ten Day Subsistence at any one time in our Store, occasion'd by several Accidents, but principally the lowness of the Waters, Desertion of Battoe Men and Waggons (it being their time of Harvest) and, above all, by the insufficient

with eight Whale Boats, capable of holding 12 or sixteen men each, to be built.

His Excellency then acquainted the Council, that he propos'd, as soon as a Sufficient Quantity of Provisions should arrive, to proceed upon the intended Attempt for the Reduction of the French Fort and Settlements at Niagara, with such a Number of the Troops now upon the Spot, such of the aforesaid Vessells and Whale Boats, and such a Train of Artillery, as can be spar'd for that Service, leaving a sufficient Force for the Protection of this Fort against any Sudden Attack, which may probably be made upon it by the French from Fort Frontenac in his Absence.

That His Excellency proposes to take with him on the aforesaid Attempt 600 Regulars, including Gunners and Matrosses, besides the Albany Men and Indians, and a Train of Artillery, consisting of one Cannon carrying an eighteen pound Shott, and four twelve pounders, one ten inch Mortar, one seven inch Hoyett, two Royals, and five small Swivel Hoyets, with the four Vessells before mention'd, the Whale Boats, and a suitable number of Battoes; and that then the Force remaining for the Defence of this Place will be about 700 Effective men, two Cannon of twelve pounders, four nine pounders, ten six pounders, six three pounders, and eight Cohorns.

His Excellency then desir'd the Opinion and Advice of the Members of this Council on the following points, vizt.

First. Whether they were of Opinion that the Force propos'd for the intended Attempt against Niagara was a sufficient one, or what other they judg'd to be so?

Secondly. Whether they judge the Force propos'd to be left here, together with the New Fort building on the opposite point, to be sufficient for the Defence of this Place against any probable Attempt from Fort Frontenac, during His Excellency's Absence on the above Service?

Thirdly. Whether they think it will not be expedient to make a Feint at the same time at Cadaraqui, or a Real attempt to burn the French Vessells there?

Fourthly. Whether they think it necessary to build another Fort or Redoubt on the West Side of this Fort, on the Rising Ground, which commands it?

Fifthly. Whether it will be not advisable for his Majesty's Service, to prepare materials here this Winter, and build, as soon as

Number of them to be found in the Country for transporting the Baggage, Provisions, Artillery, and Ordnance Stores of the Forces employ'd in this Expedition, and that against Crown point, at the same time; so that I have been inevitably prevented from leaving this Place untill now, when, from the Prospect I have of a speedy Supply of dry Provisions, and the Works of the new Fort being so far advanc'd as to be ready in a few Days to receive it's Artillery and Garrison, I am in hopes, notwithstanding the lateness of the Season, of being able to proceed to Niagara with part of the Forces, and a Train of Artillery sufficient, according to our late Intelligence of the Strength of the French Fort there, for the Reduction of it; leaving a Body of Troops here strong enough for the Protection of this Place, and upon this Occasion I yesterday took the Opinion of a Council of War, Copy of the Minutes of which is inclos'd.

I am with the highest Respect,

Sir,

Your most Humble and

most Obedient Servant.

W. SHIRLEY.

Rt. Honble. Sir Thomas Robinson Knt: of the Bath, one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State.

Endorsed:

Camp at Oswego, Sepr. 19th, 1755.

Major Genl. Shirley.

R Decr. 18th.

may be, one or more Vessells of a larger Size than the largest of those already built, and capable of mounting ten six pounders, besides Swivels, and also two more Row Galleys, and 100 more good Whale Boats? (P. R. O., C. O. 5, 46.)

To the copy sent by him to Governor Morris of Pennsylvania (1 Penna. Arch. 2, 413), John Shirley adds:

"Everything herein propos'd was unanimously agreed to, except the feint at Cadaraqui, which was not agreed to."

WILLIAM SHIRLEY TO WILLIAM JOHNSON1

SIR,

Camp at Oswego, Sept. 19th, 1755.

Three days ago, I receiv'd a Letter from Mr. Stevenson, of Albany, inclosing a Copy of the General Letter, which you have sent to Lt. Govr. Phipps, and the governors of the other Colonies, which have rais'd Forces for the Expedition against Crown-point, giving an Account of two Actions, which happen'd on the 8th instant, between the Army under your command, and the French; in the first of which, a detachmt. of 1000 English, commanded by Col. Williams, and a party of 200 Indians of the Six Nations, were defeated, with a considerable loss on their side. In the second, the French, and their Indians attack'd the main body of your Army in their Camp at Lake George, and were repulsed with a more considerable one on theirs.2

Mr. Stevenson informs me, that upon finding I had no Letter directed to me among the packetts, which came from your Camp, and discovering the words upon the seal side of that directed to Governor Phipps, "Please to despatch a Copy of this Letter to General Shirley; my time and circumstances won't permit my writing to him immediately," he open'd it, and took a Copy of it, to be sent forthwith to me; and as the Events contain'd in it, so nearly concern His Majesty's service, under my immediate Command, as well as his other service upon this Continent, under my Direction, I can't avoid expressing my surprize at your omission to acquaint me with them directly from yourself; which,

1

1 Johnson Manuscripts, 2, 229; Mass. Arch., Col. Ser. 54, 136. Extract inclosed in Shirley to Robinson, Oct. 5, post, p. 309. Printed with certain errors and omissions: R. I. Col. Rec. 5, 455.

2 Two letters of Johnson to Phips, the first of Sept. 9-10, the second of Sept. 17, may be referred to here, although the first is more probably the one intended. Both are in the Johnson Manuscripts (23, 190 and 2, 225). The former is printed Doct. Hist. N. Y. 2, 691. The latter supplements and revises the first.

let your Hurry and Circumstances be what they would, you might at least have done by ordering your secretary or any clerk to transcribe a copy of your Letter to the Governours, to be sent me from Albany, instead of desiring Lieut. Governour Phipps to send me one from Boston.

What could be your Reason for postponing my being acquainted with these matters, which I ought to have known as soon as possible, to so distant a time, as my hearing from Mr. Phipps must have been, seems difficult

to say.

However that may be, my Duty to His Majesty requires me to take the first opportunity of transmitting you my sentiments upon the present State of the Service, which I have put under your immediate Direction.

Upon the statement of your letter to the several governours, sir, it appears to me that the late defeat of the French forces and their Indians in the engagement at your camp, hath given you a favorable opportunity of proceeding, as soon as the expected reinforcements from New England shall join you, to Ticonderoge; which post, since you have taken the route to Crown Point, that you have done, it is of the utmost consequence to the success of the expedition under your command, to make yourself master of as soon as possible.

By the account given in the copy of the minutes of your council of war, enclosed to me in your letter of the Ist instant, of the strength of your army a few days before the late actions, and in your letter to the governours, of the loss you have sustained in both engagements, the number of your remaining troops must, upon the arrival of your reinforcement from New England, exceed four thousand; and that of your Indians, be upwards of two hundred.

From the account given you by the French general, your prisoner, of the strength of his army, in the beginning of the first action, it consisted of two hundred grenadiers, eight hundred Canadians and seven hundred Indians, of different nations; and from the account given you by his aid-de-camp

of the loss of the French and the Indians, in both actions, and the pursuit which ensued, they lost in the whole one thousand men, and the major part of their chief officers, together with Monsieur St. Pierre,1 the officer who had the chief command and greatest influence over the Indians; so that according to their accounts, which seem most to be depended upon, the French had not above seven hundred men left of their whole army, which attacked your camp.

In these actions, Sir, you have experienc'd the good Behaviour of your Officers and Troops, who must be now flushed with their late Victory: The French on the other hand must be greatly disconcerted by the late Defeat of their Army and loss of their general, and so many of their principal officers; and the French Indians, in particular (which consists of different Nations), by the loss of Monsr. St. Pierre, who seems to have been a necessary Officer for keeping them together.

You had before acquainted me, in your Letter of the Ist instant, from your camp, at Lake George, that "some Indians, you sent out on the scout, told you, they had discovered a Party of French and Indians at Ticonderoge, but that no works were thrown up then; and that you was impatient to get a number of batteaux up, and put in order; when you proposed to proceed with a part of the troops, and endeavor to take post at Ticonderoge."

I hope, sir, if that is not yet done, that you still propose doing it, as soon as possible; the necessity of driving the enemy from that pass, still continues; the longer time is given them to fortify it, the more difficult it will be to dislodge them, and the more you will lose the advantage, which their defeat, and your own victory have given you to effect it.

You say in your letter to the governors, "Your men have suffered so much fatigue for three days past, and are con

1 Legardeur St. Pierre was, as Shirley states, a most potent influence with the Indians, and his death at this time seemed to afford Johnson a good opportunity of winning many of the French allies over to the English or to a position of neutrality.