whatsoever, for all purposes," must be taken to mean, for some purpose connected with the voyage (a). So also if a ship be insured upon a trading voyage, it is incumbent on the parties assured, to carry on that trade with usual and reasonable expedition, otherwise their conduct will amount to a deviation, and discharge the policy. Thus, in the case of Hartley v. Buggin (b), an action by the assured against an underwriter on a policy of insurance on the ship Blossom, at and from the coast of Africa to the West Indies, with liberty to exchange goods and slaves; a verdict was given for the plaintiff. But upon a rule being obtained to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, it appeared that there had been a great deal of contradictory evidence, and many points started at the trial; but the question now made was, whether the plaintiff, by the use he made of the vessel on the coast of Africa, and the delay he there occasioned, was not the cause of the loss; that is, whether he did not make such use of her during her stay on the coast, contrary to the design of the policy, as amounted to a deviation? It appeared in evidence, that this ship stayed on the coast from August to March; that she was employed in receiving slaves on board, the produce of the cargoes of other ships, which were afterwards put on board other ships, and sent to the West Indies; that this is the employment of what they call a factory ship; but that a regular factory ship is thatched and covered, and receives the slaves till a sufficient number is collected to send away in the vessels; but it did not appear that any slaves, the produce of the Blossom's own cargo, were sent away in other vessels, but that her stay there was several months beyond the usual stay of ships in that trade. After argument at the Bar, (a) See Langhorne v. Allnutt, 4 Taunt. 519. Rucker v. Allnutt, 15 East, 276. Solly v. Whitmore, 5 B. & A. 45. Bottomley v. Bovill, 5 B. & C. 210. Warre v. Miller, 4 B. & C. 538, ante, p. 179. (b) B. R. Mich. 22 Geo. 3. Park Ins. 652. See also Williams v. Shee, 3 Camp. 469. Hammond v. Reid, 4 B. & A. 72. If a ship be insured on a trading voyage, the assured must carry on that trade with usual and rea sonable expedition or it will deviation. amount to a A ship is detained on the coast of Africa Lord Mansfield said-" When different points are agitated at a trial, and a great deal of evidence applied to each, and the counsel go out of the cause, it is not to be wondered at, if juries should lose their attention to the material point. The great advantage of a motion for a new trial is, that after argument on the motion, the cause goes down again, winnowed from the chaff of the first trial. The single point here is, whether there has not been what is equivalent to a deviation, whether the risk has not been varied? It is not material whether or not the risk has been greater. If a ship insured for a trade, is turned into a floating warehouse, or a factory ship, the risk is different, it varies the stay; for while she is used as a warehouse, no cargo is brought for her. The law being clear, how is the fact? The captain says she was not used as a factory ship; his evidence is much impeached; but he says he was young in the trade; he never saw a factory ship but once, and was not in her; he might have a salvo, because this was not thatched; but was she used as a thatched ship is used? It is said that letters are not records; it is true they may be contradicted; but if they are from the parties, and are not contradicted, they are as strong as any records. The fact is clear, the risk is different in point of length, &c." Rule absolute for a new trial (a). So in the case of Parkinson v. Collier (b), which was an action on a policy from London to Port Endick, on the coast before she can of Africa, at six guineas per cent. on the ship till moored at land her goods, in the regular anchor twenty-four hours, and on goods till discharged and safely landed. The ship arrived on the coast on the 6th of licy on goods May, and was captured by the French on the 4th of June. "till discharged and safely The barter in the trade is carried on, on board the vessel, course of the trade, on a po landed" the risk continues if there be no unnecessary and the goods afterwards sent on shore, in boats, and the gums brought back. In this case, the discharge of the cargo delay amount had not begun, the gums not having been brought down to the coast, for which purpose it is necessary to have a previous ing to a deviation. (a) See Mount v. Larkins, 8 Bing. 108, ante, p. 177, and Freeman v. Taylor, 8 Bing. 124. (b) Sit. in B. R. after Mich. 1797. Park Ins. 653. Phillips v. King, ante, pp. 177, 226. agreement with the king of the country; but no delay had been used. The counsel for the defendant contended, that by the custom of this trade, the risk on the goods, as well as on the ship, expired in twenty-four hours, and that the risk on the cargo, while on the coast, was protected by homeward policy, at fifteen guineas per cent., Lord Kenyon refused the evidence, both of the homeward policy, and of this supposed usage (which he had on a former occasion admitted against his own opinion, and on which a new trial had been granted), to qualify the clear and unequivocal language of the policy, which covered the risk, till the goods were landed. That if, in landing, any unnecessary delay had been used, that might amount to something in the nature of a deviation, so as to discharge the insurer; but that did not appear to be the case in the present instance. But though an actual deviation from the voyage insured is thus fatal to the contract of insurance; yet a deviation merely intended, but never carried into effect, is considered as no deviation, and the insurer continues liable (a). This has been frequently so decided. Thus in the case of Tasker v. Wilmer (b), which was an insurance from Carolina to Lisbon, and at and from thence to Bristol: it appeared, that the captain had taken in salt, which he was to deliver at Falmouth before he went to Bristol; but the ship was taken in the direct road to both, and before she came to the point where she would have turned off to Falmouth. It was held, that the insurer was liable; for it is but an intention to deviate, and that was held not sufficient to discharge the underwriter. In the case of Carter v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Company (c), where the insurance was from Honduras to London, and a consignment to Amsterdam; a loss happened before she came to the dividing point between the two voyages, for which the insurers were held liable to pay. A deviation templated but merely connot carried into effect, is no deviation, and does not avoid the policy. Where there is merely an intention to de viate and a loss happens before the dividing point the underwriters are liable. From the proposition just established, namely, that a mere intention to deviate will not vacate the policy, it follows as an immediate consequence, that whatever damage is sustained before actual deviation, will fall upon the underwriters. Thus it was held by Lord Chief Justice Holt, in the case of Green v. Young (a), who said, that if a policy of insurance be made to begin from the departure of the ship from England, until, &c., and after the departure a damage happens, &c., and then the ship deviates; though the policy is discharged from the time of the deviation, yet for the damages sustained before the deviation, the insurers shall make satisfaction to the insured. So in the case of Hare v. Travis (b), upon an insurance "from Liverpool to London," it appeared at the trial that the captain had taken in goods for Southampton as well as London. Having loaded his vessel with goods partly for one place and partly for the other, Lord Tenterden held, that it ought to be inferred that he sailed on a voyage to both places, and that so long as the vessel continued in that course which was common to a voyage either to Southampton or London, she was sailing on the voyage insured; but as the policy did not contain a liberty to put into Southampton, the putting into that port was a deviation, and the underwriters were not responsible for any loss which accrued subsequently. But as it appeared, however, that the vessel had met with very bad weather in the early part of the voyage, he left it to the jury to say, whether before the vessel came to the dividing point the assured had sustained a loss by the perils of the sea. The jury found that they had, and the Court afterwards upon motion supported the verdict. (a) 2 Lord Raymond, 840; 2 Salk. 444, S. C. post. (b) 7 B. & C. 14. And see the case of Middlewood v. Blakes, 7 T. R. 162, and also Heselton v. Allnutt, 1 M. & S. 46, where the several cases immediately preceding on the distinction between deviations intended, but not carried into effect, and non-inception of the voyage insured, are much considered. SECTION VIII. THE SAID SHIP, ETC., GOODS, ETC., are valued at The head of this section is important, although what is necessary to be said upon it will, nevertheless, lie in a small compass. The assurers here say, "The said ship, &c., goods and merchandises, &c., for so much as it concerns the assured, by agreement between the assured and assurers in this policy, are and shall be valued at " When the blank space is filled up by the assured, the policy then becomes that which is designated as a "valued policy." If the blank be not filled up by the assured, the policy is then said to be open. The only difference between them consists in this, that in the former, the goods or property insured are valued at a certain price, viz., the prime cost of the property insured, or the value mentioned in the policy; in the latter, the value is not stated, but requires proof when necessary, and consists of the invoice, price, shipping charges, and premium of insurance. (a) Lord Mansfield, in the case of Lewis and another v. Rucker (b), puts the construction of the meaning of a valued policy upon very clear grounds. In answer to an objection to the rule adopted by the defendant, and by the jury in that case of the rule of apportionment of a partial loss, viz., "that of taking the proportion of the difference between sound and damaged at the port of delivery, and paying that proportion of the value of the goods specified in the policy. The defendant says the proportion of the difference is equally the rule whether the goods come to a rising or falling market. For (a) By the usage at Lloyd's, where liberty is given by the policy to "declare and value" after the policy is effected, and no declaration or valuation is indorsed on the policy, it is considered as an (b) 2 Burr. p. 1170. Lord Mansfield's explanation of a valued policy |