sustain the second plea. And, when it is said that by the form of this traverse it would be necessary for the plaintiff to shew that H. & J. Johnston & Co. were his agents for that purpose at the very time of effecting the insurance, whereas, if it went to the jury upon non assumpsit only, a subsequent acknowledgment and ratification would suffice; I must say I am not prepared to admit any such distinction. If a subsequent ratification would be enough in

Sixth plea.

the one case, I do not see why it should not in the other.
On the part of the plaintiff was cited the case of Sutherland
v. Pratt (11 M. & W. 296), where a plea to a declaration in
assumpsit on a policy of insurance, that the policy was not
caused to be made by or on behalf of the plaintiff was
held bad on special demurrer, as amounting to non assumpsit.
I am unable to distinguish that case upon any solid and
substantial ground from the present. As far, therefore,
as the second plea is concerned, the demurrer must pre-
vail. By the sixth plea the defendants seek to set up as
an answer to the action, that the voyage in respect of which
the policy declared upon was made was an illegal voyage,
by reason of the non-compliance with the directions of the
statute 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 19. There can be no doubt but
that a policy effected on a ship upon the prosecution of an
illegal voyage is void, and cannot be enforced in a Court of
law. It would be singular, indeed, if the main contract
should be void and the collateral contract valid. It may,
therefore, be laid down as a general rule, that, where the
voyage itself is illegal, an assurance for the voyage is also
illegal. There are many cases where that has been held to
be undoubted law. Thus, in the time of the last war, poli-
cies effected on vessels sailing in contravention of the Convoy
Acts, 38 Geo. 3, c. 76, and 43 Geo. 3, c. 57, where held
void. So, where the voyage was in breach of the Naviga-
tion Act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 109, or of the acts regulating the
East India Company or the South Sea Company-acts
which had in view the general policy of the realm, and the
security and encouragement of navigation.
to me that the provisions of the statute 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 19,
were framed for a collateral purpose only: it was intended
to give to seamen in the merchant-service a readier mode
of ascertaining and enforcing their rights, and to prevent
them from having imposed upon them contracts into which
they had never in fact entered; and therefore it enacts, in
s. 1," that it shall not be lawful for any master of any ship
or vessel belonging to any subject of his Majesty of this

But it appears

United Kingdom trading to parts beyond the seas, or of any British registered ship of the burthen of eighty tons or upwards employed in any of the fisheries of the United Kingdom, or in trading coastwise or otherwise, to carry to sea on any voyage, either from this kingdom or from any other place, any seaman or other person as one of his crew or complement (apprentices excepted), without first entering into an agreement in writing with every such seaman, specifying what monthly or other wages each such seaman is to be paid, the capacity in which he is to act, and the nature of the voyage in which the ship is intended to be employed, so that the seaman may have some means of judging of the probable period for which he is likely to be engaged; and the said agreement shall contain the day of the month and year in which the same shall be made, and shall be signed by the master in the first instance, and by the seamen respectively at the port or place at which such seamen shall be respectively shipped: and the master shall cause the same to be, by or in the presence of the party who is to attest their respective signatures thereto, truly and distinctly read over to every such seaman before he shall be required to sign the same, in order that he may be enabled to understand the purport and meaning of the engagement he enters into and the terms to which he is bound." And then the act goes on, in section 4, to provide, that, if any master of any such ship as aforesaid shall carry out to sea any seaman (apprentices excepted) without having first entered into such agreement as is thereby required, he shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the sum of 10%. for or in respect of each and every such seaman he shall so carry out contrary to this act; and, if any master shall neglect to cause the agreement to be distinctly read over to each such seaman, as by this act he is enjoined, he shall for every such neglect forfeit and pay the sum of 5l.; and, if any master shall neglect to deposit with the collector or comptroller of the customs a copy of the agreement thereby required to be made and deposited as aforesaid [s. 3], or shall wilfully deposit a false copy of any

such agreement, he shall for every such neglect or offence forfeit and pay the sum of 50%." The non-compliance with these directions of the statute, though it may furnish good ground of action against the master, does not render the voyage illegal. It has been insisted that a non-compliance with the statute at all events amounts to unseaworthiness. The cases, however, that were cited all shew, that, to constitute this sort of unseaworthiness, it must appear that there was a crew insufficient in point of number, or a want of capacity or intelligence in the master or other officers. Here, there is nothing of the kind shewn. I therefore think the sixth plea is also bad; and consequently that upon both the demurrers there must be judgment for the plaintiff.

INDEX

TO THE

PRINCIPAL MATTERS.